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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis looks at the success of radical right parties in Western Europe through the 
perspective of welfare politics, by examining parties and voters in a comparative and mixed 
method perspective. I argue that purely socio-cultural or socio-economic accounts of the 
radical right success face several theoretical and empirical shortcomings. Focusing on the 
conflict dimension of welfare politics - who gets what, when and how in terms of social 
benefits – constitutes a novel approach to explain these parties’ and voters’ political 
preferences. Relying on different theories of the political sociology of the welfare state, I 
put forward the protection and exclusion hypotheses, which have implications at the party 
and at the voter levels. On the demand side, the precarization sub-hypothesis expects that 
economically insecure voters are likely to support radical right parties who offer them an 
alternative to mainstream parties. The scapegoating sub-hypothesis expect that voters who 
feel that core normative beliefs of the moral economy of the welfare state are being violated 
by individuals or outgroups should support the radical right because it fosters an exclusive 
conception of welfare politics. On the supply side, the programmatic shift sub-hypothesis 
expects that radical right parties turn their back on their initial ‘winning formula’ (which 
entailed retrenchment of welfare institutions) in order to adopt protective welfare 
preferences that match their constituents’ economic insecurity. The exclusive solidarity sub-
hypothesis expects that radical right parties frame their welfare preference in terms of group 
inclusion and exclusion. I find that economic insecurity and welfare specific attitudes 
(welfare populism, welfare chauvinism, welfare limitation and egalitarianism) underlie 
voters’ support for radical right parties. Conversely, some – but not all – West European 
radical right parties have adapted their welfare preferences towards protective welfare 
policies in order to match their constituents’ concerns. However, all radical right parties put 
forward an exclusive conception of solidarity. These findings contribute to a finer-grained 
understanding of the electoral of radical right parties in Western Europe, and also open a 
broader research agenda for the better inclusion of welfare politics in electoral studies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The emergence and success of the radical right has been studied like no other electoral 
phenomenon in Western Europe (to name a few comprehensive studies: Betz 1994, 
Kitschelt 1995, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007). However, the literature on the 
radical right in Western Europe has not exhausted research interests, and the academic 
debate is far from reaching a consensus. This introduction contextualizes the present 
doctoral thesis in the scholarly debates on the radical right’s success, and it presents its 
guiding approaches.  
Before reviewing existing studies and discussing the different theoretical arguments 
developed to explain this electoral success, the term of “radical right” needs a preliminary 
clarification, in order to define which parties and their voters are included in this category. 
Conceptualization is indeed the first controversy in the literature on the radical right; more 
precisely this discussion pertains to the label of this party family. While some scholars 
designate these parties as “radical populist right” (e.g. Mudde 2007), others describe them 
as “radical right” (e.g. Kitschelt 1995, Norris 2005) or “extreme right” (e.g. Ignazi 2003, 
Carter 2005). In a census of the different labels of these parties, Cas Mudde identified 26 
different approaches which included 58 different criteria (Mudde 1996). In a comparative 
perspective, the debate over the correct label, however, proves to be rather shallow: all 
these authors agree on the list of selected cases that compose this category of parties. In 
most Western European countries at least one party is identified as the “radical right” of 
the party system. That said, there is variation among the members of the radical right party 
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family: some established parties have transformed and came to be considered as radical 
right parties only in recent decades: for instance, the Scandinavian radical parties 
(“Progress Parties”), the Austrian FPÖ, or the Swiss SVP (Kitschelt 2007); other parties are 
longstanding examples of radical right movements (French Front National) while others 
are fairly new parties (Danish People’s Party, Dutch PVV). There is certainly ideological 
variance within this party family, but it is arguably not far more heterogeneous than any 
other party families traditionally studied by social scientists. To illustrate the variance 
within a party family, let’s consider the examples of the French Front National and the 
Finnish True Finns party. With regards to their historical origins, their policy positions, and 
their leaders, they are quite different. Yet, are they more different than other “pairs” of 
parties in their respective political systems? The respective pairs of conservative and 
governmental left parties in these two countries are most likely to be no less different. In 
my opinion, the debate on the labeling of the radical right is rather futile, because there is 
consensus that these parties form a party family. In addition, there is little conceptual 
variation among the different labels. Following Kitschelt (2007), who argues for a “broad 
and extensive concept” of the radical right, in the present study, I define radical right 
parties with two criteria: being nationalist (i.e. insisting on a “dominant national 
paradigm”, Kitschelt 2007) and xenophobic or exclusionist (Rydgren 2005). This study 
focuses on the electoral arena; therefore a number of other political groups that share both 
features are not included in this definition. Fascist, neo-Nazi, identitaires political groups 
are not considered to be radical right parties in this study on the count that they do not 
comply with the democratic electoral rules of Western democracies and often foster 
political violence. The present analysis is also limited to Western Europe, where such 
radical right parties have emerged within stable party systems. In addition to these criteria, 
all West European radical right parties share an additional common feature: the populist 
ideology (Mény and Surrel 2002, Kriesi and Pappas 2015). This ideology is based on the 
Manichean opposition between two sides: the people (virtuous by essence) and the elite 
(necessarily corrupt). These groups are considered to be homogenous; and the people is a 
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monolithic conception that is supposed to express the general will (Canovan 1999, Mény 
and Surrel 2002, Mudde 2004). However, relying on the populist ideology to characterize 
radical right parties is problematic, because the concept of populism itself is “slippery” 
(Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Interestingly the dispute of the term ‘populist’ extends beyond 
the academic discussion, some political parties or leaders claim to be populist (such as 
Front National president Marine le Pen, or Five Stars Movement leader Beppe Grillo), 
whereas others consider it a derogatory term and reject it (like Italian Silvio Berlusconi). 
Radical right parties are certainly populist, whether one considers a minimalist definition 
of populism (Mudde 2004, 2012) or a more extended one (Taggart 2002). But the populist 
ideology is far from being specific to the radical right; there are populist parties on the 
radical left (e.g. Podemos), on the mainstream right (e.g. Forza Italia), in some cases entire 
party systems are considered to be populist (e.g. Greece and Italy, Bobba and McDonnell 
2015, Pappas and Aslanidis 2015). Since populism is not a definitional feature per se, I 
chose not to include this label in the conceptualization of the parties under study here. 
However, defining these parties as exclusionist and nationalist covers the central 
characteristics of populism. Hence, the concept of populism is not discarded from the 
definition of radical right parties; but rather considered a dimension to study when 
working on the radical right (a section of the present chapter presents how the populist 
ideology explains the radical right’s success through the mobilization of protest voters). 
Taking into account these criteria – and their limitations – the present analysis will focus 
on nine Western European countries, and consider the parties that can be defined as 
nationalist and exclusionist or xenophobic, with substantial vote-shares over several 
elections. Note that because of discrepancies in data availability (or timeframe of the 
analysis), all parties are not systematically covered in every chapter. 
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Austria  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) 
Belgium Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (VB); Front National (FN) 
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti (DF) 
Finland Perussuomalaiset (TF) 
France Front National (FN) 
Netherlands  List Pim Fortuyn (LPF); Partej Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) 
Norway Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) 
Sweden Sverigedemokraterna (SD) 
Switzerland  Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) 
Table 1 - Western European Radical Right Parties under study 
 
Explaining Radical Right’s success 
The core debate on the radical right is not about what they are, since we know who they 
are, but how to explain their success. Two broad sets of explanations address this question 
on two levels of analysis: the supply (parties) and the demand (voters) sides of electoral 
politics. Although comprehensive analyses exist, most of the research focuses either on the 
demand-side (i.e. why do citizens vote for radical right parties) or the supply-side (i.e. how 
did radical right parties emerge and what are their political positions). The substantive 
explanations mobilized to explain the vote for radical right parties is usually divided into 
two categories that transpose (and sometimes oppose) the two main cleavages that shape 
political systems. Radical right support is generally explained because of the saliency of 
socio-cultural issues for these parties and their voters; yet some authors provide socio-
economic explanations of this electoral success. 
Studying the radical right’s electoral success is generally confined to a single approach - 
substantially, through either economic or cultural factors, but also practically through 
analysis of either parties or voters. In this study, I argue that the confinement of the radical 
right field needs to be overcome, and I take the standpoint of a comprehensive study. The 
question on whether it is more important to study the demand or the supply side of the 
radical right is an artificial one– similarly, the debate arguing for the absolute prevalence of 
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the economic or the cultural explanation bears unnecessarily restricting explanatory 
power.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. In the next section I 
provide an overview of the scholarly debate on the radical right in Western Europe. For the 
sake of clarity, I follow the lines of a comprehensive map of the subfield, ordered by 
economic, cultural, and mixed explanations of their success, on both the demand and the 
supply side (1.1. Figure 1). I will then expose how the present project intends to go beyond 
existing studies and their controversies. In particular, I will demonstrate the relevance of 
studying the radical right through the lens of welfare politics (or the sociology of the 
welfare state) and the need to go beyond purely economic or cultural explanations, and 
investigating both supply- and demand-sides (1.2.). Finally, I will discuss the why and how 
of this project: its purpose and its approach. More specifically, I will discuss how this 
research is grounded in political sociology; it follows a cleavage-based approach of parties 
and elections and adopts a resolutely multi-method perspective (1.3.). The final section 
give an outline of the chapter that compose this book (1.4.). 
 
1.1.  Explaining the radical right’s success: demand, supply and controversies 
 
Two major sets of explanations are generally offered to account for the radical right vote 
(Oesch 2008, Rydgren 2013). On the one hand, the cultural explanation posits that the 
radical right vote is mainly determined by diversity and immigration issues (Rydgren 
2008). On the other hand, economic factors are brought forward to account for the radical 
right vote: these parties appeal to group with specific economic concerns. These two sets of 
explanations mirror the two cleavage dimensions that structure the political space in 
advanced Western democracies (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). After broadly discussing the two 
dimensions of radical right success, I present two additional theories that go beyond 
strictly cultural or economic explanations. The concept of protest vote and populist success 
do not belong to the aforementioned set of explanations because they are not structured on 
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a political cleavage, but they are rather explained by perceptions and evaluations of the 
political system. These broad explanations of the radical right’s success form the three 
columns of the map of radical right studies, and the latter are labeled mixed explanations 
(Figure 1). In addition, this map accounts for two levels of analysis: the demand side 
(voters) and the supply side (parties). Factors explaining the radical right’s success on both 
levels are divided into subcategories, which constitute the different lines of the table. On 
the demand side, I distinguish between explanations that stem from the constituencies’ 
characteristics (‘voters’) and the individual beliefs of voters (‘attitudes’). On the supply 
side, I distinguish between the parties themselves (‘organization and ideology’), their 
impact on party systems and governments (‘institutions and office’) and their political 
output (‘policy impact’). 
 
The cultural logic of the radical right vote: a matter of immigration 
Radical right parties are believed to mobilize their voters mostly on the socio-cultural 
dimension – most importantly on immigration, but also on issues law and order and social 
conservatism and Euroscepticism (Rydgren 2005, 2007, Bornschier 2010).  
In line with the post-materialist thesis, socio-cultural issues, such as those that appeal to 
radical right voters have become more and more politically and electorally relevant 
(Inglehart 1997)1. Globalization has been assumed to intensify the cultural conflicts and 
therefore fuel the radical right’s electoral success (Mudde 2007, Kriesi et al. 2012). The 
predominant salience of the new cultural dimension  - on which the radical right is located 
at the nationalist/traditional end - at the expense of the more long-established state-
market conflict has been described as the key factor explaining the emergence and the 
success of this party family (Bornschier 2010). Arguably, the radical right parties were not 
only benefitting from structural change and the emergence of a new structuring cultural 
                                                        
1 Inglehart shows how post-materialist values such as religious beliefs, attitudes towards families, 
openness, have profoundly changed societies, and have come to be at the core of the political debate 
in Western countries.  
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cleavage, but they also “drove” the transformation of political conflict in the 1990’s (Kriesi 
et al 2008). The cultural cleavage has gained renewed salience, yet it has also been 
transformed by globalization. Since the 1980’s, the cultural cleavage that structures the 
political space cannot be reduced to the religious cleavage described by Rokkan; it centers 
on issues of cultural diversity. Ironically, and maybe contrary to the original purpose 
intended by its advocates, the opening of borders has increased the salience of the cultural 
(demarcation/integration) cleavage, making issues such as EU integration, immigration, or 
Islam increasingly salient and contested in the electoral arena.  
On the demand side of electoral politics, the salience of the cultural cleavage among the 
“losers of globalization” is considered to be the driving force behind the radical right’s 
electoral success. These arguments are found on the top left corner of the comprehensive 
map or radical right studies. This cultural cleavage centers on the issues of national culture 
(values, religion) and immigration, yet it is often reduced to anti-immigration attitudes. In 
fact, the major explanation of the radical right vote is that anti-immigration attitudes are an 
– the most? – important factor for predicting the radical right vote (Lubbers et al. 2002, 
Norris 2005). It is, however, notable that if almost all radical right voters are against 
immigration, not all the individuals who express such attitudes vote for these parties. The 
anti-immigration argument has come to be the – almost monocausal - theory explaining 
radical right support. It has become so dominant that studies shifted the paradigm to 
refining what anti-immigration sentiments are: immigration skepticism, xenophobia or 
racism? Rydgren argues that the first, i.e. “wanting to reduce immigration” is the strongest 
(Rydgren 2008).When looking at the sociological profile of radical right voters, anti-
immigration attitudes are not the sole explanation of radical right success. Indeed, radical 
right voters are found among groups of voters that are traditionally considered to be 
conservative on cultural issues (e.g. self-employed and small business owners) or even that 
display “authoritarian” features (for the working class: Lipset 1960, for all radical right 
voters: Koster and Van der Waal 2007). 
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On the supply side of electoral politics, immigration has been typically considered the 
central dimension of radical right parties’ ideology, and, that is, their anti-immigration 
preferences (lower left side of Figure 1). The literature on issue-ownership has provided a 
suitable framework to conceive the relevance of immigration for radical right parties 
(Budge and Farlie 1983, Petrocick 1996). Each party is assumed to have a specific policy 
domain, or issue area that it champions; parties thus invest in building a good reputation 
regarding handling this issue area. Parties identify with this issue, and they are considered 
to “own”” it (Van der Brug 2004). Indeed, radical right parties mobilize voters on the issues, 
which they own: immigration (Rydgren 2007, Mudde 2007). Although Mudde insists these 
parties put forward essentially sociocultural issues, and mainly immigration (“it is not the 
economy, stupid”2), he does not consider radical right parties to be “single-issue” parties 
(Mudde 1999). However, not being a single-issue party focused on immigration certainly 
does not contradict their ownership of this issue3. 
 
                                                        
2 This chapter’s title is a direct – and fairly rude - response to Herbet Kitschelt’s seminal work 
explaining the radical right’s success by a combination of economic and cultural positions (Kitschelt 
1995).  
3 Note that the criteria Mudde uses to disconfirm this hypothesis are very restrictive. He defines a 
single issue party as “(1) having an electorate with no particular social structure; (2) being 
supported predominantly on the basis on one single issue; (3) lacking an ideological programme; 
and (4) addressing only one all-encompassing issue” (Mudde 1999). According to this definition, 
radical right parties do not qualify as single-issue parties, as criteria 1 and 3 are surely lacking.   
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Radical right parties have so noticeably dominated the political debate over immigration 
and have made it such a salient issue, that part of the scholarly debate on radical right 
success has focused on their possible “contamination” of other parties. This means that 
other parties would adapt their preferences on this issue to compete with radical right 
parties (Mudde 2004, Bale et al. 2010, Rooduijn et al. 2014). Even further, authors argue 
that some countries’ policies on immigration have been influenced by the political pressure 
of progressing radical right parties (Minkenberg 2001, Afonso and Pappadopoulos 2015). 
 
The economic logic: the “new working class parties”?  
The anti-immigration explanation of the vote also finds a rationale on the economic 
dimension, on both the supply and the demand side; and thus can be found on the right 
column of the radical right map. The demand side explanation for the economic framing is 
also divided into two levels: individual attitudinal levels, and the aggregate profile of 
radical right voters.  
Focusing on the demand side, anti-immigration attitudes cannot be only explained by 
cultural factors (the social and cultural threats that migrants are perceived to represent); 
and a strand of literature has looked into the economic reasons for hostility towards 
migrants. This economic argument focuses on labor-market competition, and more 
precisely “sectoral exposure to immigrants”. In brief, the individuals who work in sectors 
which rely on immigrant work-force are more likely to be hostile to immigration, under the 
condition that they also express a negative perception of the general economy (Dancygier 
and Donnelly 2014). This argument relies on the assumptions that immigration would 
cause wages decreases and job losses. As a consequence, individuals whose jobs are more 
“offshorable” would be more likely to support the radical right (Dancygier and Walter 
2015). The clear class bias in the sociological profile of the radical right voter across 
Europe supports the indication of the importance of socioeconomic factors: the working 
class constitutes the core electorate of the radical right in Western Europe (Oesch 2008, 
Rydgren 2013). It is noteworthy that industrial sector jobs are considered among the most 
“offshorable”. The importance of the working class among this constituency is also steadily 
increasing. While Betz was writing about the “proletarization” of the radical right 
electorate in the 1990’s, he considers them to be “working class parties” twenty years later; 
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and he argues this transformation is made at the expense of parties on the Left (Betz 1994, 
Betz and Meret 2013). The working class’ overrepresentation in radical right 
constituencies is well documented and particularly relevant in the case of the French Front 
National (Mayer 2002), Flemish Vlaams Block (Swyngedouw 1998), Norwegian Progress 
Party (Bjorklund 2011), the Danish People’s Party (Meret 2010), and the Austrian FPÖ 
(Scheuregger and Spier 2007). Class and occupational status seem to structure the radical 
right electorate; however, there is a difference between ‘working class parties’ and being 
‘the party of the working class’. Indeed, some radical right parties claim to be the latter 
(Front National, Danish People’s Party). In most countries, the preferred voting choice of 
workers is not the radical right, but rather not voting. The radical right is not the party of 
the working class because it is simply not the most chosen electoral option among this 
group. The electorate of the radical right can, however, be composed by a large proportion 
of working class voters. Besides the working class, another occupational group is 
overrepresented in the radical right constituency; self-employed and independents.  The 
core of this segment of the electorate was to be found in the “small shops and the 
workshops” (Mayer and Perrineau 1992). Their support for the radical right has arguably 
sociological-economic roots. Self-employed and independents are not the worst-off 
individuals but those who suffered the biggest relative socio-economic decline in the post-
war era (Kriesi and Bornschier 2013). This déclassement, real or perceived, is also a key 
factor of the support of the middle-class to fascist movements in the 1930’s. In the Political 
Man, Lipset argues that these movements successfully mobilized voters by exploiting 
economic fears, and particularly the fear of downward social mobility (Lipset 1960)4. On an 
aggregate level, without distinguishing particular sociological types of voters, Kitschelt 
finds that overall, radical right voters tend to express more right-wing preferences when it 
comes to welfare and economic issues (Kitschelt and McGann 1995).  
                                                        
4 Although they are on the very right of the political spectrum, contemporary radical right parties 
are not directly comparable to the fascist and radical movements of the 1930’s because both their 
objectives and methods are very different. Here, it is not the parties themselves that are the object 
of the comparison; but rather the mechanism of support for fascism that Lipset (1960) provides, 
which is similar to the one put forward by Kriesi and Bornschier (2013).  
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On the supply side, radical right parties have used their ownership of the immigration 
issue, framing its consequences in terms of unemployment: according to this logic, 
immigrants would be taking the jobs of the natives for lower wages, as a consequence 
unemployment rates would decrease if immigration were to be restricted and reduced. 
Since the early days of the party, the French Front National has offered a good example of 
such framing, with its famous motto: “One million unemployed, its one million immigrants 
too many”5. This shows that although the cultural aspect of anti-immigration sentiments is 
strong and central to the radical right discourse, there is an economic aspect to it. Even 
though it is largely framed in a cultural manner, this suggests that hostility to immigration 
– allegedly the strongest predictor of radical right support - is not based on purely cultural 
grounds. Economic factors constitute a piece of the puzzle of the explanation of radical 
right parties’ success, and its importance cannot be completely discarded as some authors 
argue (Mudde 2007, Bornschier 2010).  
Considering socio-economic factors of support for the radical right is in line with earlier 
studies of contemporary radical right movements. Kitschelt’s renowned “winning formula” 
provided a starting point for this debate: he explained the success of radical right parties 
resulted from a combination of cultural and economic arguments: more precisely, they 
combined culturally authoritarian and exclusionist positions with liberal-market 
preferences on redistributive issues (Kitschelt 1995). This capital hypothesis has been 
contested on several grounds: some argued the economic dimension was not relevant 
(Mudde 2007), or that these parties held more centrist economic positions (Ivarsflaten 
2005), to the point that authors considered a “new winning formula” (De Lange 2007). De 
Lange argued that radical right parties held simultaneously culturally authoritarian 
positions with centrist economic positions - on a dimension that she calls “socialist-
capitalist”6. Challenges to the winning formula hypothesis have been identified by its 
author himself: Kitschelt later defined it as time-specific (i.e. restricted to the radical right 
                                                        
5 This statement is extracted from the 1978 manifesto (“Un million de chômeurs, c’est un million 
d’immigrés de trop. La France et les Français d’abord“.) The exact same poster/argument was 
updated for the 1993 legislative campaign, with 3 million instead of 1.  
6 This being true for some, but not all of the radical right parties, only the Front National and the 
Vlaams Belang in this study. 
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breakthroughs of the 1980s to the mid-1990s), and he argued that these parties may 
include liberal-market policies in their manifestos, which does not imply they are the 
parties that are the most market-liberal in the polity (Kitschelt 2004, 2007). 
Regarding party positions on economic issues, radical right parties have evolved from the 
formula of their earlier successes and have adapted to the interests of their (potential) 
voters: nowadays not only do they offer economic agendas, but they also adapt these 
agendas to the expected preferences of their voters. Indeed, radical right parties are not 
single-issue parties anymore (Rydgren 2007). Their stances on welfare politics are usually 
different from that of mainstream right-wing parties, and they are believed to partly adopt 
the working class’ support for redistribution (Koster et al. 2013).  
 
Neither cultural nor economic: the protest vote? The populist vote? 
Two alternative theories of radical right success are based on neither sociocultural nor 
socioeconomic grounds, but are disconnected from ideology (taken as a set of defined and 
coherent political – policy – preferences).  
The first approach is a demand side argument: voters express their general discontent with 
politics, governments and parties, and casting a vote for the radical right vote is considered 
to be a “protest vote”. This early conception refers to the demand side of central column of 
the radical right map (Figure 1). Some authors considered the radical right vote to be 
chiefly a “vote against” (Mayer and Perrineau 1992, Flecker 2007). In that sense, it is a form 
of retrospective voting, in which “the prime motive behind a protest vote is to show 
discontent with the political elite” (Van der Brug et al. 2000). The choice of voting for the 
radical right is not explained by the adhesion to an ideology or the congruence of positions 
between voters and parties, but rather as a protest against traditional parties (Poglia Mileti 
and Plomp 2007). The protest-vote theory has been mainly put forward during the early 
successes of radical right parties in the 1980’s and 1990’s, but it has been challenged in 
recent years - not least due to the high levels of ideological congruence between radical 
right parties and their supporters. More than protest, radical right parties and voters seem 
to share political preferences (Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio 2013). Indeed, the constant 
or increasing electoral support these parties enjoy points towards alternative explanations 
which go beyond the mere rejection of governing parties and political disenchantment. 
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At the party level, the protest-vote explanation echoes the populist ideology, which relies 
on an opposition that pits the people against the elite. Radical right parties tend to take an 
outsider position and denounce the mainstream ruling parties as a failed political elite, 
which does not represent the people as they claim they do. Radical right parties’ success 
would be explained because they manage to capture a widespread “populist Zeitgeist” 
(Mudde 2004). Indeed, the populist ideology is characteristic and perhaps constitutive of 
all West European radical right parties. Instead of a Zeitgeist, which is just a public opinion 
phenomena, the rise of populism can be conceived as a long-term trend, which is inherent 
to modern democracies. Populism is, on the one hand, the result and consequence of a 
“malfunctioning representative democracy” (Mair 2002) or, on the other hand, in a more 
theoretical perspective, the unavoidable product of the tension between the ideal of 
democracy and its “pragmatic face” (Canovan 1999). Mair’s conception is however a bit 
more optimistic, since a malfunctioning democracy can/could be cured or improved; 
whereas Canovan’s theory makes populism an intrinsic feature of modern democracy. This 
is in line with the “pathological normalcy hypothesis” which considers populism as a 
radical – and unavoidable - interpretation of democratic values. By combining the previous 
contextual and structural arguments, it views populism as a normal path for representative 
democracy (Mudde 2010). However this conception of populism can be criticized: it is 
static, it exists because democracy exists. The general argument goes: radical right parties 
are successful, because they thrive on the tension inherent to democracies by putting 
forward a populist ideology. But they could be challenged by other forms of populism on 
the left, or by movements that put forward a non-ideological form of populism. The 
populist ideology is not a particular characteristic of radical right parties because populism 
is an essentially “chameleonic” ideology – it cannot fully account for these parties’ success. 
A parallel account of populism considers it as a political strategy, wherein having a 
charismatic leader is key to success. Indeed most radical right populist parties are led by a 
charismatic leader (Kriesi and Pappas 2015, Canovan 2002). Providential leaders, such as 
Le Pen (father and daughters, FN), Haider (FPÖ), Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Blocher (SVP), 
Kjaersgaard (DF) explain part of the success of these parties; they appeal to voters because 
of their charisma and personality. It is worth noting that a substantial share of these 
leaders is women (Marine Le Pen for the FN, Pia Kjaersgaard for the DF, and Siv Jensen for 
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the FrP), which had been underestimated in earlier studies that expected radical right 
party leaders to be charismatic men.  
 
1.2.  Going beyond the classical divide: the relevance of welfare politics 
 
Two dimensions for sure? 
When studying the radical right’s electoral success, cultural and economic issues prove to 
be intensely interconnected, to the point that the two – supposedly distinct - dimensions 
are blurred. This blurring is observed at both levels of analysis: voters and parties. The 
voters themselves may have blurred preferences on these issues, and do not clearly 
distinguish between the two dimensions (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015). But this may well 
also be the case for the radical right parties themselves, they may “deliberately adopt 
blurred positions” to attract voters, but not siding too strongly on an end or the other of 
political dimensions on issues other than their anti-immigration agenda (Rovny 2013). The 
previous sections have shown the relevance of both cultural and economic determinants of 
the radical right success. But the economic and cultural dimensions of the radical right vote 
may prove to be more entangled than cleavage theory would expect. In other words, when 
studying the radical right vote, the orthogonality of the bi-dimensional cleavage structure is 
uncertain.  
Drifting apart from bi-dimensional cleavage politics, recent research has focused on the 
electoral relevance of welfare politics for the radical right’s success in Western Europe. 
Concretely, it has avoided framing the issue in terms of distinct conflict dimension- either 
economic or cultural. Indeed, welfare politics is neither strictly one nor the other. Broadly, 
it be can defined in a Laswellian way as “who gets what, when and how” in terms of social 
benefits7. In the present study, I circumscribe welfare politics to the preferences of voters 
and parties (whether they are general political values or more specific policy preferences), 
but a wider conception could include the study of policies and institutional dynamics. 
Traditionally, welfare politics has almost only been considered through a socio-economic 
                                                        
7 This is a reference to the political scientist Harold D. Laswell’s famous model of communication 
which analysis “Who (says) What (to) Whom (in) What Channel (with) What Effect”. 
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perspective, until Häusermann demonstrated the relevance of cultural value divides 
alongside socio-structural positions to study welfare politics. Explaining welfare state 
reform dynamics, the author shows how political struggles about the welfare state are 
“always both distributional conflicts and value conflicts” (Häusermann 2010).  
 
Introducing the role of welfare politics 
The debate over the influence of welfare politics on voting behavior stems from the 
controversy over the so-called ‘unnatural vote of the working class’ for right wing and 
radical right parties. This voting pattern has traditionally been considered a political 
anomaly or at least puzzling. Indeed, the working class has always been assumed to be 
more interventionist and supportive of welfare redistribution than other classes; and the 
parties of the left were assumed to defend its interests (see discussion on the power 
resource theory discussed in chapters 2 and 5, Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen 1990). 
However, this assumption does not hold empirically in contemporary electoral politics. The 
question of how do the less well-off manage to reconcile their economic attitudes with 
voting for the (radical) right emerges from the discrepancies between theoretical 
assumptions and the empirical reality. One answer may be that these voters tend to 
manifest an aversion to the welfare institutions themselves (and not the principles of 
welfare redistribution) and thus support right wing parties which are critical of the 
functioning of the welfare state (Houtman et al. 2008). Indeed, this negative perception of 
the welfare institutions is associated with egalitarian views and ideas of social justice – 
especially among the less educated individuals (Achterberg et al. 2011). 
Building on this puzzle, authors have shown that welfare preferences are a significant 
characteristic and determinant of the radical right vote (Derks 2006, Koster et al. 2013). 
Both these contributions also make the case that it is misguided to study the electoral 
relevance of welfare politics for the radical right in either economic or cultural terms. In 
their seminal contribution to that field, De Koster et al. have established a clear pattern in 
the relation between welfare attitudes and radical right voting8. They find that welfare 
                                                        
8 Looking at the relation between welfare politics and the radical right vote, a parallel interrogation 
emerges: what is the relation of such welfare politics in countries where no radical right party is 
electorally significant? Generally, this question opens a wider subfield of welfare politics as 
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attitudes such as welfare populism or welfare chauvinism are not only widespread among 
the radical right electorates; they also underlie support for these parties (Koster et al. 
2013). Welfare chauvinism has become a central focus of the studies of the radical right, 
and can be defined as a conception of the welfare state as a “social protection for those who 
belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it” (Kitschelt, 
1995: 22). It has since been extensively analyzed (to name a few, Mau and Burkhart 2009, 
Koning 2013), to the point of becoming a catch-all concept. In Kitschelt’s words, welfare 
chauvinism is “indeed not necessarily rooted in cultural patterns of xenophobia and racism, 
but in a ‘rational’ consideration for alternative options to preserve social club goods in 
efficient ways” (Kitschelt, 1995: 262).  
The emerging literature that investigates the relevance of welfare politics on the radical 
right vote is growing, but still faces several shortcomings. In conceptual terms, this debate 
is still muddled and needs clarification and a better systematization (Abts and Kochuyt 
2016); empirically it is often limited to case studies (Derks 2006, De Koster et al. 2013) or 
focused on a specific segment of voters such as the working class (Mau and Mewes 2013). 
Departing from the individual – or class – level, authors have pointed to the relevance of 
welfare politics at the aggregated level: support for the radical right in Western Europe is 
mediated by welfare state institutions – their type and scope (Swank and Betz 2003). This 
influence manifests itself in at least two ways. First, on a contextual basis, welfare state 
institutions determine the characteristics of a society – such as the level of unemployment, 
immigration, or inequalities – that have a positive effect on voting behavior, and 
particularly on the radical right vote (Arzheimer 2009). Second, on an attitudinal basis, 
welfare regimes and their associated shared values shape individuals’ beliefs, and 
specifically attitudes towards immigration and welfare chauvinism, which are linked to 
voting for the radical right (Van der Waal et al. 2010). Yet the individual-level mechanisms 
of influence of welfare politics on radical right voting behavior remains unspecified. On the 
supply side, the welfare preferences (and policy influence) of radical right parties is still an 
underinvestigated field (Afonso 2015, Norocel 2016). At the micro (individuals), meso 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
determinant of the vote, which constitutes a wider research agenda that goes beyond the objective 
of the present study.  
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(social classes, parties) and macro (welfare regime types) levels, the role of welfare politics 
in the radical right’s success has been incompletely established; filling these gaps is the 
ambition of the present study. 
This book addresses this gap by making a theoretical and an empirical contribution. 
Theoretically, a comprehensive theoretical framework of how welfare politics can 
determine the radical right vote is still missing. Empirically, the existing analyses linking 
welfare politics to radical right vote are too restrictive: in terms of approaches, cases, time 
period and social groups studied. I further make the case that such a theoretical discussion 
should be grounded in, and relying on, the concepts provided by political sociology, and 
that the empirical demonstration should rely on the variety of its methods. 
Providing a theoretical framework to assess the relation between welfare politics and the 
radical right, and extending the empirical evidence of this relation across Western Europe 
vote are the goals of this research. By bridging the literature on the radical right vote to the 
political sociology of the welfare state, I address the question of the role welfare politics in 
the radical right’s success in Western Europe. Before specifying the sub-questions that 
guide the different chapters, it is worthy to make a final critical assessment of the radical 
right field, which pertains to two drawbacks of most studies of the radical right.  
Studying the radical right success through the lens of welfare politics (or the sociology of 
the welfare state) is also an attempt to reconcile the different parts of the radical right 
literature both methodologically and in terms of the explanations they produce. In my 
opinion, two important shortcomings of this literature have to be avoided: (1) “one-eyed 
explanations” focusing solely on one side of the coin, or one dimension of the problem 
(whether demand or supply side; or giving purely socio-cultural or economic explanations 
to this vote) and (2) asserting “big theories” (e.g. schematic explanation that would explain 
the radical right’s success and even its impact on the polity, without comprehensive 
analyses and allowing for cross-country variance).  
In his overview of the field, Kitschelt (2007) recommended the studies include both 
demand and supply side explanations. Mudde (2010) makes a rather similar argument 
when considering that “widespread demand [for radical right] is a given” but that the 
parties themselves “have to be brought (back) into the analysis”.  Yet, considering this 
demand as a given does not mean that the individual level support for the radical right is 
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explained. This “demand”, its sociological roots and its attitudinal consequences call for 
further analysis. In order to capture the relation between supply and demand arguments of 
radical right success the present study takes up on Mudde’s reference to Wlezien’s 
thermostatic model. This means that the growing salience in public opinion on an issue 
(welfare politics in this case) leads to electoral success for the parties who address it 
(radical right), which in turn, increase policy activity and political debate on this issue 
(Wlezien 1995, Mudde 2013). However, this project will focuses on electoral politics - that 
is looking at voters, parties, and the relation between the two, but not beyond. Another 
strand of literature considers the radical right’s success as an explanatory variables for 
coalition building potential or policy changes (to name a few, on policy impact: Minkenberg 
2001, Akkerman and De Lange 2012, Afonso 2015, on impact on other parties: De Lange 
2012). Kitschelt’s research agenda for the field also includes two specifications that are 
equally important: integrate multilevel, and time-related analysis. Whenever data allows, I 
include different levels of analysis and patterns of evolution of radical right parties and 
their constituencies. 
Because of the variety of radical right parties and the political systems they compete in, the 
studies on the radical right frequently face another shortcoming: overarching – and maybe 
simplistic - explanations. These “big theories” certainly feed the academic debate but they 
are consistently empirically rejected. Kitschelt’s famous “winning formula” did not pass the 
empirical test, and it has been debunked by its author himself (De Lange 2007, Kitchselt 
2013). In a similar vein, Mudde’s hypothesis of a “populist Zeitgeist” - i.e. that the populist 
rhetoric of the radical right was contaminating other parties - has been rejected (Mudde 
2004, Rooduijn et al. 2014). This latter hypothesis can be considered part of Mudde’s wider 
theory that the radical right’s success is a “pathological normalcy” of democracy, which 
implies that the populist radical right is merely a radical interpretation of mainstream 
democratic ideology (Mudde 2010). Not only is this theory not empirically grounded, but 
also it is too general and simplistic to attribute the success of these parties and the different 
motives of their voters to the radicalization of mainstream attitudes. 
Paradoxically, I believe what characterizes the radical right is diversity; both in terms of the 
voters and parties. To put it simply, there is much sociological and class diversity in the 
radical right electorate: traditional (religious) conservatives, independent shopkeepers, 
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and working class former communist electors. Conversely, radical right parties display at 
times very diverse programmatic positions on specific issues such as welfare politics9. 
Radical right parties form a coherent party family; with comparable positions on their most 
salient issues (i.e. immigration); however, like most party families, they are no entirely 
homogenous on all policy fields. 
 
 
1.3.  Research perspective and methodological approach 
 
A political sociology question 
The main goal of this study is to make a contribution to the subfield of radical right studies 
through the lens of welfare politics. This is certainly of academic relevance, and somewhat 
also of social relevance, as these parties are the fastest growing and most polarizing ones in 
Western Europe.  But I want to root this project into wider academic concerns: the study of 
voters, parties and elections as a political sociologist. 
Asking how relevant welfare politics is for the radical right’s success, this study is deeply 
rooted in political sociology and more precisely in cleavage theory. This research question 
is embedded in the literature on cleavages and the transformation of political conflicts and 
it can be asked in Rokkanean terms.  Political sociology takes a broader look than political 
science, it does not deal with the “machinery of government, the mechanisms of public 
administration, and the formal political realm of elections, public opinion, pressure groups, 
and political behaviour” but it looks into the “interrelationships between politics, social 
structures, ideologies and culture” (Marshall 2009). In his landmark article, Sartori argued 
that political sociology should not be a subfield of sociology either, but rather be 
autonomous. Thus, it is not reduced to the “sociology of politics” which would only 
consider the political as an object. Political sociology looks into the political processes as 
they are, but also into their social conditions, distributions and how they are combined 
                                                        
9 Radical right parties also seem to vary in their ambitions to reach power and govern (not all of 
these parties can be considered to have always been truthfully office-seeking). 
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(Sartori 1969). Sartori’s seminal works set the agenda for this book, spelling out clearly the 
necessity of articulating demand and supply sides of electoral politics: 
“With specific reference to the party topic, a real political sociology calls for a 
simultaneous exploration of how parties are conditioned by society and how the society is 
conditioned by the party system. To say that a party system is a response to a given socio-
economic environment is to present half of the picture as if it were the complete picture. The 
complete picture requires, instead, a joint assessment of the extent to which parties are 
dependent variables reflecting social stratification and cleavages and, vice versa, of the extent 
to which these cleavages reflect the channeling imprint of a structured party system.” (Sartori 
1969: 214)  
The object of this study is political conflict, in the form of welfare politics, and how 
responsive radical right parties and their voters are to each other on this issue in the 
electoral arena. The model developed in this study tries to bridge top-down (supply) and 
bottom-up (demand) approaches, looking both at voters (across countries, classes, and -
when possible also- time) and parties. The argument here is not that welfare politics 
constitutes a “fully developed cleavage” which should include “a distinct socio-structural 
basis, specific political values and beliefs, and a particular organization of social groups and 
normative values” (Kriesi et al. 2012: 9, Bartolini and Mair 2007). Welfare politics likely 
includes the second and third normative and institutional elements, but it is considered 
here an important conflict dimension of West European politics rather than a structuring 
cleavage. However, Häusermann and Kriesi argue that “distributive deservingness”- 
defined as “the definition of the scope of beneficiaries who should be entitled to (welfare) 
benefits and services” - may constitute a new conflict dimension of the political space. And 
they conclude that “with this transformation, the distinction of the two preferences 
dimension into one cultural and one economic becomes obsolete, as both dimension bear 
clear and direct relevance for economic and social policy making” (Häusermann and Kriesi, 
2015: 206). To use a Lipset-Rokkan terminology, I ask the question of the “translation” of a 
political conflict (welfare politics) into the political system. This means considering how 
the welfare politics conflict is translated into politics (the extent to which it drives voting 
for the radical right) and looking at the “translator” (radical right parties’ preferences). 
Arguably, using the cleavage theory terminology, the welfare politics conflict matches the 
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concept of “translation mishandling”: when the cleavage/conflict structure in the polity is 
characterized by a low coincidence with the opinion (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). A 
substantial proportion of voters combine nationalistic preferences with rather 
economically interventionist positions (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009, Kriesi et al. 
2008). There is, however, no party that openly put forward such a combination. Kriesi et al. 
have labeled this political space the “empty quadrant”, as there is a mismatch in a corner of 
the two dimensional axes (Kriesi et al. 2012). Would a renewed analysis of the radical right 
vote allow concluding that this translation is not “mishandled”? Through the lens of welfare 
politics, can we explain the electoral success of the radical right and their positioning in the 
party system? The chapters of this book will address more practically the following 
questions: what underlies a radical right vote? Is this voting behavior better explained by a 
normative or by a self-interest centered approach? Are radical right voters all the same (in 
terms of social classes, countries, policy preferences, welfare regimes)? How relevant is 
welfare politics for the radical right parties? Have parties evolved and adapted to their 
voters? 
 
The case for mixed methods research 
In order to answer these questions, I take a methodological stand in favor of multi-method 
research. Whereas conducting mixed method research is now considered the third 
research paradigm alongside with quantitative and qualitative research (and it is indeed 
praised by all social scientists); it is often underachieved (Johnson and Onwuebuzie 2004). 
Interestingly, even though it stems from the combination of the two widely recognized 
research strategies; mixed methods research has developed as an autonomous approach, 
with its own methodological guidelines. The autonomization of this research strategy is 
cross-disciplinary (in the social science) and has been long debated. Several concepts have 
been used to conceptualize mixed method research: ‘multiple operationalism’, 
‘multimethod research’, ‘triangulation’, ‘critical multiplicism’, or ‘methodological pluralism’ 
(for an overview of mixed method research see Johnson et al. 2007). However, all authors 
agree that mixed methods research provide stronger confirmation or corroboration of the 
hypothesis, relying on richer data. In this project I adopt a mixed methodology in terms of 
approach (supply and demand), but also regarding the data, theory and analytical 
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strategies. I will carry this mixed methods agenda over the course of the book (across the 
different chapters), and when possible within the same analysis (within a single chapter). 
As much as possible, I try to diversify data sources. In this project, the analyses rely on 
different types of data, mainly individual level surveys (European Social Survey, 
Eurobarometer, Baromètre Politique Français) and party manifestos (Comparative 
Manifesto Project10, euandi expert placement of party positions and the full-text 
manifestos for case studies). Additionally, the party documentation of the Front National 
has been collected in electoral archives (campaign propaganda) or through personal 
collection (party leader speeches). Thanks to the diversification of the sources I can 
investigate cross-country and time variation. Furthermore I conduct the analyses on the 
basis of different theoretical perspectives and hypotheses. Both the analyses of the 
relevance of welfare politics for radical right voters and for radical right parties provide 
competing hypotheses in terms of explanation and possible change over time. These 
hypotheses might in fact prove to be more complementary as “it may well be that each 
proposition contains a kernel of the truth” (Denzin 1970).  
When analyzing the cross-country individual level data, voting for the radical right in this 
case, I rely on multiple strategies, looking for a variety of explanatory factors (such as 
attitudes, class or the role of institutions). On top of this within method diversity, I rely on 
‘between’ or ‘across’ methods: combining dissimilar methods to measure the same unit. 
This is employed mainly when looking at party manifestos: they are analyzed both 
quantitatively (through salience based analysis) and qualitatively (through in-depth 
substantive analysis). Investigator triangulation is also mentioned in the methodological 
literature on mixed-method research, although it is not particular to it. It is common to 
most contemporary research: several investigators would remove potential bias in the 
analysis and ensure greater reliability. The nature of the thesis prevents this type of 
triangulation in its strict term, although certainly the interactive way in which it is 
                                                        
10 The CMP is complemented by other aggregated level data sources such as the Parlgov database 
(Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2015. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): 
Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies), or recoding of 
Eurobarometer trends.  
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conceived and the place where it is done make it a less solitary and more collaborative 
work. This study also results from careful guidance from my supervisor, and comments and 
advices from co-authors and peers11.  
 
1.4.  Plan of the book 
 
In order to complete the investigation on the influence of welfare politics on the radical 
right vote, several steps are necessary. Each chapter has to consider the different level of 
analysis presented in the analytical framework, and tackle a specific question of the 
relation.  
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework of the study and develops the protection and 
exclusion hypotheses: the two mechanisms that link welfare politics and the radical right 
vote. I rely on two strands of the political sociology of the welfare state to elaborate how 
economic insecurity and specific welfare attitudes can be associated to the radial right’s 
success. Both hypotheses are specified for the demand side (precarization and scapegoating 
sub-hypotheses) and the supply side (programmatic adaption and exclusive solidarity sub-
hypotheses). 
Chapter 3 examines voting for the radical right by testing the protection and exclusion 
hypotheses; and more precisely, it tests the individual-level precarization and scapegoating 
sub-hypotheses. It relies on survey data and provides a multivariate cross-country analysis 
to test to what extent the radical right vote is determined by welfare politics. Overall, it 
shows that economic insecurity and welfare normative attitudes are determinants of the 
radical right vote in Western Europe.  
Chapter 4 considers the supply side: the radical right parties. By comparing similarities and 
differences of radical parties’ positions on welfare issues, it looks at different patterns 
linking welfare politics and the radical right vote. The chapter shows that the 
programmatic shift and exclusive solidarity sub-hypotheses are validated for some radical 
                                                        
11 Parts of the analysis of chapter 4 were written and published separately with Zoe Lefkofridi 
(Lefkofridi and Michel 2016); parts of the analysis of chapter 5 were conducted together with Koen 
Damhuis, in view of publication. 
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right parties only. This chapter relies on mixed-methods to analyse the party manifestos: it 
is based on different data sources and on several approaches: quantitative salience based 
study of manifestos, expert survey, and in-depth case analyses. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to class-based analysis, and its consequences on party supply. Because 
the working class has become the core of radical right constituencies, this chapter provides 
detailed data on the evolution of the class composition of the radical right electorate, and it 
shows the precarization of the radical right voters over time. In a second step, it shows that 
some radical right parties have adapted their programmatic positions to the welfare 
preferences of their voters. This chapter therefore provides a dynamic demonstration of 
both the supply-side and demand-side of the protection hypothesis, and it shows that the 
programmatic shift of some radical right parties results from strategic adaption to the 
transformation of their constituencies.  
Finally, Chapter 6 assesses the relation between demand-side and supply-side of both the 
protection and exclusion hypothesis. This chapter relies on an in-depth case study of the 
Front National including a longitudinal analysis (1988-2012) of voters and manifestos. It 
shows that the FN is a clear example of the transformation of a party and its electorate.  
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2. Theoretical framework: economic insecurity, normative welfare 
attitudes and the radical right 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the book and the hypotheses on how 
welfare politics conditions the radical right vote in Western Europe. The introduction has 
set forth the claim that welfare politics (attitudes, values, interests) is relevant to explain 
the radical right parties’ and the voters’ preferences. This chapter elaborates this reasoning 
by bridging electoral politics to the political sociology of the welfare state. The latter 
subfield owes a lot to the work of Stefan Svallfors, who paved the way for the comparative 
analysis of how attitudes, values, class positions, and contextual factors (such as policies 
and institutions) pertaining to the welfare state interplay with opinions and political 
behaviour (Svallfors 1996, 2006, 2007).  
To recall, my understanding of welfare politics is one of a political conflict that 
encompasses values, policy preferences and performance evaluation of the welfare state. In 
other words, it is the politicization of the nature of welfare policies (what), its extent and 
principles (when), the deservingness (who) and contributions (how) of individuals (Van 
Oorschot 2000). The following theoretical framework is based on the two broad 
assumptions guiding the welfare politics literature, which are rooted in different 
conceptions of the welfare state. There are two main functionalist conceptions of the 
welfare state: a scheme of risk-management and a norm oriented social insurance. 
Economists label them the “piggy bank” and the “Robin Hood” function (Barr 2012). Both 
conceptions, in turn, determine the major hypotheses of the study of welfare politics. For 
the first, the welfare state is conceived as the institutional set-up for risk management; for 
the second, the welfare state is the institutional set-up that reallocates wealth and reduces 
social inequalities (Mau and Veghte 2007). More than functionalist labels these 
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assumptions result in different – and somewhat opposed – models of welfare politics. In the 
case of a risk management conception, welfare politics is driven by self-interest, whereas in 
the case of social insurance, normative beliefs of social justice form the guiding assumption.   
Expanding these two assumptions of welfare politics, I derive two hypotheses on how 
welfare politics determines radical right voters; and, correspondingly, how it affects radical 
right parties. Both of these assumptions relies on a different mechanism about how welfare 
politics affects attitudes and political behaviour. From a self-interest perspective, I argue 
that welfare politics is determined in an instrumental and egoistic way, on the basis of 
individuals’ benefits and risks (Kumlin 2004). On the other hand, when the central 
assumption of the welfare state is that it is based on the promotion of social justice, I argue 
that welfare politics is determined by a set of norms that constitute the moral economy of 
the welfare state. From these two mechanisms, I formulate two hypotheses on how welfare 
politics affects the radical right: protection and exclusion. Table 2 summarizes the different 
theoretical steps from the two conceptions of the welfare state to the hypotheses on the 
radical right. Both of these hypotheses consider the supply and the demand side of 
electoral politics. In short, the protection hypothesis expects that individuals who face 
stark economic insecurity will vote for radical right parties which offer them protection; 
the exclusion hypothesis holds that individuals whose normative beliefs are breached by 
out-groups or individuals are expected to support radical right parties because they single 
out and exclude these out-groups.  
Following the comprehensive approach laid out in the introduction, this book considers 
three levels of analysis. The aim is to explain the micro-level (voting for the radical right) 
and meso-level (parties’ preferences) of electoral politics through the protection and 
exclusion hypotheses while taking macro-level factors into account. Both hypotheses rely 
on different assumptions about welfare politics, and the way it can affect political 
behaviour. However, in this book, these conceptions and the corollary hypotheses are 
considered more complementary than competing.  
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WELFARE POLITICS 
Conception of the 
Welfare State 
Scheme of Risk-management Norm-oriented Social Insurance 
Welfare Politics 
assumptions 
 Self-interest   Social Justice     
Impact on attitudes, 
values, and political 
behavior 
Economic Insecurity Moral Economy of the Welfare State 
Hypothesis on how 
Welfare Politics 
Affects the Radical 
Right 
Protection Exclusion 
Examples of attitudes 
and behaviors 
Ex: negative perception of change, national 
capitalism, protecting the in-group… 
Ex: Targeting norm violating out-group 
and individuals, bounding and restricting 
welfare policies, excluding beneficiaries...  
Table 2- Theoretical framework 
 
Both assumptions posit that welfare institutions – and the distributive characteristics of a 
society – are determinant in the translation of welfare politics into political behaviour. On 
the one hand, economic risks are mediated through welfare institutions. Different welfare 
policies determine the scope of economic risks. Very generous regimes, in terms of welfare 
insurance of resource redistribution, will reduce the economic risks of individuals. 
Conversely, individual face higher economic risks and are more subject to macro-level 
economic changes in minimal welfare states. On the other hand, institutions have a decisive 
influence on the shaping of common norms of the welfare state. Yet this book does not 
engage in the study of how welfare institutions affect the radical right –whether considered 
broadly like the different welfare regime type or more specifically like concrete policies. 
Rather, the focus of this study is to uncover how individuals’ welfare politics attributes 
(attitudes, values, interests) determines their vote for the radical right, and conversely how 
radical right parties place themselves in the welfare politics conflict.  
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This chapter is divided into two parts, which follow the theoretical reasoning of the two 
conceptions of the welfare state (i.e. along the two columns of Table 2). Building on a self-
interest conception of the welfare state, I argue that economic insecurity is a driver of West 
European radical right success, and elaborate the protection hypothesis (2.1.). From a 
normative conception of the welfare state, I argue that radical right voters and parties 
target groups or individuals that violate the core norms of the moral economy of the 
welfare state, and therefore the electoral success of these parties is explained by the 
exclusion hypothesis (2.2.). Both section share the same structure, which follows the 
theoretical paths between welfare politics and the concrete hypotheses on the radical right, 
i.e. the lines of table 1. In both parts, I first elaborate on the conception of the welfare state 
and its underlying behavioural assumption, then I described the impact (mechanism) this 
theory implies for political behaviour and the radical right success, and finally I formulate 
the guiding hypotheses of the book.  
 
2.1. Economic insecurity and the radical right vote 
 
The first section presents how self-interest drives welfare politics in risk-based conception 
of the welfare state (2.1.1.), and I argue that increasing economic insecurity is the 
mechanism that affects political behaviour under this assumption (2.1.2.). Finally, I 
elaborate the protection hypothesis: the radical right’s success is explained by the appeal of 
these parties to economically insecure voters (2.1.3.). 
 
2.1.1. The welfare state as risk management and self-interested welfare politics 
 
The first theory of welfare politics considered in this book is based on a conception of the 
welfare state as a risk-management scheme. Simply put, individuals comply with the 
constraints of the welfare state (taxes, social contributions) to the extent that it guarantees 
them a safety net in case of loss of resources. The welfare state’s legitimacy lies essentially 
in individuals’ self-interest; and as long as it remains its guiding principle, the existence of 
redistributive institutions is justified. The relation between individuals and the welfare 
state is thus clearly instrumental: welfare state institutions exist because of the benefits 
 31 
 
individuals can obtain from them (Mau and Veghte 2007). This risk-based approach to the 
welfare state rests in the assumption that citizens are driven by self-interest (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, Rehm 2009).   
A second literature strand of the theory of welfare also considers interest as the basis of 
welfare politics; but instead of taking individual interest as a driving factor, it considers 
class interest. The “power resource school” finds the foundations of the welfare state and 
the roots of its support to be more political than strictly self-interested; it is the group’s 
interest that matters more than an individual’s own benefits. The size of the working class 
is the main factor behind the welfare state’s developments under the assumption that 
support for the welfare state is essentially coming from the demand of lower income 
individuals for taxes and transfers (Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen 1990). However, for the 
“revisionist” school, class position cannot be the sole explanation to welfare preferences: 
low income is not the only factor of support for social insurance. These authors claim that 
facing higher risks is equally important (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 2006). Their core 
argument is that support for the welfare state does not lie in concepts of redistribution 
(which is entailed in class-based interest), but as a demand for insurance, which depends 
on individuals’ economic risk level (Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012). For instance, 
individuals with jobs that require specific skills are particularly at risk when shocks affect 
their specialized labour markets, and therefore tend to support the welfare state as an 
insurance scheme (Iversen and Soskice 2001). The argument also applies to individuals 
working in very open and internationalized economic sectors (Scheve and Slaughter 2004). 
In this book, I follow the revisionist conception of welfare politics and consider individual 
self-interest as central to their preferences in welfare. This conception is broader than an 
individual’s only immediate interests: it takes risks, economic foreseeing and individual 
predictions into account. It is also more complex than simple class position because it takes 
an individualistic and less static approach. 
In order to decide to comply with welfare institutions and their constraints, individuals 
make a cost-beneftit calculus (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). 
When rationally maximizing their welfare, individuals are not short-sighted and do not 
only favour policies that immediately benefit them, they also support policies that reduce 
their risks. To support welfare policies concerns about prospective evaluation, assessment 
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of possible risks and of one’s position in society, are at least as important as immediate 
gains. Preferences are thus also defined by exposure to risks, and individuals’ perception of 
this exposure. With this conception, the welfare state is defined as the institution that 
collectivises the risks of individuals, and individuals support it because it is intended to 
protect them from and deal with risks. In other words sharing risks is utility maximizing 
because collective institutional schemes are more efficient than individual safety nets.  
Based on the assumption that individuals express their preference for welfare 
arrangements (taxes, level of redistribution, insurance) according to the maximization of 
their economic utility (Alesina and Giuliano 2009), the next sections deal with the political 
translation of such preferences. Political preferences express patterns of risk-reduction, 
whether these risks are anticipated or not. The focus is on the social insurance component 
of the welfare state, which functions as a risk-management institution. In Western Europe, 
welfare schemes of social insurance deal with all major perceived economic risks that are 
associated with a possible loss of income. There is a logical pairing between economic risks 
that lead to income loss (e.g. age, disability, sickness, and unemployment) and the 
respective welfare state institutions (pensions, healthcare, disabilities and unemployment 
benefits). 
Objective and subjective individual economic characteristics are crucial in shaping 
individuals welfare preferences, whether they are support for economic redistribution or 
for a minimal intervention of – and contribution to – welfare state institutions. These 
individual preferences – from the most diffuse support to concrete policy positions - 
translate into political preference in the electoral arena. Where the “power resource 
school” assumed welfare political preference to be given by class status, the present theory 
of self-interest considers that political preferences are determined by a variety of factors. 
The translation of welfare politics into the electoral arena echoes one strand of the voting 
behaviour literature: egotropic economic voting (Fiorina 1981, Lewis-Beck 1988). Because 
individuals may face socio-economic risks that they can anticipate (or not), and eventually 
are confronted to social downgrading, they adapt their political preferences to their 
economic situation. This may determine their vote choices for the left, or the right – or for 
attributing political blame and sanctioning incumbent governments.  
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From this theoretical discussion on the self-interest conception of the welfare state, I take 
economic (in)security is a key mechanism of expression of welfare politics into attitudes 
and political behaviour. Economic insecurity goes beyond the experience of economic 
distress such as falling in unemployment, or becoming ill. Some authors consider economic 
insecurity mainly as a perception, eventually dominated by the fear of social decline. 
Others, have looked more precisely at occupational experiences and how one’s work 
position (e.g. sector, hierarchy) affects one’s perception of economic (in)security.  
 
2.1.2. Economic insecurity as a mechanism of political behaviour 
 
Regardless of how they are measured, indicators of self-interest shape preferences for 
welfare policies, whether they are general or specific and retrospective or prospective 
(Pettersen 1995). Personal involvement intensifies these effects: they are stronger when 
individuals are themselves recipients of the associated benefits of these policies (Kumlin 
2004). But evaluating one’s economic risks is not simply the result of the individuals’ 
rational assessment of their personal present economic situation. Structural 
transformations of the economy directly impact one’s risks and shape the evaluation of 
risk. Indeed, globalization has given rise to new conflicts (economic and cultural) that 
produce oppositions, new forms of competition among individuals and therefore new risks. 
I focus on the economic dimension of increasing risks and insecurities, but the cultural 
approach of the consequences of globalization is also largely dealt with in the literature 
(Mudde 2007, Kriesi et al. 2012).  
In their landmark study of the effects of structural changes on political conflicts, Kriesi et al. 
argue that globalization gave rise to a revived economic competition and that this process 
has constituted groups of winners and losers (Kriesi et al. 2008, Kriesi et al. 2012). The 
concrete manifestations of this revived competition have materialized in 
deindustrialization, the closing down of factories, and outsourcing of job to low-cost 
countries. Another approach argues that it is mainly deindustrialization – the product of 
“technology induced structural transformations of labour-markets – which generates new 
risks (Iversen and Cusack 2000). I side however with broader conceptions which take the 
opening of national economies as the origin of revived economic competition, and that 
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deindustrialization is one of its consequences.  At the individual level, this new competition 
has produced increased economic risks, such as income instability, unemployment, and 
labour-market instability. These new risks affect and subside one’s level of economic 
security: some individuals feel threatened. Importantly, these new risks are not evenly 
distributed among the population, but rather they are predominant among certain 
categories and classes. The industrial working class is the most exposed to the revived 
international competition. Yet, the new risks do not affect blue-collar workers only; more 
generally the low skilled (who make up a large proportion of the tertiary sector) are 
confronted with increasing competition that fuels their economic insecurity. Overall, the 
globalization of the economy has created losers, who feel economically insecure. These 
individuals evaluate the concrete consequences of globalization, and with regards to the 
revived economic competition they emphasize its negative consequences (Kriesi et al. 
2008). Consequently, the losers of globalization feel entitled to a form of compensation 
from their economic precariousness and insecurity (Kriesi et al. 2012). To sum up the 
causal mechanism: changes brought by globalization of the economy (trade, foreign direct 
investments, and immigration) have transformed the structure of labour markets and 
increased one’s economic risks, and thereby have direct effects on one’s voting behaviour 
(Dancygier and Walter 2015). 
The remainder of this section delves into how economic insecurity, in the context of the 
globalization of national economies, affects welfare politics and consequently political 
preferences. In short, I argue that economic insecurity triggers a higher demand for welfare 
protection and induces a negative perception of change. The fundamental argument is that 
economic inequality shapes welfare preferences – which does not clash with the power 
resource theory. Because the losers of globalization face increasing economic insecurity 
and a growing inequality, they are expected to express preferences for more securing 
welfare policies. Particularly, people in lower socio-economic classes are more likely to 
support pro-redistribution left-wing parties (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). 
At an aggregated level, an entire subfield of political economy is devoted to the 
distributional effects of globalization and their consequences on policy preferences – yet 
falling short of a consensus (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Rehm 2009, Dancygier and Walter 
2015). Two diverging models have identified groups of winners and losers of globalization. 
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First, the sectoral theory claims that globalization produces winners and losers along 
economic sectors, i.e. the sheltered non-tradable sectors are advantaged compared to the 
exposed tradable sectors which are disadvantaged (Gourevitch 1986, Frieden and 
Rogowski 1996). One way to measure this sectoral insecurity is to consider the 
“offshorability” of jobs (Dancygier and Walter 2015). Second, the factor-endowments 
theory finds the winners and losers of globalization are defined by one’s level of skills. 
Higher-skilled individuals generally benefit from globalization, whereas low-skilled 
workers lose out. Both these theories find empirical support (Mayda 2006, Rehm 2009). 
Incidentally, low-skilled workers in “offshorable” exposed sectors report higher economic 
insecurity (Scheve and Slaughter 2004, Walter 2015). Indeed, the sectoral effect intersects 
with the skills level; and within the internationally exposed sectors, low-skilled individuals 
face the greater economic risks. Economic globalization is also intrinsically linked to 
immigration. The impact of immigration on policy preferences has an important cultural 
dimension: it affects political values, the sense of national community and traditions 
(Sniderman and Hageendorn 2007, Banting and Kymlicka 2016). In general, “depending on 
the economic context, natives may view immigration as benefiting or harming their 
economic welfare” (Dancygier and Walter 2015: 141). But I focus here on the effects of 
globalization on immigration politics: the losers of globalization are more susceptible to 
express reject of immigration on economic grounds (Dancygier 2010).  
The losers of globalization – the most exposed and lower-skilled individuals – are expected 
to be opposed to the globalization of the economy; and, I argue, more reticent to change. 
Opposition to further globalization is particularly salient amongst the low-skilled 
(regardless of their employment sector). In addition to the objective structural economic 
changes they face, and their consequent increased economic insecurity, losers of 
globalization also express feelings of social disintegration, and social decline, and they feel 
are ‘threatened to become superfluous and useless for society” (Betz, 1994). In terms of 
political preferences, the consequences of economic insecurity triggered by globalization 
are double. On the one hand, the losers of globalization are expected to support political 
parties that commit to “curb globalization”. On the other hand, they should support the 
parties that they expect to compensate for their losses, and thus offer them greater 
economic protection. 
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If greater economic insecurity undeniably affects politics preferences, its link to the radical 
right vote is not self-evident and still needs to be established. Indeed, left-wing parties 
usually match the demands for more economic security; they are traditionally in favour of 
higher welfare state intervention (Houtman et al. 2008). The next section develops how 
economic insecurity affects voting behaviour, and particularly how it contributes to the 
radical right’s electoral success.  
The ‘power resource’ theory and ulterior self-interest based conceptions of welfare politics 
imply that individuals at risk will seek to be protected through welfare arrangements. Both 
theories assume that the parties of the left defend and implement favourable welfare 
policies for the economically insecure individuals. Therefore, the basic expectation would 
be that high economic insecurity would trigger higher support for left-wing parties. 
However, I argue that high economic insecurity also fuels the radical right success for two 
reasons. First, the parties of the left have partially lost their leadership (issue ownership) of 
expansive welfare politics; second, radical right parties have successfully attracted losers of 
globalization by mobilizing them through welfare politics.  
While globalization has transformed the economy and labour-market conditions in 
Western Europe, party systems have also evolved and transformed. Most importantly, the 
transformations of party systems and parties themselves can be gathered under the 
convergence hypothesis. Simply put, the argument is that mainstream parties that usually 
hold office (both on the left and the right) have converged in terms of economic policies 
because of the structural changes of capitalism in advanced democracies (Kitschelt 1999). 
The programmatic convergence of the social-democratic and conservative parties applies 
chiefly at the macro-economic level, but these parties also face increased constraints at the 
national level – in which a large proportion of welfare policies is still determined. Indeed, 
the Single Market and the Maastricht Treaty fundamentally changed national parties’ policy 
arena and dampened important policy conflicts between left and right, especially regarding 
the management of the national economy (e.g. Mair 2007, 2000). According to Mair, EU law, 
policies and institutions have been increasingly limiting the policy space, the policy 
instruments and the policy repertoire at parties’ disposal. This, in turn, led to dampening 
the competition between mainstream parties on policy domains where the EU has 
increased competences. This is chiefly economic policy: monetary discipline, deregulation, 
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and labour-market flexibility (Nanou and Dorussen 2013). Overall, the parties of the left do 
not represent the obvious political choice for economically insecure voters anymore, 
because they are perceived to face too many structural constraints. The convergence of the 
mainstream parties on economic issues has two potential consequences. First, Kitschelt 
argues that, as major parties converge in terms of economic policies, voters become 
indifferent to the economic dimension of politics, and focus on the cultural dimension 
(Kitschelt 2007). This is one way to explain the success of the radical right: political 
conflicts have shifted to the cultural dimension and increasingly on the issue of 
immigration which is favourable to these parties (Mudde 2007, Bornschier 2010). 
However, there is an alternative consequence to this reconfiguration of the party system: 
the convergence of mainstream parties could benefit the radical right because these parties 
stand out in contrast with the converging mainstream parties, on both conflict dimensions. 
The reduction of the difference in policy preferences (and output) of mainstream parties 
creates a favourable political space for the radical right parties (Hainsworth 1992, Kitschelt 
1995). Carter shows how the convergence of mainstream parties is correlated to the 
radical right’s electoral success because they are perceived as an alternative (Carter 2005). 
There is a political opportunity for radical right parties to distinguish themselves from 
mainstream parties on the issue of welfare politics, specifically by appealing to 
economically insecure voters.  
In addition to the argument that the convergence of mainstream parties benefits electorally 
to the radical right, I argue that radical right parties have also successfully mobilized losers 
of globalization because they are openly opposed to globalization and to denationalization. 
Radical right parties have traditionally opposed change in society, whether economic or 
cultural. They have always been the parties praising an imagined virtuous past, while 
denouncing the damages of change and modernity. This idealized past is rooted in 
nationalism: praising the nation as a homogenous and fixed entity, that can only be 
corrupted by change and transformations (Gellner 1983, Freeden 1998). Additionally, 
radical right parties may also be actively trying to appeal to the losers of globalization by 
turning to interventionist-nationalist preferences. This position is a combination of the 
rejection of denationalizing processes, and economic interventionist stances and it 
resonates positively with economically insecure voters (Kriesi et al. 2012). A similar label 
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for this combination of preferences is to consider the ‘left-authoritarian voters’ who have 
left-wing preferences on economic issues, but traditional preferences on socio-cultural 
issues. However, Lefkofridi et al. have found that left-authoritarian voters generally tend to 
vote for left-wing parties (Lefkofridi et al. 2014). This book challenges this result and 
argues that such groups of voters are mobilized by the radical right. Radical right parties in 
Western Europe have targeted the two aspects of economic insecurity that are likely 
perceived by the losers of globalization: rejection of economic globalization and change, 
and increased risks that prompt demand for more welfare state intervention. They aim at 
defending those who were ‘left on the side of/by modernization’, those who lost more than 
they gained in economic and social changes. Because economic insecurity triggers a need 
for protection against economic globalization, the radical right parties present themselves 
as alternative against these changes, and their success can stand as a ‘protective vote’ 
(Givens 2005). Indeed, their success can be explained because the radical right parties are 
“status quo parties” (Geering 2013). As status quo parties the radical right responds to both 
aforementioned dimensions of economic insecurity. The parties put forward a negative 
perception of change and higher protection against increased risks. Alternatively, the 
(radical) left could also benefit from growing economic insecurity, as it also rejects 
economic globalization and still contends that it is the proponent of welfare protection. Yet 
these parties are somewhat unsuccessful in attracting economically insecure voters. One 
explanation could lie in these voters’ aversion to change. Where the left is more future and 
change oriented, and usually promotes the transformation of society; the radical right 
idealizes the past compared to the present, which can appear safer to economically 
insecure voters. Indeed, ‘losers of globalization’ are the individuals who “had it better in the 
past”, and I argue that they are thus likelier to support protective parties which praise an 
idealized past and claim to restore anterior situations. 
 
2.1.3. The protection hypothesis 
 
Based on the previous theoretical developments, which show how insecurity can affect the 
radical right’s success through a self-interest based conception of welfare politics, I 
formulate the protection hypothesis: 
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 Protection Hypothesis: the success of the radical right in Western Europe is explained 
by the successful mobilization of voters who are economically insecure, i.e. who are seeking 
more protective and risk-reducing, welfare arrangements and who are opposed to change. 
 
Since the protection hypothesis has implications on both the voter and party levels, I 
consider two sub-hypotheses throughout the book. The precarization sub-hypothesis 
expects individual-level indicator of economic insecurity to positively influence voting for 
radical right parties in Western Europe. At the macro-level, empirical studies suggest that 
aggregate levels of unemployment, indicators of trade openness, capital mobility, and 
foreign immigration (considered as indicators of labour-market instability and greater 
economic risks) are contextual variables that influence positively the radical right vote 
(Swank and Betz 2003; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). However, at the individual level, the 
precarization sub-hypothesis expects that economic risks and precariousness are positive 
determinants of the radical right vote. Precariousness risks are multifaceted, and of various 
nature. First, they pertain to labour-market position: some categories are more at risks 
than others, e.g. lower-skilled individuals or those working in vulnerable sectors. Beyond 
the fear of unemployment and income loss, economic insecurity also increases with the fear 
of reduced welfare benefits and unpredictable expenses. For instance, healthcare expenses 
and insufficient healthcare coverage are also indicators of economic insecurity (see for 
instance the Economic Security Index, Hacker et al. 2013). Broader approaches to 
precariousness can also include non-strictly economic indicators and social capital factor 
such as the feeling of growing away from the rest of society and the feeling of being left 
out12. Hans-Georg Betz showed how the radical right parties appeal to individuals who 
express social risks and fear of social downgrading on top of economic insecurity. These 
parties are very successful among these “forgotten” voters (Betz 2015). The programmatic 
shift sub-hypothesis expects that radical right parties have changed their political 
                                                        
12 See for instance, the insecurity index EPICES (Evaluation de la précarité et des inégalités de santé 
pour les Centres d’Examen de Santé), measured by items on economic characteristics, and lifestyle, 
social and familial risks; and it is positively associated to the radical right vote (Mayer 2013b, 
detailed in chapter 6). 
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preferences on welfare politics to appeal to their economically insecure voters. Radical 
right parties oppose structural changes and claim they can curb (or reverse) their effects; 
they frame economic globalization in terms of “labour and social security” (Höglinger et al. 
2012)13. In addition to defending the status quo, these parties are expected to support 
economically interventionist policies and favour a protecting welfare state against 
structural changes of the economy14. 
 
2.2. Welfare normative beliefs and the radical right 
 
In contrast to the self-interest driven theory, the normative conception of the welfare state 
means that individuals’ preferences towards the welfare state are based on shared norms. 
In order to define them, I gather these norms and values under the concept of moral 
economy of the welfare state (2.2.1.). These norms drive welfare and political preferences, 
and I argue that it is particularly the perception that normative prescriptions are being 
violated that affects the radical right vote (2.2.2.). Finally, I elaborate the exclusion 
hypothesis, which states that the radical right success is explained by appeal of voters and 
parties to excluding and scapegoating certain individuals or outgroups (2.2.3.). 
 
2.2.1.  The moral economy of the welfare state 
 
The normative theory of the welfare state challenges the assumption that welfare politics is 
determined by self-interest only – however this interest is defined. It considers that welfare 
politics is grounded in norms and values, and cannot be reduced to interest, whether of one 
individual or of a class. It is noteworthy that pioneering studies of welfare attitudes have 
found that, overall, the massive support for the welfare state in advanced democracies is 
stable (Taylor-Gooby 1985, Svallfors 1996). Despite the structural changes discussed in the 
                                                        
13 Only the radical left addresses the consequences of economic globalization in terms of “labour 
and social security” in greater proportions than the radical right.  
14 Hypothesising that increased economic risks trigger radical right voting competes with the fact 
that usually the worst-off individuals and the precarious importantly abstain from voting (Kriesi 
and Bornshier 2013, Mayer 2014).  
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previous section, which have triggered economic insecurity, the public’s attitudes are 
strongly supportive of the welfare state over time, especially universal encompassing 
programs (pensions, healthcare). Assuming the welfare politics is entrenched in norms and 
values requires the stability of preferences for welfare, which should be rooted in public 
opinion. Other conceptions of the welfare state have made opposite claims, and they 
predicted that the public’s preferences for welfare would dramatically change over time, 
without considering self-interest as the core of welfare politics. Because of social 
differentiation and individualism, Offe argued that support for equality and redistribution 
would crumble (Offe 1987). At the other end of the spectrum, the “government overload” 
theory thought the citizens would always expect the state to hold greater welfare 
responsibility and solve their problem: the demand for welfare intervention would grow, 
even if the state capacities stagnate (Crozier et al. 1975). However, the comparative and 
systematic analyses of ‘Beliefs in Government’ have provided extensive empirical 
refutation to these theories: citizens’ demand for government intervention is stable over 
time (Kaase and Newton 1995).  
While the works showing the stability of welfare preferences do not develop the normative 
dimension of welfare politics; they point out to the fact that individualism and sole self-
interest are not the driving mechanisms of welfare preferences over time (Mau 2003). 
Regarding political preferences, Inglehart argues that “the electorates of advanced 
industrial societies do not seem to be voting with their pocketbooks, but instead primarily 
motivated by ‘sociotropic’ concerns” (Inglehart 1990). An exactly similar argument can be 
made about welfare politics. Normative and cultural factors are at least as important as 
self-interest as the driving determinants of welfare politics (Mau 2003, Van Oorschot 2006, 
Svallfors 2007, 2012). I rely on the concept of moral economy to complement the 
conception of welfare politics, by adding a normative dimension to the narrow self-interest 
factor. The concept of moral economy of the welfare state has been revived by recent 
contributions of the sociology of the welfare state, and in a simple form, it is defined as the 
beliefs pertaining to the rights and obligations of citizens regarding welfare politics (Mau 
2003, Svallfors 2006, 2012).  
Before detailing the composition of the moral economy of the welfare state itself, I give a 
brief overview of the concept of moral economy, which originates from various fields of the 
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social sciences. The roots of the concept of moral economy are found in Karl Polanyi’s 
seminal essay on the transformations of capitalism, and particularly on the distinction 
between the two systems that guide economic relations. On the one hand, the ‘embedded 
economy’ is a system in which production and exchange are presided over by significant 
social, political and religious institutions. This means that economic relations are presided 
over by substantive values. On the other hand, the ‘autonomous economy’ is a system in 
which production and exchange are significant per se; economic relations do not bear 
additional values than their worth and they function according to market rules. The 
transition from a normative values-oriented system of exchange to the market rules 
generates social violence and unrest (Polanyi 2001, originally published in 1944). 
Following the initial assumption that societies and economic exchanges are guided by 
normative principles, E.P. Thomson coined the term of moral economy and defined it as “a 
popular consensus about what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate practices, a 
consensus which is rooted in the past and capable of inspiring action” (Thompson 1971). 
The tensions provoked by the transitions to a market-based system are largely studied as a 
source for political and social conflict. Inadequacy of the new organisational scheme with 
the moral economy is found as the roots of numerous studies on peasants or third world 
insurrections (Scott 1976).  
Arnold offers a renewed conception of moral economy based on its relation to social goods, 
and which is more relevant and applicable to the study of welfare politics. It broadens the 
conception of moral economy beyond the transition from non-market to market-based 
societies; and it also expands its scientific use outside of the confined analysis of the 
sources of resistance and rebellion. To Arnold “social goods and moral economies are 
plural, not singular. Each moral economy is a separate, although often nested sphere of 
action-inspiring legitimacy” (Arnold 2001). Moral economies do not have to be conceived 
as an organic set of generic beliefs, but can be envisioned in relation to more specific 
objects. This pluralist conception allows for the definition of a moral economy that applies 
to welfare politics. Because welfare politics cannot be limited to “economic utility”, and 
because individuals are determined by norms and not just their egoistic self-interest, I rely 
on the concept of moral economy of the welfare state, to evaluate the normative 
underpinnings of welfare politics (Mau 2003).  
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In order to assess how a normative conception of welfare politics affects political 
preferences, the constitutive norms of the moral economy of the welfare state have to be 
clearly defined. I argue that the moral economy of the welfare state is constituted by three 
overarching norms: equality, reciprocity, and self-reliance. To identify these norms, I rely 
on three strands of literature, which are respectively theoretical, political, and empirical. 
First, these norms can be derived from the political philosophy of welfare, which defines 
three closely related principles of welfare. Second, the study of the political foundations of 
the welfare state has identified five moral justifications that overlap with the overarching 
norms. Finally, public opinion research on welfare deservingness has identified five criteria 
on which ground individuals are more or less deemed to deserve welfare benefits. Table 3 
summarizes each level of justification of the three norms of the moral economy of the 
welfare state. 
 
Core norms of 
the MEWS 
Equality Reciprocity Self-reliance 
Principle of 
Political 
Philosophy 
Equality Merit/Equity Need 
Political 
foundations of 
welfare state 
institutions 
Reducing Poverty 
Equality of Opportunity  
Social stability 
Social Inclusion Efficiency 
Deservingness 
criteria  
Identity                       
Need 
Reciprocity 
Control 
Attitude 
Associated 
welfare regime 
Universal Corporatist Liberal 
Table 3 – Justifications of the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state 
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The political philosophy of welfare has identified ‘principles of justice’, the general 
principles of distribution. Three principles define the bases from which decision about 
welfare entitlements are made, or on what ideal is an individual entitled to receive welfare 
benefits. In general, theorists determine three principles of welfare: equality, merit, and 
need (Fives 2008). With slightly different terminology, Deutsch defines ‘equality’ as a 
universal redistribution, ‘equity’ (or merit) as a redistribution relative to one’s 
contribution, and ‘need’ when there is a set threshold of need that determines benefits 
(Deutsch 1985). The ‘political foundations of the welfare state’ do not just refer to the 
history and development of the welfare institutions, but rather to the justifications of these 
institutions, which ground their legitimacy. The ‘foundations of the welfare state’ are 
functional justifications, they are outcome oriented: welfare institutions and their 
corresponding constraints and benefits are acceptable because they enable to achieve 
desirable goals. A set of five justifications has been consensually identified within different 
social sciences: reducing poverty, achieving equality of opportunity, social stability, social 
inclusion, and efficiency (Goodin et al. 1999, Barr 2012, Greve 2013). The final strand of 
literature used to define the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state stems from 
public opinion research, which has identified five criteria of deservingness. These criteria 
are the moral reasoning that individuals use when evaluating one’s right to access welfare 
benefits. Van Oorschot distinguishes five criteria: ‘control’ (people are more deserving 
when they are not personally responsible for their neediness), ‘need’ (welfare benefits 
should go to the most deprived), ‘identity’ (people who belong to a common in-group are 
more deserving), ‘attitude’ (conformity and good conduct are granted higher 
deservingness), and ‘reciprocity’ (those who contribute the most should be entitled the 
higher benefits) (Van Oorschot 2000, 2006). The remainder of this section details the three 
norms of the moral economy of the welfare state building on the three levels of 
justification.  
Equality is the first norm of the moral economy of the welfare state. It corresponds to the 
principle that a society needs at least a minimum level of equality – material and potential – 
among its members to sustain itself. As a principle, equality is both morally desirable and 
practically necessary. These moral foundations of the welfare state are closely linked to the 
Rawlsian conception of equality, which calls for the fair distribution of “primary social 
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goods”. Equality does not mean equal conditions for all, but it rests on the “difference 
principle” which states that some inequalities can be justified, only if they serve to improve 
the expectations of the least advantaged individuals (Rawls, 1971). Corresponding to the 
principle of equality are three political functions legitimizing welfare institutions: reducing 
poverty, promoting social equality, and promoting stability. Reducing poverty was always a 
primary concern of societies and welfare institutions originated in “Poor Laws” (Goodin 
and Mitchell 2000). To define poverty, one needs to take distance from a minimalist 
approach (fulfilling basic needs necessary for physical existence) but consider relative 
deprivation. The welfare state is justified by trying to minimize the relative deprivation 
between individuals. The promotion of social equality is another outcome oriented political 
justification of welfare institutions: guaranteeing an equality of status of citizens before the 
law, and further the equality of opportunity before welfare institutions. The last equality 
oriented function of the welfare state is to promote social stability. Not only do societies 
need to be stable to remain integrated, but individuals also want stability in their personal 
lives. This is the aim of welfare institutions: ensuring resources to individuals when their 
regular sources are interrupted. For instance, egalitarians tend to promote the better 
distribution of social goods, such as jobs. For instance, full employment policies have 
become crucial aspects of the promotion of social equality (Goodin et al. 1999). Empirical 
evidence supports the idea that equality is a central norm defining the moral economy of 
the welfare state. Public opinion in Western democracies is largely supportive of equality, 
and individuals judge positively the effects of the welfare state, such as the prevention of 
poverty, of social unrest, and enhancing population well-being (Van Oorschot 2012, 
Svallfors 2012)15. To assess the deservingness of welfare benefits under the norm of 
equality, individuals rely on two criteria. The norm of equality aims at reducing the distress 
of the individuals that are perceived to be the neediest. However, this deservingness is also 
                                                        
15 Defining “Government responsibility”, Svallfors constructs a scale very close to what the norms of 
equality is. It is constructed of the following items on the scope of action of the welfare state: 
“ensure a job for everyone”; “ensure adequate healthcare for the sick”, “ensure reasonable 
standards of living for the unemployed”; “ensure sufficient child services for working parents”; 
“provide paid leave from work to those who have to care for family members”. Despite cross-
national and categorical variations,, support for this dimension of social justice is strong in 
industrialized countries.   
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conditioned by identity, i.e. individuals need to be members of a bounded community for 
others to support their claims for welfare benefits. Based on the principle of equality 
welfare states stabilize social relations and enable a more equal distribution of the 
opportunities; this process however requires internal bonding of individuals and external 
bounding to define who can claim its benefits (Ferrera 2005).   
Reciprocity is the second core norm of the moral economy of the welfare state. The political 
philosophy of the welfare state argues that merit is one of the main principles of justice. 
The notion of merit is very close to reciprocity in the sense that it grounds redistribution in 
a scheme of valued participation and conditionality (Fives 2008). This understanding of 
distributive justice implies that a political community divides, exchanges and shares social 
goods. To base distribution on reciprocity requires societies to enjoy a high degree of social 
capital, i.e. the features, such as values and networks that improve the efficiency of a 
society by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam et al. 1994). Reciprocity is the main 
prerequisite for individuals to cooperate. This is extremely relevant for the groups that are 
expected to contribute the most. The idea of belonging to a community is a forceful 
justification for the welfare state, under the condition that relations among individuals are 
perceived to be reciprocal. ‘Contingent consent’ to an institution – here the welfare state – 
can by explained through reciprocity, as a norm requiring that individuals cooperate with 
government demands but only as long as others also do (Levi 1997). The definition of the 
population of those expected to contribute is of central importance: those who contribute 
are deserving of social benefits, those who do not (or do not sufficiently contribute) are not. 
In terms of the political justification of the welfare state, reciprocity is closely linked to the 
promotion of social inclusion. It is because all contributing members of a society are 
included in a common scheme of welfare that they consent to it. The ‘deservingness debate’ 
demonstrates the central importance of the norm of reciprocity in the moral economy of 
the welfare state. When individuals evaluate who is entitled to welfare benefits, past and 
future contributions are of critical importance. For instance, the elderly are always ranked 
as the most deserving, because they have contributed during their whole life. (Van 
Oorschot, 2008).  
Self-reliance constitutes the third norm of the moral economy of the welfare state. It has 
always been the conventional reference when individuals consider the welfare state 
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(Goodin and Mitchell 2000). Self-reliance is at the centre of the welfare state narratives: 
individuals who are perceived to be self-reliant, sufficient without state intervention, are 
positively viewed (Halvorsen 1998). In the philosophical debate on welfare, Dworkin 
replies to the Rawlsian conception of equality on the basis of individual self-reliance. To 
him, the pivotal distinction for social justice is between ‘chances and choices’. To insure 
social justice, the hazards of chance should be corrected by institutional schemes; but 
above all individuals should be held responsible for their choices (Dworkin 1981). Thought 
as a consequence of indivudal self-reliance, efficiency acts as a guiding principle of the 
political foundation of the welfare state. In that sense, individuals are not only responsible 
for their own welfare, but poverty, and need of assistance are also viewed as a personal 
failure (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989). Self-reliance also has implications at the macro-level, 
since dependence and relying on the community are considered as violations of the rule of 
‘Pareto efficiency’ (when no one can be better off, without some others being worse off). 
Too great dependency bears greater cost on the general welfare of society (Goodin et al. 
1999). In terms of public opinion, self-reliance translates into two criteria for 
deservingness of welfare benefits. To claim rightfully welfare benefits, individuals have to 
demonstrate control (responsibility for their situation, individuals are deemed more 
deserving if their distress is not due to their personal actions) and attitude (individuals will 
be viewed more positively if they show benevolence: they need welfare assistance even 
though they comply with the ‘rules of the game’). 
If norms are stable, they are nonetheless not set in stone: they can evolve over time, or vary 
among countries, classes, and individuals. Indeed, breaking with the Parsonsian theory of 
norms and their attitudinal and behavioural consequences, contemporary studies has 
shown how norms can change – and sometimes rather quickly (Bicchieri 2006). Much of 
the literature that considers the normative dimensions of welfare attitudes stands on an 
institutionalist point of view, i.e. systemic factors shape the normative dimensions of 
welfare attitudes. In his seminal contribution, Esping-Andersen considers welfare regime 
types in terms of institutions but also ‘social relations’. Each of his three welfare regimes is 
grounded in “shared moral assumptions” (Esping-Andersen 1990). Indeed, the three norms 
of the moral economy of the welfare state can be associated with different types of benefit 
or welfare policy orientations that are characteristic of the three welfare regimes. The 
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norm of self-reliance, tied to the principle of need, where only those in the greatest 
deprivation are entitled to welfare benefits (and the majority should rely on itself), is 
associated with means-tested benefits typical of the liberal welfare regime. The norm of 
reciprocity is at the roots of the conditional social insurance schemes of the corporatist or 
continental welfare states. Conversely, the universal and even unconditional entitlements 
of the Scandinavian regimes have their origins in the norm of equality. Institutions, as the 
formal rules, procedures and practices that structure the relationship between individuals 
and the state, shape both norms and interests, and their effect is considered as 
“paramount” (Svallfors 2007, Larsen 2008). The impact of institutions on welfare attitudes 
has been specifically observed:  “in simplified form, the mental figure looks like this: 
institutions give rise to certain interests and norms, which in turn either reinforce or 
undermine the original institutions” (Rothstein, 1998). Welfare regimes are rooted in 
distinct normative values, but regimes themselves tend to “mold” the welfare attitudes 
(Svallfors 1997, Mau 2004). This reciprocal relation exists whether looking at generic 
institutional arrangements or tangible public policies (Mettler and Soss 2004).  
This section defined the constitutive norms of the moral economy of the welfare state: 
equality, reciprocity, and self-reliance. They are grounded in philosophical, political, and 
empirical reasons for welfare, but also shaped by welfare institutions. The next section 
develops how those norms influence attitudes, political behaviour, and how they can 
contribute to the explanation of the success of radical right parties. 
 
2.2.2. Norms, norm violation, welfare attitudes, and the radical right vote 
 
Defining a set of norms that guide preferences towards welfare does not have self-evident 
implications for political attitudes and behaviours. In order to elaborate on how the norms 
of the moral economy of the welfare state can influence political preferences, I rely on the 
assumption that normative beliefs correlate with individual behaviours (Fishbein 1967). 
With his theory of the social actor, Talcott Parsons has defined the academic debate on 
norms and behaviours; in his terms, a norm is “a verbal description of a concrete course of 
action (…) regarded as desirable, combined with an injunction to make certain future 
actions confirm to this course” (Parsons 1968). This theory rests on three principles: 
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norms only change slowly, normative beliefs influence actions, and when a norm is 
internalized, expectations of others conformity have no effect on an individual’s choice to 
conform. However, the latter principle on one’s relation to the others’ conformity to norms 
has been extensively contested. Indeed, norms are determined by one’s beliefs, but also by 
expectation of others’ beliefs (Bicchieri and Chavez 2010). Beyond the significance of 
others’ beliefs, their actions and conformity to norms are also highly influential. The 
question of norm compliance has long constituted the core of the academic debate on social 
norms, and since norm conformity is the most common, it is thus the less interesting 
behaviour to study (Merton 1986). Yet, focusing on one’s deviance to norms should not be 
considered through the lens of individual consequences, but should evaluate how norm-
breaching behaviours affect others’ beliefs (Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011; Brennan et al. 
2013). Indeed, experimental research on norms shows how one’s perception of other 
individuals’ expectations and behaviours is significant for their own choices (Bicchieri 
2006, Bicchieri and Xiao 2009). With regards to welfare preferences, I argue that the most 
important influence of norms on attitudes and political behaviour is the perceptions of the 
others’ compliance with the norms (or their violation). Diverging from the socialization 
theory of Parsons, authors have argued that behaviour are not solely determined by norms, 
but are embedded in networks of individuals. This ‘social identity’ - an individual’s 
membership to a social group (or groups) and the value he attaches to it – is determinant in 
forging his beliefs (Tajfel 1981). Normative beliefs have to coincide both with what an 
individual thinks, but also with what he believes the others in his group think and should 
do (Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011). Regarding the norms of the welfare state, normative 
beliefs should not be considered ‘external’ or ‘exogenous’, because individuals evaluate 
those norms in relation to the representation and perceptions that they have of society, i.e. 
other individuals’ behaviour. Normative beliefs are shaped by the perception of consent 
and dissent to norms within and between social groups (Staerklé et al 2011). More 
concretely, norms imply stereotypical images of individuals or outgroups that are 
considered to be abiding with or deviating from (or violating) these norms. For instance in 
the United States, conformity with a norm such as self-reliance is associated with upper-
class groups. Conversely, violations of this norm is associated with other groups: welfare 
recipients in the case of self-reliance, or more precise sub-groups, such as immigrants, 
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women, or black people (Staerklé 2009). I argue that an individual’s assessment of others’ 
(or of another group’s) compliance with the norms of the welfare state is what influences 
his welfare attitudes, and thus his political preferences. This implies that individual-level 
welfare attitudes, and subsequent political preferences, are sharply influenced by the 
perception that one or more of the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state are 
being violated by an individual or another social group. Normative beliefs on welfare 
produce different representations of different social groups, and boundaries are set 
between groups, who are perceived differently. As a result, some groups are positively 
connoted (in-groups), others are negatively connoted (out-groups) (Tajfel 1978). The 
antagonisms produced between groups are the central feature of normative beliefs 
(Staerklé et al. 2012). As a result, the norm-violating individuals are differentiated, they are 
considered an out-group, and thus considered as negative elements of society (Kreindler 
2005). Definition of boundaries, exclusion and inclusion of social groups, is therefore 
central to the influence of normative beliefs on welfare preferences. The perception of a 
violation of one, or more, of the core norms of the moral economy of the welfare state is 
translated in the exclusion of individuals or a social group: norm violating individuals or 
perceived outgroups are considered undeserving of welfare benefits, and should be 
excluded from welfare schemes. A central feature of the radical right is to be exclusive, and 
value individuals and outgroups differently: from identifying scapegoats to idealizing 
national groups. Consequently, I expect the singling out of outgroups as a result of 
perceived welfare norm violation, is prone to fuel the radical right’s success, and I 
elaborate the exclusion hypothesis in the next section.  
 
2.2.3. The exclusion hypothesis 
 
Individuals who perceive that a welfare norm is violated will hold excluding or exclusive 
welfare attitudes. This attitude is the result of an exclusion process: a norm-violating out-
group is defined, and its deviant behaviour antagonizes some individuals. The radical right 
parties are likely to capture this welfare antagonism because they are ideologically prone 
to exclusion, exclusiveness and targeting others. 
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Indeed, defining bounded communities and exclusion are characteristics of radical right 
parties (Sniderman et al. 2000, Mudde 2007). They are essentially “movements of 
exclusion” (Rydgren 2005). This patterns of exclusion are expressed through their populist 
ideology, despite its ‘chameleonic character’ it always displays an exclusionary trademark 
(Betz 1994, Mény and Surel 2002, Mudde 2004). Populism is based on the antagonism 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, however these groups are defined. Populist exclusionary 
opposition can be vertical or horizontal. Whether directed at the “corrupted elite” (vertical) 
or another out-group (horizontal), the mechanism is one of setting boundaries between the 
‘heartland’, an idealized community and a negatively perceived group (Taggart 2002). 
Welfare states and solidarity are already morally based and practically organised on the 
national community. Therefore much of welfare politics’ conflict echoes in the radical 
right’s nationalism. However, because of their exclusionary features, radical right parties 
are expected to capture to capture the bounding and excluding effects even more, and 
particularly the antagonisms produced by the perceptions of norms violation. Based on this 
theoretical developments, I formulate the exclusion hypothesis of the radical right success 
in Western Europe.  
 
Exclusion Hypothesis: the success of the radical right in Western Europe is explained by the 
successful mobilization of voters who perceive that other individuals and outgroups are 
violating the shared normative welfare beliefs, and who therefore think that they should be 
excluded from welfare schemes and who perceive that the own-group is treated unjustly in 
comparison with outgroups.  
 
The next sections details four excluding welfare attitudes and their exclusion dimension, 
which spur from the three norms of the moral economy of the welfare state. Once these 
attitudes are defined I specify the voting behaviour sub-hypothesis of scapegoating, and the 
party level hypothesis of exclusive solidarity.  
Welfare populism is the attitude derived from the norm of reciprocity. It emerges when 
individuals feel an out-group is not contributing its share of the welfare social contract. 
Similarly to the populist ideology, which is based on vertical and horizontal oppositions, 
welfare populism is structured on the exclusion of out-groups, which are considered 
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undeserving. For instance, ‘welfare scroungers’ are the individuals who abuse the welfare 
system, the welfare dependents who violate the norm of reciprocity because they are seen 
to be maximizing their benefits while minimizing their contributions. Therefore, they 
constitute an out-group within the population at-large. Another populist claim is to blame 
the ‘corrupt elite’, who could be the better integrated individuals of the welfare system. For 
instance, public servants can become a scapegoated out-group of welfare populism, as they 
are the elites of the welfare system, and are deemed usurpers of its benefits. In that 
perspective, even if they contribute, they are perceived to receive higher benefits than their 
contribution should entitled them to. Thus, welfare populism is an opposition between the 
‘hard working citizens’, the ‘little guys’ to welfare usurpers and to the welfare elites. 
Welfare populism therefore creates a category of “social parasites”16, individuals and 
groups who do not participate in the industrious production, and the collective effort of 
welfare schemes. Because of its populist features, the radical right may be prone to blame 
and oppose particularly such individuals or groups. Welfare chauvinism is a specification of 
welfare populism, which is distinctly applicable to the radical right; it can be defined as 
support for a “system of social protection only for those who belong to the ethnically 
defined community and who have contributed to it” (Kitschelt 1995)17. It is considered a 
central feature of populist right vote in Europe in recent years (De Koster et al. 2013). 
Welfare chauvinism corresponds to the idea of violation of the norm of reciprocity: 
immigrants are considered to be an out-group less entitled to welfare, because they have 
contributed less. By nature immigrants join the welfare system programs later than 
natives; and they are perceived to form a structurally dependent group (Van Oroschot 
2008, Van der Waal et al. 2010). Because some individuals perceive that the norm of 
                                                        
16 The term « social parasite » is inspired from Saint-Simon in “Sur la querelle des abeilles et des 
frelons ou Sur la consommation respective des producteurs et des consommateurs non producteurs” 
published in 1819.  
17 Jens Rydgren defined welfare chauvinism in a rather similar way: “In such a conflict situation, 
immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate competitors pitted against natives who are entitled to 
keep the entire cake for themselves. Hence, in this view immigration is seen as a zero-sum game in 
which one side always loses what the other side gains. In addressing welfare chauvinist frames, the 
new radical right-wing parties have used the idea of ‘national preference’: giving to native priority 
in jobs, housing, health care and so on – a proposal that can be characterized as ‘reversed 
affirmative action” (Rydgren 2003) 
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reciprocity is breached by deviant individuals or out-groups, they are prone to support the 
radical right since it is more likely to ‘exclude’, scapegoat, or blame the undeserving groups 
who unfairly monopolize welfare benefits - whether they are an elite or an out-group such 
as immigrants. 
Welfare limitation is the attitude derived from the perception that individual or groups are 
breaching the norm of self-reliance. This norm holds that individuals should not rely on the 
welfare state to fulfil their needs, but rather on their personal actions, specifically through 
hard work. Individuals who are autonomous are positively viewed, whereas individuals 
who are deemed ‘welfare dependent’ are negatively viewed. The argument in favour of the 
self-reliant behaviours is developed at the micro and macro levels. The libertarian 
economic thinking, in the tradition of Hayek and Friedman, argues that the welfare state is 
not the ideal arrangement to maximize the well-being of a society. In this macro-level 
perspective, the welfare state should be reduced to its minimal form, because its 
institutions foster dependency, corrupt citizens from a righteous conduct; and therefore 
does not allow for the maximization of welfare. Because it is deemed to essentially corrupt 
individuals’ self-reliance, the welfare state should be limited in scope. This argument 
implies that welfare institutions also shape micro-level behaviours and incentivizes 
dependence over self-reliance. The support for welfare limitation is stronger when 
dependence is considered avoidable. For instance, unemployment is the most likely to be 
blamed on the individuals, because it is perceived to be one’s responsibility to find and 
keep a job, whereas pension schemes are always more supported since ageing is 
unavoidable and affects all individuals18. However, it is unlikely that citizens evaluate the 
conformity to self-reliance on a macro-level economic scale. They are more concerned with 
abusers and scroungers: individuals who are voluntarily dependent on the welfare system. 
As a consequence, they can assess that the welfare state schemes foster such behaviours, 
and conclude that welfare programs should be retrenched (Halvorsen 1998). The targeting 
of scroungers and appeal for welfare limitation resonates with Kitschelt’s famous “winning 
formula” that expects radical right parties to hold preferences for the reduction of the 
                                                        
18 Under a strictly libertarian conception of the economy, individuals should be expected to forecast 
their future dependence (or eventual illness) and provide insurance systems for themselves instead 
of relying on state schemes.  
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welfare state’s scope and range (Kitschelt 1995, 2007). The blaming the welfare 
dependents and arguing for limitation of the welfare state is a central component of the 
economic views of some radical right parties, and underlies their electoral support.  
Egalitarianism is conceived here as resulting from a breach of the norm of equality, 
whereas in more general studies it is often equated to support for the welfare state 
(Svallfors 1999). But egalitarianism is more than support for welfare institutions, it implies 
the perception that some groups are treated unequally with regards to other (in a 
favourable or unfavourable way). Indeed, expressing egalitarian views can even go along 
with critical views pertaining the welfare state because egalitarianism is not an evaluation 
of the performance of welfare programs, but rather an assessment of group disparities 
(Achterberg et al. 2011). Contrary to the previous attitudes that isolated individuals and 
groups negatively in order to exclude them from welfare programs, egalitarianism singles 
out positively precarious groups that are deemed specially deserving. Applied in the 
conceptual framework of populism, egalitarianism considers that a part of the imagined ‘us’ 
suffers from inequality and exclusion. This applies particularly to some categories of the 
population who display high levels of egalitarianism; in general the blue-collar workers and 
the less well-off tend to express higher egalitarianism (Svallfors 2012). They feel that they 
are unequally treated with regards to the rest of the population. Incidentally, the working 
class is also considered as the core electorate of the radical right (Oesch 2008; Mau and 
Mewes 2012, Rydgren 2007, 2013). We can therefore assume that such feeling of being 
unequally treated drives the support for the radical right.  
Similarly to the protection hypothesis, the exclusion hypothesis is expected to apply at the 
voters’ and parties’ level. Following the previous discussion on identification of deviant 
outgroups, the scapegoating sub-hypothesis expects that some voters identify particular 
outgroups that violate norms, which leads them to support radical right parties. Each of the 
four welfare attitudes described above can lead to radical right support because voters’ 
normative beliefs result in populist inspired group singling out. Targeting negatively 
perceived outgroups such as welfare scroungers or immigrants, or identifying with 
disfavoured social groups is a disposition of voting for antagonizing parties such as the 
radical right. Conversely, radical right parties base their ideology and preferences on 
exclusion (Rydgren 2005). Therefore, the exclusive solidarity sub-hypothesis expects that 
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these parties will promote their welfare preferences chiefly in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion.   
 
2.3.  Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework of this study, and detailed its two 
guiding hypotheses. In order to do so, I rely on two different conceptions of the welfare 
state which are respectively interest-based or rely on normative assumptions. Both 
hypotheses present mechanisms on how welfare politics influences the electoral success of 
radical right parties in Western Europe. The protection and exclusion hypotheses have 
implications at the party and at the voter levels. 
 
  Protection Exclusion 
 
The success of the radical right in 
Western Europe is explained by 
the successful mobilization of 
voters who are economically 
insecure, i.e. who are seeking 
more protective and risk-
reducing, welfare arrangements 
and who are opposed to change. 
The success of the radical right in 
Western Europe is explained by 
the successful mobilization of 
voters who perceive that other 
individuals and outgroups are 
violating the shared normative 
welfare beliefs, and who therefore 
think that they should be excluded 
from welfare schemes and who 
perceive that the own-group is 
treated unjustly in comparison 
with outgroups.  
Demand Side Precarization Scapegoating 
Supply Side Programmatic shift Exclusive solidarity 
Table 4 - Protection and Exclusion hypotheses for the demand and the supply side of 
electoral politics 
 
On the demand side, the precarization sub-hypothesis expects that economically insecure 
voters are likely to support radical right parties who offer them an alternative to 
mainstream parties. The scapegoating sub-hypothesis expect that voters who feel that core 
normative beliefs of welfare redistribution are being violated by individuals or outgroups 
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should support the radical right because it fosters exclusiveness in terms of welfare 
politics.  
On the supply side, the programmatic shift sub-hypothesis expects that radical right parties 
turn their back on their initial ‘winning formula’ which entailed retrenchment of welfare 
institutions in order to adopt protective welfare preferences that match their constituents’ 
economic insecurity. The exclusive solidarity sub-hypothesis expects that radical right 
parties frame their welfare preference in terms of group inclusion and exclusion.  
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3. Welfare politics and voting for the radical right 
 
 
 
 
The protection and exclusion hypotheses provide individual-level voting rationales for 
radical right parties. In this chapter they are both tested with a quantitative large-N 
approach, in order to give a renewed account of the determinants of the vote for radical 
right parties in Western Europe. More precisely, it tests the precarization and the 
scapegoating sub-hypotheses: the radical right vote is expected to be driven – among 
other factors – by economic insecurity and by the perceptions that the normative 
prescriptions of welfare politics are being violated.  
To recall, the guiding hypotheses of this study are considered to be complementary 
more than competing, they are not expected to rule out one another. This introduction 
does not develop extensively the theoretical arguments which grounds each of the 
hypotheses and which have been presented in chapter 2, but it provides individual-level 
testable expectations for both hypotheses. First, the protection hypothesis entails that 
increasing economic insecurity is positively associated to the radical right vote, because 
these parties reject the globalization which is considered responsible for economic 
insecurity, and because they represent parties of the status quo, which grants them a 
protective image. There are multiple ways of measuring economic insecurity but due to 
conceptual choices and data restriction, I have defined three individual level 
characteristics, which are expected to be associated with radical right voting: high-risk 
occupational positions, retrospective and prospective economic insecurity. Blue-collar 
workers are the most exposed to globalization’s economic consequences, and they are 
confronted with a structural economic insecurity, therefore belonging to this 
economically insecure occupational groups is expected to increase the support for the 
radical right (H1). In addition to sectoral economic insecurity, individuals’ perception of 
economic security – both retrospective and prospective, is expected to drive the radical 
right vote (H2 and H3).  Second, based on the scapegoating of out-groups and 
individuals who are perceived to be violating normative prescriptions about welfare 
  58 
politics, the exclusion hypothesis posits that four welfare attitudes are positively 
associated to the radical right vote: welfare populism (H4), welfare chauvinism (H5), 
welfare limitation (H6) and egalitarianism (H7). The previous chapter showed how the 
perceived violations of the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state can lead to 
group scapegoating and welfare attitudes which underlie radical right support. Yet, the 
moral economy of the welfare state is a complex system of norms and values, which are 
not strictly independent from one another and most likely interact. One can perceive 
that several normative prescriptions of welfare politics and being breached; and 
interactions of the consequent welfare attitudes may increase their influence on voting 
for the radical right. For instance, the critics of the welfare state under the violations of 
the norms of reciprocity and self-reliance can be combined. The limitation of the welfare 
state can be associated with the expression that welfare redistribution benefits only an 
undeserving non-contributing outgroups, and that its beneficiaries should be limited to 
the most deserving – excluding groups perceived as less deserving such as the 
unemployed and immigrants (H8 and H9) Alternatively, when both norms of reciprocity 
and equality are perceived to be violated, individuals can feel their in-group is not 
entitled to enough social benefits, whereas some are not contributing their share, such 
as welfare scroungers or immigrants (H10 and H11). 
The final level of interactive hypotheses tackles the influence of institutions on welfare 
attitudes. In short, each of the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state is the 
fundamental principle of the three different welfare regime types identified by, 
constituting their “shared moral assumption” Esping-Andersen (1990). Therefore, I 
expect the effects of the welfare attitudes on the vote to be stronger within welfare 
regimes in which they are the guiding principle. In continental welfare states, the breach 
of the norm of reciprocity should be even stronger, and welfare populism and 
chauvinism should have a greater influence on the radical right vote (H12 and H13). 
Likewise, the effect of egalitarianism on the radical right vote should be stronger in 
Scandinavian welfare states (H14)19. Table 5 summarizes the fourteen individual level 
testable hypotheses of the influence of welfare politics on the radical right vote.  
                                                        
19 There is no case of a country that has both a liberal welfare regime and a successful radical 
right party in Western Europe in the dataset. Therefore the possible interaction between the 
breach of norms of self-reliance and the vote cannot be tested in this chapter. Considering recent 
electoral developments in the United Kingdom, the influence of welfare politics on the UKIP vote 
and on the Brexit referendum make for a stimulating future research agenda.  
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Protection Hypothesis 
H1 High risk occupational position 
H2 Retrospective economic insecurity 
H3 Prospective economic insecurity 
Exclusion Hypothesis 
H4 Welfare Populism 
H5 Welfare Chauvinism 
H6 Welfare Limitation 
H7 Egalitarianism 
Interactive Hypotheses 
H8 Welfare Populism*Welfare Limitation 
H9 Welfare Chauvinism*Welfare Limitation 
H10 Welfare Populism*Egalitarianism 
0H11 Welfare Chauvinism*Egalitarianism 
H12 Welfare Populism*Continental welfare regime 
H13 Welfare Chauvinism*Continental welfare regime 
H14 Egalitarianism*Scandinavian welfare regime 
Table 5 - Protection, Exclusion, and interactive hypotheses at the individual level 
 
This chapter provides a conventional analysis of voters’ preferences: it analyses the 
determinants of the vote for the radical right parties. Its originality, however, lies in the 
comprehensive account of how occupational and attitudinal factors of welfare politics 
can explain the vote for a radical right party in Western Europe.  
The first part of the chapter details the data and operationalization of variables of 
interest (3.1.). The following section tests the effects of each of the constructed variables 
on the radical right vote. The second step of the analysis takes a broader perspective and 
compares the influence of welfare politics on the radical right vote with other voting 
behaviours and across countries (3.2.). Finally, the results and their implications are 
discussed (3.4.).  
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3.1. Data and operationalization 
 
The individual-level analysis is based on the European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS4) of 
200820. This dataset is not the most recent to account for the radical right vote, but it is 
particularly well suited to study the relation between radical right voting and welfare 
politics. ESS4 has a specific rotating module on “welfare attitudes in changing Europe” 
which allows for finer grained analysis of welfare dispositions and attitudes and their 
consequences on political behaviour. This section first details the construction of voting 
behaviour dependent variables (3.1.1.), then variables of interest of the protection and 
exclusion hypotheses (3.1.2.), and finally of additional control variables (3.1.3.). 
 
3.1.1. Dependent variables: voting for the radical right 
 
This analysis deals with voting behaviour, therefore it focuses on the radical right 
electoral constituencies and not with other types of support (such as partisan 
proximity). It is restricted to countries in which there is an electorally relevant radical 
right party at the time of the survey. I define electoral relevance by two conditions: the 
radical right party must have reached a significant share of the vote, and in at least two 
consecutive elections. Therefore, I exclude cases with longstanding micro radical right 
parties or ephemeral radical right party successes (for instance in Portugal, Spain, or the 
United Kingdom prior to 2014). Two potentially significant cases also have to be left out 
of this analysis: the Sweden Democrats and the Italian Lega Nord.  The former have only 
broken through electorally in 2010 (while the ESS4 data was collected in 2007). The 
latter is not included in the ESS4 dataset. Although Lega Nord meets all the criteria of 
radical right parties, it presents the additional problem of being an essentially 
regionalist movement. This could create difficulties to study welfare politics which is 
essentially tied to national communities (Ferrera 2005, Banting and Kymlicka 2017). 
Hence, the analysis of the radical right voting in Western Europe is based on eight 
countries and their respective radical right parties: Austria (Freiheitliche Partei 
                                                        
20 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 4.3. NSD - 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS 
ERIC. 
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Österreichs, FPÖ) Denmark (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), Finland (Perussuomalaiset, TF), 
Norway (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP), France (Front National, FN), the Netherlands (Partij 
voor de Vrijheid, PVV), Belgium (Vlaams Belang, VB; Front National, FN) and Switzerland 
(Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP)21.  
Voting for the radical right is the dependent variable throughout this chapter, but it is 
operationalized in different ways. The analysis is based on retrospective vote choice 
from the last legislative election before the interview (elections date from 2005 to 
200822). Voting behavior is measured in two different ways: a dichotomous variable, and 
a categorical variable. In the first case, voting for the radical right is opposed to all other 
options: one either votes for the radical right or not. In the second case, voting for the 
radical is compared to every other possible vote choice. Alternative vote choices are 
classified in seven coherent party families: Non-governmental Left, Socialist/Social-
democrat, New Left (greens), Liberals, Christian-Democrats, Conservatives and the 
Radical Right. Not-voting is included in the analysis as another “alternative vote choice”.  
The seven party families encompass almost every party competing in Western Europe 
and the classification is based on the European party affiliation of each national party. 
Parties of the mainstream right are however subdivided into two categories 
(Conservatives and Christian-Democrats) since the EPP gathers parties with arguably 
distinct socio-economic preferences23. (See Appendix A for the full classification of 
                                                        
21 Although the SVP is the most important radical right party in Switzerland, three other parties 
classify as belonging to this party family: Schweizer Demokraten, SD; Lega dei Ticinesi, LdT, 
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union, EDU. Only the SVP gathers the two conditions of electoral 
relevance, but four parties are kept in the analysis. Since the electorate is considered as a whole, 
it is acceptable to include the four parties to form the group of Swiss radical right voters. A 
similar approach is taken for Belgium, even if VB and Front National (Wallonia) do not compete 
in the same electoral arenas; their voters are the Belgian radical right electorates. An alternative 
for the case of voting for the Vlaams Belang would be to consider Flanders only. This would 
however reduce the sample too much.   
22 Although most of the data has been collected in late 2007, the survey was conducted later in 
Austria than in the other countries, thus data for the 2008 legislative elections is included.  
23 The Liberals, Christian-Democrats and Conservatives have been distinguished even though 
they can belong to the same EP groups because, although they share common positions, they are 
expected to diverge precisely on the issues of redistribution. Regionalist parties have been 
reallocated to other party families accordingly to their European affiliation at the time. This is 
particularly relevant for the radical right, where the regionalist Vlaams Belang is considered as 
the main radical right party in Belgium. In Switzerland, the regionalist Lega dei Ticinesi – which 
is formally allied to the SVP – and represents only 3 observations, is pooled with the radical 
right.  
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political parties). Non-voting is a distinct electoral option (including blank votes and 
spoilt votes). Electoral analysis of the radical right is often confronted with the issue of 
underrepresentation of the voters in surveys. Smaller parties already have small 
proportions of respondents in such surveys, but this is worsened by under-declaration 
of the radical right vote due to social desirability. Radical right voters are systematically 
underrepresented when compared to the official electoral result; in the present case, the 
gap is acceptable and the samples are always comparable to the actual electoral result 
(table 6). In the pooled sample for these eight countries, the 974 radical right voters 
constitute a satisfactory sample. However, there is quite a large variation within 
countries, in which radical right voters range from a low n=37 in France to n=218 in 
Switzerland.  
 
 
Austria 
(2008) 
Belgium 
(2007) 
Switzerland 
(2007) 
Denmark 
(2007) 
Finland 
(2007) 
France24 
(2007) 
Netherlands 
(2006) 
Norway 
(2005) 
ESS4 17% 8% 29% 10% 4% 3% 4% 16% 
Election Results 18% 12% 29% 14% 4% 4% 6% 22% 
Table 6 - Representativeness of ESS4 radical right voters 
 
3.1.2. Variables of interest: economic insecurity and welfare attitudes 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, I put forward two hypotheses to explain the relation between 
welfare politics and the radical right. Hence, there are three sets of independent 
variables: those relating to the protection hypothesis, those relating to the exclusion 
hypothesis, and the usual control variables of electoral analysis.  
The first aspect of the theory that links economic insecurity to radical right voting is the 
individuals’ own economic risks. There are two ways to assess economic insecurity:  
occupational experiences and individual perceived risks. Occupational experiences are 
                                                        
24 France poses an additional problem, vote choice is calculated for the 2007 legislative election 
whereas the presidential election would have been more suited. Traditionally, the FN always 
scores lower in legislative elections which are held a month after the presidential ones, and who 
electorally confirm the legislative majority of the newly elected president. In a runoff 
majoritarian system the FN is obstructed, because other parties strategically choose to eliminate 
it (cordon sanitaire). This might explain the important underrepresentation of FN voters, 
whereas this party is among the strongest radical right parties in Europe. In addition, the 2007 
legislative election was an under performance for the FN compared to its usual scores.  
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generally captured by belonging to a specific economic sector and therefore a given 
occupational class. To account for occupational experiences I rely on Oesch’s (2006a, 
2006b) class schema, which is derived from the International Standard of Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO88). This recalibration accounts for labour-market positions and 
also goes beyond the manual/non-manual divide. The ISCO classification in 16 distinct 
positions gives a fine-grained account of individuals’ occupational experience, but 
produces categories that are too small for statistical relevance. This is even more crucial 
when looking at the profile of the radical right voters, who already make up a limited 
sample. These groupings can also be aggregated in 8 occupational positions, or in 4 
reliable social classes: employers, middle-class, working class and routine workers. In 
order to construct these groupings, I follow Häusermann and Gingrich’s method of 
recoding groups with a combination of occupational status, education levels and self-
employment status (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015, presented in Table 7) 25.  
Yet membership in an occupational class – however coherently aggregated is not a 
sufficient measure of economic insecurity. There are two major reasons why 
occupational status cannot fully give account of economic insecurity. First, the 
aggregation obliterates the individual-level differences within social classes. Indeed, 
there can be a strong variance in economic insecurity within individuals of the same 
occupational class. Among the routine workers or the working class for instance, some 
individuals are established insiders, whereas others are precarious outsiders.  Second, 
class is also a very static measure that cannot account for the possible variations of an 
individual’s employment history. One could be economically secure now, but still have 
faced dire economic insecurity in the past. An alternative approach to measuring 
economic insecurity is to add occupational level rates of unemployment, in a 
combination with skill specificity or employment types (for instance Rehm 2009, 
Schwander and Häusermann 2013) or employment characteristics at the individual 
level (Rueda 2005). 
There are still disadvantages to using objective labour-market risks to account for 
economic insecurity: first, it is restricted to employment characteristics (economic 
insecurity relates to broader concerns about finances, health and household situation); 
                                                        
25 I thank prof. Häusermann and prof. Gingrich for their assistance in implementing this coding 
scheme in the analyses of chapters 3 and 5. The finer-grained occupational classifications are not 
directly of use for this chapter, but they are introduced, as they will be central to the chapter 
analyzing the diverging class interests of radical right voters. 
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second, it does not account for one’s past experiences. Because both mere occupational 
class and objective labour-market risks are insufficient to fully capture economic 
insecurity, I opt for subjective measures of prospective and retrospective of economic 
insecurity, which allow for correcting (or completing) these shortcomings.  
 
ISCO 
Occupational classification 
(Oesch 2006) 
Occupational classification 
(Häusermann & Gingrinch 2015) 
Large employers  (>9)          Large employers and self-
employed professionals 
Employers 
Self-employed professionals 
Small business owners with 
employees (< 10) 
Small business owners 
Small business owners without 
employees 
Socio-cultural professionals 
Socio-cultural (semi-) 
professionals 
Middle class 
Socio-cultural semi-
professionals 
Higher-grade managers and 
administrators 
(Associate) managers 
Lower-grade managers and 
administrators 
Skilled service 
Service workers 
Workers 
Skilled clerks 
Technical experts  
Technical (semi-) professionals 
Technicians 
Skilled manual/crafts 
Production workers 
Low-skilled manual 
Low-skilled service 
Office clerks Routine 
Unskilled clerks 
Table 7 - Occupational Classifications 
 
Prospective subjective economic insecurity is measured by a Likert-scale that aggregates 
three items of economic insecurity: the perceived likelihood of becoming unemployed, 
of lacking money to cover the household’s expenses, and of lacking healthcare coverage 
over the next 12 months. To account for the possible influence of past events on 
preferences formation, retrospective economic insecurity is measured by a binary 
variable capturing whether an individual once experienced an unemployment period of 
more than 3 months (that is without a job and looking for one). In the pooled sample, 
25% of the sample reports having been unemployed in the past. However, there are 
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variations of level of retrospective economic insecurity among countries: past levels of 
unemployment are the highest in Finland (30%) and France (34%), whereas they are 
the lowest in the Switzerland and Denmark (16%). Prospective economic insecurity is 
subject to smaller variations within the sample (average score of 1.8, highest in Austria 
with 2.1, and lowest in Denmark with 1.6). (See Appendix B for average of the variables 
of interest and Appendix C for country details). The combination of labour-market 
experience (occupational status) with retrospective and prospective economic 
insecurity fully captures the dimensions of economic insecurity as defined in chapter 2; 
it combines structural factors with individual’s assessments of past and present 
economic insecurity.  
The exclusion hypothesis defined four welfare attitudes resulting from perceived norm 
violation: welfare populism, welfare chauvinism, welfare limitation, and egalitarianism. 
These four attitudes are measured by 5-point Likert-scales. The specific module on 
welfare attitudes of the ESS4 (2008) is the only dataset, which gives enough information 
to create comprehensive scales of normative beliefs about welfare politics. In addition to 
their theoretical definition, the validity and homogeneity of the welfare attitudes is 
empirically confirmed with series of factor analyses of relevant variables of the specific 
ESS module pertaining to beliefs about the welfare stat. In addition to the main 
questionnaire of the ESS, the rotating module has 50 questions about welfare, which 
includes “attitudes towards welfare provision, size of claimant groups, views on 
taxation, attitudes towards service delivery and likely future dependence on welfare”. 
The results of the factor analysis select only the relevant and significant variables. The 
theoretically constructed attitudes are supported by the data; welfare limitation, 
egalitarianism, welfare populism, and welfare chauvinism are built on the results of 
factor analysis. 
Each of the hypothesized welfare attitudes is a Likert-scale formed of between two and 
four Likert-items. Each scale ranges from 1 to 5, higher scores expressing higher 
agreement.  Table 8 presents the composition of the four distinct factors identified by 
the orthogonal rotation of principal component factor analysis. 
Welfare limitation is the attitude that derives from the violation of the norm of self-
reliance and it is praises autonomous individuals in contrast to those who rely – or 
depend - on the welfare state. On top of identifying norm breaching behaviours, this 
attitude entails a broader conception of the role of the welfare state. Therefore welfare 
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limitation is composed of a reversed scale of agreement with the position that the state 
should guarantee the “standards of living” of different groups at risks (the old, the 
unemployed, the sick) and ensure jobs for every individual. The higher scores on the 
scale of welfare limitation correspond to the belief that the welfare state should be more 
limited.  
Egalitarianism is the welfare attitude derived from the norm of equality, which 
dimensions including reducing poverty, promoting social equality and avoiding 
exclusion. Following the definition developed in chapter 2, egalitarianism implies the 
perception that some groups are treated unequally with regards to other (in a 
favourable or unfavourable way). Contrary to the other attitudes, egalitarianism 
identifies  a group positively, and considers it particularly deserving when it comes to 
welfare benefits or at least to be denied benefits it should receive. The egalitarianism 
scale is thus composed of items that identify such deserving groups:  “low incomes” and 
“those in real need” who are perceived not to receive the benefits to which they should 
be entitled.  
Welfare Populism and Welfare Chauvinism both derive from the violation of the norm of 
reciprocity, the latter being a specification of the former that targets specifically 
immigrants. Welfare Populism expresses the violation of the norm of reciprocity by 
identifying an out-group that is deemed undeserving of the welfare benefits it enjoys, 
because it is not contributing its share. It is an opposition to the “welfare scroungers” 
who abuse the welfare system and who are seen to be maximizing their benefits while 
minimizing their contributions. The attitudinal scale is composed of two items related to 
the negative consequences of welfare benefits (making people more lazy, and less caring 
for themselves and their families) and two items on concrete violations of the norm of 
reciprocity (unemployed individuals not looking for jobs, employees pretending to be 
sick). The scale of welfare chauvinism focuses on reciprocity in giving welfare benefits to 
immigrants: after how long in the country should they receive welfare benefits, do they 
receive more than they contribute, are immigrants settling in the country because of 
social benefits. 
 
 
 
 
  
6
7
 
   
F
ac
to
r 
1
 
W
el
fa
re
 
P
o
p
u
li
sm
 
F
ac
to
r 
2
  
W
el
fa
re
 
L
im
it
at
io
n
 
F
ac
to
r 
3
 
E
ga
li
ta
ri
an
is
m
 
F
ac
to
r 
4
 
W
el
fa
re
 
C
h
au
v
in
is
m
 
U
n
iq
u
en
es
s 
So
ci
al
 b
en
ef
it
s 
m
ak
e 
p
eo
p
le
 l
az
y
 
0
.8
1
 
-0
.0
3
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.3
2
 
So
ci
al
 b
en
ef
it
s 
m
ak
e 
p
eo
p
le
 l
es
s 
lo
o
k
 a
ft
er
 t
h
em
se
lv
es
 
0
.7
8
 
-0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.3
9
 
M
o
st
 u
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
 d
o
 n
o
t 
re
al
ly
 t
ry
 t
o
 f
in
d
 a
 jo
b
 
0
.6
9
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.4
4
 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
o
ft
en
 p
re
te
n
d
 t
h
ey
 a
re
 s
ic
k
 t
o
 s
ta
y
 h
o
m
e
 
0
.6
1
 
0
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.5
7
 
G
o
v
. R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
: s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 o
f 
li
v
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
o
ld
 
0
 
0
.8
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.3
6
 
G
o
v
. R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
: h
ea
lt
h
ca
re
 f
o
r 
th
e 
si
ck
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.7
7
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.3
9
 
G
o
v
. R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
: s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 o
f 
li
v
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
u
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
 
-0
.1
3
 
0
.4
7
 
0
.0
9
 
-0
.0
6
 
0
.7
6
 
G
o
v
. R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
: j
o
b
s 
fo
r 
ev
er
y
o
n
e 
0
.0
2
 
0
.6
2
 
0
.1
2
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.5
9
 
In
su
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
b
en
ef
it
s 
in
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
 t
o
 h
el
p
 p
eo
p
le
 in
 r
ea
l n
ee
d
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.7
9
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.3
7
 
M
an
y
 w
it
h
 lo
w
 i
n
co
m
es
 g
et
 le
ss
 b
en
ef
it
s 
th
an
 le
ga
ll
y
 e
n
ti
tl
ed
 t
o
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.7
9
 
0
 
0
.3
7
 
W
h
en
 s
h
o
u
ld
 im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 o
b
ta
in
 r
ig
h
ts
 t
o
 s
o
ci
al
 b
en
ef
it
s/
se
rv
ic
es
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.4
1
 
0
.7
4
 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 a
re
 e
n
co
u
ra
ge
d
 t
o
 c
o
m
e 
to
 t
h
e 
co
u
n
tr
y
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
so
ci
al
 b
en
ef
it
s 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.7
6
 
0
.4
1
 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 r
ec
ei
v
e 
m
o
re
 t
h
an
 t
h
ey
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
te
 
0
.2
6
 
0
.0
7
 
-0
.1
4
 
0
.7
2
 
0
.4
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
ig
en
v
al
u
e
 
2
.3
 
1
.9
 
1
.4
 
1
.4
 
  
 
T
a
b
le
 8
 -
 F
a
ct
o
r 
a
n
a
ly
si
s 
fo
r 
w
e
lf
a
re
 a
tt
it
u
d
e
s 
re
p
o
rt
e
d
 f
ro
m
 o
rt
h
o
g
o
n
a
l 
ro
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ri
n
ci
p
a
l 
co
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
fa
ct
o
r 
a
n
a
ly
si
s.
 
     
  68 
 
 
3.1.3. Control variables 
 
The models include the conventional control variables of electoral behaviour analysis, 
mainly socio-demographic characteristics. Moreover, they are especially relevant when 
dealing with the radical right vote in Western Europe, since they account for a – minor 
but real – portion of the variance in support for the radical right parties (Van der Brug et 
al. 2005). Hence, in the following analysis variables of age, gender, education (as a 
categorical variable of 3 levels: ‘less than upper secondary’, ‘upper secondary’, and 
‘tertiary education’) and household income (in deciles) are included.  
Attitudes relating to cultural issues are prominent in explaining the radical right vote, 
and more specifically the workers’ support for the radical right (Mudde 2007, Oesch 
2008). One cannot assess the influence of welfare politics (holding specific welfare 
attitudes, or being economically insecure) without controlling for the cultural 
explanation of radical right support. As radical right parties have been framed as single-
issue parties focusing on immigration I rely on an attitude towards immigration to 
measure the cultural factor of the radical right vote. Note that welfare chauvinism also 
expresses an attitude towards immigrant (on the economic dimension, and based on the 
norm of reciprocity), therefore the anti-immigration attitude is restricted to the socio-
cultural dimension. The variable of socio-cultural attitude towards immigration is 
measured with the item “country’s life is undermined or enriched by immigrants”, a 5-
point Likert scale, with higher scores corresponding to anti-immigration attitudes. (See 
Appendix B and C for a statistical summary of the variables of interest constructed in 
order to test the protection and exclusion hypotheses.  
 
3.2. Results 
 
In order to demonstrate – or invalidate – the protection and exclusion hypotheses the 
following section proceeds in four steps. First, the significance of economic insecurity 
and welfare attitude determinants for voting for radical right parties is tested through 
different models of logistic regression (3.3.1.). Second, the seven variables of interests 
(three for the protection hypothesis, four for the exclusion hypothesis) are analysed 
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more closely through a comprehensive presentation of predicted probabilities of the 
radical right vote for each covariate (3.2.2.). Third, multinomial logistic models show 
how the influence of welfare politics on the radical right vote contrasts with that of 
other constituencies (3.2.3.). Voting cannot be reduced to binary choices, and explaining 
voting behaviour should focus not only on what drives the vote for a specific party, but 
also how these drivers play differently with regards to other voting options. Indeed, vote 
choice cannot be simply reduced to voting for the radical right or not; but it should be 
analysed with regards to other voting (or non-voting) possible outcomes. We can expect 
welfare politics’ factors to have significant contrasting effects on voting for the left, the 
right, or the radical right. The question remains if welfare politics significantly 
distinguishes radical right voters from other party families and in which direction. The 
last section deals with cross-country variations since both constituencies and parties 
display variance within West European cases (3.2.4.).  
 
3.2.1. Voting for the radical right in Western Europe 
 
Voting for the radical right in Western Europe is explained through logistic regressions 
on a sample of voters (who have expressed a party preferences) comprising between 
9133 and 9620 individuals. Using this method, cross-country variations can pose a two 
problems that may bias the results: there may be country-specific effects that the model 
would obliterate; and there is a rather large variation of radical right voters in the 
different country samples. To correct for these issues, the models are run with country 
fixed-effects. Table 9 presents the results for the six models of the analysis, including the 
control variables (I), the protection hypothesis variables (II), the exclusion hypothesis 
variables (III), a combined model (IV), a model including attitudinal interactions (V), and 
a model with welfare regime type interactions (VI). Since odds-ratio provide more 
intuitive interpretation for binary or categorical variables in terms of percentages, the 
odds-ratio derived from these models are presented in Appendix D.  
In model I, the control variables confirm existing knowledge of the determinants of the 
radical right vote in all models (Lubbers and Scheppers 2000, Givens 2004, Norris 
2005). Moreover their effect is consistent across all models – with some marginal 
variation in the size of coefficients. Age (as a numerical variable) is not a predictor of the 
vote for the radical right. However, Arzheimer and Carter have shown that age has a U-
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shaped effect on voting for the radial right: the youngest and the oldest age cohorts are 
more likely to vote for a RRP than middle-aged voters (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). 
Income does not yield significant results in this model. Possibly, the controls for 
education, class, and attitudes towards immigration – all positive and significant - 
capture an effect of income. Indeed, education yields significant and strong effects on the 
radical right vote, in line with what prior analyses have established: the more voters are 
educated, the less they vote for the radical right. However, the reciprocal relation is not 
true, the least educated voters are not the individuals that vote the most for the radical 
right – they tend to abstain – but it is rather the voters with a “middle-school education” 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Kriesi and Bornschier 2013). This trend finds support in all 
models: there is no significant difference in voting for the radical right between 
individuals with a secondary level of education and those with a primary level of 
education. Gender remains a strong determinant of voting for the radical right: women 
are between 25% and 30% less likely to support a radical right party across all models, 
which is consistent with previous findings (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer 
2009, Harteveld et al. 2015, Immerzeel et al. 2015). However, the gender gap in radical 
right constituencies is a contested debate: while some authors claim it is closing (Mayer 
2013a), others argue that the gender gap persists because of women’s motivation to 
control their prejudice, i.e. internalized social desirability (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 
2016). Finally, as expected, cultural the anti-migration attitude is strongly and 
consistently associated with voting for the radical right.  
Model II presents the results of the variables derived from the protection hypothesis. 
Both prospective and retrospective economic insecurity are positive determinants of 
voting for the radical right. Retrospective insecurity has the strongest effect, and the 
model predicts that an individual who has experienced a period of at least three months 
of unemployment in his life is roughly 40% more likely to vote for the radical right than 
an individual who was continuously employed. Although with lower coefficients, 
prospective economic insecurity is also positively linked to voting for the radical right. 
These results confirm that economic insecurity is a significant determinant of voting for 
the radical right. The effects of occupational class are also in line with existing 
knowledge of the sociological composition of the radical right electorate. Compared to 
working class voters, belonging to the middle class or being an employer make it 
roughly 25% less likely to vote for a radical right party. There is, however, no significant 
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difference between the working class and routine service workers. There is nonetheless 
a difference of socio-economic status with regards to the radical right vote: individuals 
with a lower status (blue-collar workers, routine non-manual workers) are more likely 
to vote for the radical right than those with a higher socio-economic status (middle class, 
employers). All things constant, introducing occupational class and variables of 
economic insecurity in the model reduces the effect of education on the radical right 
vote (dark grey in table 9). When taking the variables of the protection hypothesis into 
account, individuals with a tertiary education are 43% less likely to vote for the radical 
right than individuals with a primary education, whereas this likelihood was of 50% in 
Model I (odds-ratio, Appendix C of this letter). This, however, does not mean that the 
effect of education is smaller than the effect of occupational class. Indeed, education is 
established in the literature as a very significant factor of voting for the radical right. 
When comparing the predicted probabilities of the vote, being a production worker and 
holding a primary level of education are associated with the same predicted probability 
of 9% of voting for the radical right (all else equal). Whereas, the mean probability of the 
sample is 7%, it increases to 12% for individuals with secondary education (Annex D of 
this letter). Overall, the variation in levels of education appear to have a stronger effect 
on the probability to vote for the radical right than belonging to different occupational 
classes. Yet, occupational class – and particularly being a blue-collar worker - has an 
effect of their own, which is otherwise partially captured by education in models that do 
not account for it. Overall, Model II confirms that economic insecurity, measured by 
occupational class belonging and prospective and retrospective economic insecurity 
underlies support for the radical right. 
Model III presents the effects of the four welfare attitudes derived from the exclusion 
hypothesis. Previous research had established that welfare chauvinism is a typical 
attitude of radical right voters, and the model forcefully confirms it. No other variable 
has a comparable effect to that of holding welfare chauvinist preferences. The 
introduction of welfare chauvinism in the model also reduces the anti-immigration 
effect by a quarter, which shows that anti-immigration attitudes capture welfare related 
concerns. This reduction of the effect of socio-cultural anti-immigration attitudes is 
mostly driven by the effect of welfare chauvinism. Indeed, the two attitudes have similar 
trends of effects on voting for the radical right, although the predicted probabilities 
associated with welfare chauvinism are lower (Annex E). These evidence point to the 
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fact that some welfare attitudes and particularly welfare chauvinism not just positively 
associated to voting for the radical right. Welfare politics factors have individual effects 
that are generally captured by broader factors in the literature, such anti-immigration 
attitudes. Additionally, the hypothesis on violated reciprocity is supported by the 
positive – yet smaller - effect of holding welfare populist attitudes on the radical right 
vote. These two attitudes spur from the same logic – normative prescriptions of 
reciprocity are being breached – and they are similarly associated with voting for the 
radical right. On the other hand, egalitarianism and welfare limitation are not 
significantly associated to voting for the radical right, yet being egalitarian or in favour 
of welfare limitation is not negatively associated to this vote either. This means that the 
more distrustful of the welfare recipients (welfare populists), particularly if they are 
immigrants (welfare chauvinists) are more likely to vote for the radical right. However, 
at this stage, no conclusion can be drawn on the effect of preferences for extending 
(egalitarianism) or limiting welfare benefits on the vote.  
Model IV presents the combined model establishing the relation between welfare 
politics and the radical right. On the whole, the effects of models II and III hold, but they 
are marginally affected. When controlled for welfare attitude, economic insecurity 
appears to have slightly stronger explanatory power. Welfare limitation and 
egalitarianism remain without effect in the combined model. 
Model V adds interaction terms between attitudes derived from two couples of norms: 
reciprocity and self-reliance, and reciprocity and egalitarianism. In the case of 
attitudinal scales, the main terms of the interactions give little information (both 
egalitarianism and welfare limitation become significant and positively associated to 
radical right voting). The effect of welfare populism is mitigated when combined with 
welfare limitations; individuals who perceive that there are welfare abusers and also 
believe that the state’s responsibility for welfare should be reduced are less likely to 
vote for the radical right. This provides indirect support for the protection hypothesis, 
since the individuals who do not support the protective vocation of the welfare state and 
who feel it is being cheated tend to vote for other parties than the radical right. On the 
other hand, the interaction between welfare chauvinism and egalitarianism is negatively 
associated to the radical right vote; even if welfare chauvinism is the highest covariate 
across models, it is mediated by egalitarianism. Individuals who are both welfare 
chauvinist and egalitarian tend to support other parties (presumably on the left).  
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Model VI26 tests the effects of each welfare attitude interacted with contextual variables, 
the welfare regime types. In each welfare regime type, one constitutive norm of the 
moral economy of the welfare state is the founding principle. The assumption is that the 
political consequences of the perception of norm violation will be higher where this 
norm is deemed more important. Because the norm of reciprocity is assumed to be the 
most important “shared principle” in corporatist continental welfare regime, the effects 
of welfare populism and chauvinism are expected to be higher. Conversely, the breach of 
the norm of equality is expected to have a positive influence on the radical right vote in 
universal Scandinavian regimes. Welfare chauvinism remains a strong predictor of the 
vote in both welfare regime types. In this model, egalitarianism is negatively associated 
to the radical right vote, except in Scandinavian countries. However, the positive and 
significant interactive term result implies the perception of violation of egalitarianism is 
positively associated to voting for the radical right in universal welfare regimes. 
Contrary to the expectations, this regime-specific relation does not hold for reciprocity 
corporatist welfare regimes.  
Admittedly, the regression models shown in the models of chapter 3 have rather low R2, 
and the addition of variables in the different models only marginally increase this 
measure (ranging from 0.13 to 0.18). However, the limited increase does not mean that 
the additional factors of the model are not decisive. Even with an average R2, “noisy” 
data can have significant trends. Important conclusions can still be drawn on that model 
under the condition that the factors in the model are statistically significant. This is the 
case of most factors and attitudes deriving from the protection and exclusion 
hypothesis, which also tend to have rather high coefficients. 
These models however do not fully account for the effects of economic insecurity, and 
even for welfare attitudes. Most importantly, the effects of these factors cannot be 
expected to have completely linear relations to voting behaviour; the next section goes 
further in explaining the effects of these variables by presenting detailed predicted 
probabilities of the vote. 
 
 
                                                        
26 In order to include a welfare regime type dummy, model V does not use country fixed effects. 
However, the yielded results are extremely similar (with the exception of the interacted 
variables) which tend to indicate that welfare regime type capture most of the cross-country 
differences.  
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3.2.2. Individual effects of the variables of interest 
 
The predicted probabilities for the different levels of each of the variables of interest 
provide a finer-grained analysis of their effect. Predicted probabilities are also easily 
interpretable, as they give a predicted share of the vote for the radical for given levels of 
economic insecurity or welfare attitudes27. However, they are not giving an account of 
the genuine sample that is analysed, as they are calculated for each variable of interest 
with all other variables set at means and therefore they are predictions about 
hypothetical observations. Hence they do not exactly describe the entire population, but 
rather the specific individual effects of the modalities of each variable. In this sample, 
the average predicted probability of voting for the radical right is 0.072. Therefore all 
predicted probabilities should be interpreted with regard to the 7% likelihood of voting 
for a radical right party.  
The computed predicted probabilities of the economic insecurity variables confirm the 
effects presented in the previous section (figure 2). The working class, as well as 
individuals who experienced unemployment are more likely to vote for the radical right 
than others. Among the four broad occupational classes, the working class stands out for 
its level of support for the radical right. Being a working class voter increases the 
probability of voting for the radical right to 9%. Yet, this does not mean that 9% of the 
working class votes for the radical right. Indeed, this is the effect of being a working 
class voter, all else equal (other variables held at their mean). The radical right vote of 
the working class is also determined by other factors. In the sample, 15.3% of working 
class individuals reported voting for radical right parties. However, the large gap 
between the predicted probabilities for the working class and the average probability 
shows the specific effect of belonging to an occupational class on the vote. Among the 
different dimensions of economic insecurity, belonging to the working class is the one 
that is the more strongly associated to the radical right vote. Prospective economic 
insecurity is associated to the radical right vote but the predicted probabilities indicate 
that this effect is concentrated among the individuals who express the highest level of 
economic insecurity. There is a 2% difference in predicted vote share between 
individuals with mild economic security (score of 2) and the more economically 
                                                        
27 For this part of the analysis the welfare attitudes scores have been reorganized into quintiles.  
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insecure (score of 4). Financial hardship, the fear of unemployment and the fear of 
lacking healthcare are influencing the vote for the radical right for the individuals that 
feel the greater risks.  
 
   
 
Figure 2 - Predicted probabilities of voting for the radical right by economic 
insecurity 
 
Each attitudinal variables of the tested models is a 5-point scale of agreement. The 
predicted probabilities for each level show that the effects of the welfare attitudes on the 
radical right vote are note always linear (Figure 3). Welfare Chauvinism is the strongest 
predictor of the radical right vote, and its effect is quasi linear: the more welfare 
chauvinist one is, the likelier one is to vote for the radical right. In the general models, 
egalitarianism is not associated to voting for the radical right, which is confirmed by the 
predicted probabilities. However, the individuals who are the most egalitarian are 
expected to vote significantly less for the radical right than all others. Welfare populism 
has a reversed relation: individuals who are the least welfare populist – that is, who do 
not denounce outgroups of welfare abusers – are the least likely to vote for the radical 
right.  
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The relation between welfare limitation and voting for the radical right does not follow a 
linear pattern. The imperfect U-shaped curve of the effects of welfare limitation is 
nonetheless an important result, because it shows that radical right voters are more 
likely to be found among either individuals with the highest level of welfare limitation or 
those with the lowest. To put it differently, radical right voters are more likely to be 
found among individuals who have extreme views in terms of the scope of the welfare 
state.  
  
   
 
Figure 3 - Predicted probabilities of voting for the radical right by welfare 
attitudes 
 
3.2.3. Voting for the radical right compared to other vote choices 
 
As the previous section showed, the protection and exclusion hypothesis of voting for 
the radical right vote are partly supported. Yet a further question is to understand how 
these factors play in comparison to their influence for other party choices. For instance, 
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is economic insecurity linked to radical right and radical left votes? Is egalitarianism 
more relevant to voters of the radical right than to those of mainstream right parties? 
Which of these factors makes a difference between voting (for the radical right or other 
party families) and not voting? Multinomial logistic regressions allow to grasp vote 
choice entirely and in a more dynamic manner (a similar approach, which allows for the 
comparison of radical right voting behaviour is found in Koster et al. 2013 and Zhirkov 
2014). Table 10 present the results of a multinomial logistic regression that explains 
radical right voting: other voting options (and non-voting) are compared to voting for 
the radical right (reference category). This table can be read in two ways: columns 
indicate the contrast between the radical right voters and other electoral constituencies, 
whereas lines show how each variable of interest distinguishes radical right voters.  
Cultural anti-immigration attitudes and welfare chauvinism are the two attitudes that 
differentiate the radical right voters from every other group. Welfare chauvinism is the 
attitude that genuinely characterizes radical right voters. Welfare chauvinism is also the 
only welfare attitude that forcefully distinguishes radical right voters from other 
mainstream right voters. On the other hand, radical right voters have significant 
differences on every welfare attitude with the left voters. The variables of economic 
insecurity show a clear divide between radical right voters and those of mainstream 
right parties. Being economically insecure (prospective and retrospective) marks a 
strong difference between radical right voters and those of the liberal, Christian-
democratic and conservative parties. In this regard, there is little statistically significant 
difference between radical right voters and voters of left-wing parties (except with 
radical left voters who are more prospectively economically insecure, and radical right 
voters who have been more unemployed than social-democratic voters). Substantially, 
radical right voters and left-wing voters are similarly economically insecure: as 
hypothesized, we can argue that their vote is motivated a desire for welfare protection. 
Welfare populism, the perception of the violation of the norm of reciprocity, also 
distinguishes radical right voters from the left and the right. Radical right voters are 
more welfare populists than the left, but there is no difference with the right. The 
patterns is reversed for welfare limitation: whereas radical right voters are not more in 
favour of welfare limitation than right-wing voters, left wing voters stand out against 
welfare limitation. On a more general level, there is an opposition between the 
electorate of the radical right and those of the left parties, which contradicts previous 
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works that considered them more similar (Koster et al. 2013). Almost all predictors of 
the vote for the radical right, when compared to the left, are significant and strong, 
whereas it is much less the case when compared to the conventional right block. It may 
be that the working-class supporters of the radical right are akin to those of the left, 
whereas the self-employed constituency of the radical right resembles the traditional 
right voters in terms of welfare attributes. 
Previous studies have shown that non-voters and radical right electors have somewhat 
similar sociological profiles (Oesch 2008, Kriesi and Bornschier 2013). This model 
therefore allows seeing what elements of economic insecurity or welfare attitudes 
distinguish these two groups (results of this comparison are located in the right-hand 
column). If higher levels of economic insecurity distinguish radical right voters from 
most other constituencies, the relation is reversed with non-voters. This means that the 
more prospectively economically insecure individuals are more likely not to vote than to 
vote for radical right parties28. However, non-voters have not been subject to higher 
retrospective economic insecurity than radical right voters. Non-voters are really 
different from radical right voters in terms of welfare attitude: they are less chauvinist 
and proponents of welfare limitation, but more egalitarian.  
Overall, the four welfare attitudes have opposite influences on the vote choice following 
a traditional left/right divide. Assessing the relation of these attitudes to voting 
behaviour for all types of parties constitutes a wider research agenda than this thesis. 
Nonetheless, when compared to non-voters, the radical right voters attitudinally side 
with the other right-wing voters. However, in terms of economic insecurity radical right 
voters are much closer to the profile of left-wing constituencies.   
 
 
                                                        
28 The most economically insecure voters are also more likely to vote for a radical left party.  
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3.2.4  Differences among radical right voters 
 
The previous sections give partial support to the hypotheses of the relation between 
welfare politics and radical right parties among Western European countries. Yet these 
parties are not entirely similar, and most certainly their electorates also differ. In 
addition, the disparities of effects of attitudinal variables seem to match the different 
welfare regime types: welfare normative prescriptions – egalitarianism - are more 
significant for Scandinavian radical right voters. The following step of the analysis 
breaks down the explanations of voting behaviour by countries. Table 11 shows the 
effects of welfare attitudes and economic insecurity variables on the radical right vote 
for each country of the sample following model IV. These models cannot be fully 
statistically fit, as country samples are somewhat limited, and the proportion of radical 
right voters is small in some cases.  
The strong impact of welfare chauvinism on the radical right vote holds in every 
considered country except for France29. The violation of the welfare norm of reciprocity 
by immigrants is even more relevant in continental welfare state, where the effect of 
welfare chauvinism on the vote is particularly strong. Previous studies had already 
shown the critical influence of welfare chauvinism in some countries (Andersen & 
Björklund 1990, Mau & Mewes 2012, Rydgren 2013), yet results are extended to most 
significant radical right parties. In three of the eight countries selected, welfare 
limitation, and thus the violation of the norm of self-reliance, is also a determinant of the 
vote for the radical right. The country level models do not confirm the specific effect of 
egalitarianism in Scandinavia. However, this also implies that holding an egalitarian 
attitude is not contradictory to a radical right vote. This is in line with previous work 
that showed how welfare chauvinism and critical views pertaining the welfare state 
institutions (welfare limitation and populism) can be combined to egalitarianism as 
determinants of the radical right votes (Achterberg et al. 2011).  
 
                                                        
29 This is likely to be explained by the small numbers of respondents who voted for the radical 
right in the sample. With only 37 Front National voters in the sample, only one predictor is 
statistically significant. 
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Welfare 
Regime type 
  
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Welfare 
Limitation 
Welfare 
Populism 
Egalitarianism 
Retrospective 
economic 
insecurity 
Prospective 
economic 
Insecurity 
N R2 
Scandinavian 
Denmark ++ +   +  1244 0.16 
Finland ++    +  1356 0.15 
Norway +  +   + 1102 0.22 
Continental 
Austria ++ +   +  1112 0.26 
Belgium ++      1156 0.14 
France      + 1145 0.13 
Netherlands ++  +    1298 0.16 
Switzerland ++ + +    720 0.23 
Table 11 - Breakdown by countries off the effects of economic insecurity and welfare 
attitudes on the radical right vote30.  
The pattern of effects of economic insecurity is less evident; economic insecurity – 
prospective or retrospective - is however a determinant of the vote in all Scandinavian 
countries.  
 
3.3.  Conclusion and discussion 
 
This first empirical chapter has shown that welfare politics does matter when studying 
the determinants of the radical right vote. The account of this vote cannot be limited to 
the already deeply scrutinized cultural aspect of the radical right support. In order to 
demonstrate this, I put forward two hypotheses on the relation between welfare politics 
and the radical right: protection and exclusion. The first states – through the mechanism 
of precarization of voters - that because some individual feel economically insecure they 
may be inclined to support radical right parties that stand out to mainstream parties and 
represent the status quo (against the process of globalization that increases economic 
risks and against further change of the welfare arrangements). The second hypothesis 
states – through a mechanism of scapegoating of out-groups - that because individuals 
feel some core norms of the welfare state are being violated; by identifying a responsible 
and norm-violating out-group, which are also singled out by radical right parties, they 
are more inclined to support these parties. These claims were tested in this chapter with 
14 verifiable voting behaviour hypotheses.  
Supported hypotheses: The most remarkable results are the high significance welfare 
chauvinism and individual prospective and retrospective economic insecurity as 
determinants of the radical right vote in Western Europe. H2, H3 and H5 are 
                                                        
30 Effects reported if p<0.05 
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consistently confirmed. The relevance of welfare chauvinism does not constitute an 
original finding, but it is now generalized to most major West European radical right 
constituencies. In addition, the mechanism of scapegoating of an out-group extends 
beyond immigrants, and following a similar logic of violated reciprocity, welfare 
populism is another predictor of the radical tight vote and H4 is also supported. Welfare 
chauvinism has often been linked to the working-class support for the radical right, 
which is a well-documented phenomenon. However, even controlled for cultural and 
welfare attitudes, being a blue-collar worker remains a significant determinant of the 
vote. This effect may capture the perception of labour-market instability, which would 
then translate into support for parties that oppose globalization, H1 is therefore 
considered supported.  
Partially supported hypotheses: A second interesting finding relates to the attitudes of 
welfare limitation and egalitarianism. Radical right do not really distinguish themselves 
from the mainstream right in terms of welfare attitudes, but they are much more 
economically insecure. Radical right vters have the opposite relation with left-wing 
voters: they display similar levels of economic insecurity, but they are opposed on every 
welfare attitude. These results make an interesting contribution with regards to the 
singularity of radical right voters and their distance or proximity to mainstream left and 
right-wing voters.  In addition, egalitarianism is positively associated to voting for the 
radical right in Scandinavia (H14 confirmed), but has a negative effect on this vote when 
combined with welfare chauvinism (H11 rejected).  
Rejected hypotheses: the interaction of welfare chauvinism with welfare limitation does 
not yield significant results, H9 is therefore rejected. Finally, the hypothesis that 
breached normative prescriptions about the welfare state would be stronger in welfare 
regime type where these norms are grounding principles – H12, H13 – does not find 
empirical support for continental welfare regimes.  
As a first empirical chapter, this analysis also raises a number of questions to be solved 
in the next chapters. Do radical right parties compete specifically in the electoral arena 
on welfare attributes? Do they adapt to the welfare preferences of their national 
constituencies? These interrogations are at the core of chapter 4. The protective radical 
right support of the working class entails a competition with mainstream left-wing 
parties who used to represent the ‘parties of welfare and solidarity’. Chapter 5 looks 
more closely into sectional support of the radical right constituencies by adopting a 
  84 
class-based approach: looking at the welfare attitudes of different occupational classes 
of voters (blue-collar, self-employed).  
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APPENDIX B: Statistical summary of independent variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C: Statistical summary of attitudinal variables per country 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables (AT) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 2255 1 5 2.9 0.94 
Welfare Chauvinism 2255 1 5 3.3 0.77 
Welfare Limitation 2255 1 5 2.1 0.92 
Egalitarianism 2255 1 5 3.1 0.94 
Prospective economic insecurity 2255 1 4 2.1 0.52 
Retrospective economic insecurity 2255 0 1 0.27 0.44 
Attitudes toward immigration 2255 1 5 2.8 1.1 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 In order not to lose information and maintain the sample size, missing values of the 
independent variables were replaced by the mean value.  
Variables of interest31 Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 15039 1 5 3.2 0.72 
Welfare Chauvinism 15039 1 5 3.3 0.66 
Welfare Limitation 15039 1 5 2.9 0.80 
Egalitarianism 15039 1 5 3.8 0.71 
Prospective economic insecurity 15039 1 4 1.8 0.56 
Retrospective economic insecurity 15039 0 1 0.25 0.43 
Attitudes toward immigration 15039 1 5 2.6 0.99 
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Independent Variables (BE) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 1760 1 5 3.1 0.72 
Welfare Chauvinism 1760 1 5 3.4 0.63 
Welfare Limitation 1760 1 5 2.2 0.62 
Egalitarianism 1760 1 5 3.3 0.80 
Prospective economic insecurity 1760 1 4 1.8 0.59 
Retrospective economic insecurity 1760 0 1 0.26 0.43 
Attitudes toward immigration 1760 1 5 2.7 0.92 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables (DK) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 1610 1 5 2.6 0.74 
Welfare Chauvinism 1610 1 5 3.3 0.71 
Welfare Limitation 1610 1 5 2.1 0.61 
Egalitarianism 1610 1 5 2.9 0.77 
Prospective economic insecurity 1610 1 4 1.6 0.5 
Retrospective economic insecurity 1610 0 1 0.25 0.43 
Attitudes toward immigration 1610 1 5 2.6 0.98 
 
 
 
Independent Variables (FI) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 2195 1 5 2.9 0.77 
Welfare Chauvinism 2195 1 5 3.4 0.59 
Welfare Limitation 2195 1 5 1.8 0.58 
Egalitarianism 2195 1 5 3.5 0.72 
Prospective economic insecurity 2195 1 4 1.7 0.52 
Retrospective economic insecurity 2195 0 1 0.3 0.46 
Attitudes toward immigration 2195 1 5 2.1 0.82 
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Independent Variables (FR) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 2073 1 5 3.1 0.91 
Welfare Chauvinism 2073 1 5 3.4 0.69 
Welfare Limitation 2073 1 5 2.3 0.71 
Egalitarianism 2073 1 5 3.4 0.91 
Prospective economic insecurity 2073 1 4 1.9 0.63 
Retrospective economic insecurity 2073 0 1 0.34 0.47 
Attitudes toward immigration 2073 1 5 2.8 1 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables (NL) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 1778 1 5 2.9 0.67 
Welfare Chauvinism 1778 1 5 3.3 0.60 
Welfare Limitation 1778 1 5 2.3 0.56 
Egalitarianism 1778 1 5 2.8 0.74 
Prospective economic insecurity 1778 1 4 1.7 0.52 
Retrospective economic insecurity 1778 0 1 0.18 0.38 
Attitudes toward immigration 1778 1 5 2.6 0.83 
 
 
 
Independent Variables (NO) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 1549 1 5 2.9 0.65 
Welfare Chauvinism 1549 1 5 3.4 0.62 
Welfare Limitation 1549 1 5 1.9 0.58 
Egalitarianism 1549 1 5 3.1 0.58 
Prospective economic insecurity 1549 1 4 1.6 0.48 
Retrospective economic insecurity 1549 0 1 0.19 0.4 
Attitudes toward immigration 1549 1 5 2.6 0.96 
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Independent Variables (CH) Obs Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Welfare Populism 1819 1 5 2.8 0.77 
Welfare Chauvinism 1819 1 5 3.2 0.62 
Welfare Limitation 1819 1 5 2.5 0.76 
Egalitarianism 1819 1 5 3 0.86 
Prospective economic insecurity 1819 1 4 1.6 0.5 
Retrospective economic insecurity 1819 0 1 0.16 0.37 
Attitudes toward immigration 1819 1 5 2.5 0.92 
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APPENDIX E: Predicted probabilities of voting for the radical right 
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4. The welfare agendas of radical right parties in Western Europe 
 
 
 
 
This chapter tackles the supply side of the protection and exclusion hypotheses. As 
argued in the introduction, the electoral success of radical right parties cannot be 
explained without examining the parties themselves and particularly the role of welfare 
politics for their success. Indeed, the electorates of these parties have dramatically 
changed – in size and composition - over the last three decades, and radical right parties 
cannot be assumed to have remained unaffected by this transformation. 
This chapter deals with radical right parties’ positions on welfare issues, and their 
potential evolution across time and countries. Since the radical right does not constitute 
an ideologically homogenous party family, cross-country variance is particularly 
relevant. Although there is a consensus in the literature on which these parties are (see 
introduction), they do not share a common determined ideology. The affiliation to 
parliamentary groups in the European Parliament (EP) is a good indicator of these 
parties’ programmatic heterogeneity. In EP, radical right parties are scattered in at least 
three groups: the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, including the Danish 
People’s Party), Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD, including the 
Swedish Democrats) and Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF, including the Vlaams 
Belang, the Front National, the Austrian and Dutch Freedom Parties). The divergence of 
radical right parties is not just strategic and institutional, it also applies to concrete 
policy orientations, especially in the programmatic area of welfare politics. For instance, 
among these parties we find preferences for lowering (FN), maintaining (FPÖ) or 
increasing retirement age (SVP).  
The goal of this chapter is therefore to analyse what radical right parties “offer” voters in 
terms of welfare politics. In order to characterize the positions of radical right parties, I 
rely on two sub-hypotheses about the radical right welfare programs. First, the 
programmatic shift sub-hypothesis expects that radical right parties have curbed their 
welfare positions to address structural growing economic insecurity and their 
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constituents’ preferences. The programmatic shift sub-hypothesis is examined through 
the evaluation of the ‘quantitative’ aspect of party positions: how much do radical right 
parties put forward their welfare agenda and preferences. Second, the exclusion 
hypothesis expects that radical right parties’ welfare preferences to be grounded in 
normative beliefs of exclusion, defining boundaries and restrictions between (groups of) 
welfare recipients. The exclusive solidarity sub-hypothesis is examined through the in-
depth case study of the normative justifications of radical right parties’ welfare 
preferences. This chapter is based on a realignment driven puzzle: the changing 
sociological composition and attitudinal profile of the radical right constituencies is 
expected to influence the parties’ preferences. Radical right parties are expected to 
update their programmatic positions in order to adapt to changing voters. However, this 
assumption does not neglect historical and ideological aspect of party preference, and 
does not imply that there is a unilateral bottom-up link between the profiles of the 
voters and the party positions” (Häusermann 2014). Chapter 5 addresses the issue pf 
party-voter linkage more extensively. 
 
Parties and welfare politics: determining preferences 
Conventionally, party preferences have been determined largely by the (assumed) 
interest of their respective constituents (Häusermann et al. 2013). This assumption 
builds on the “power resource” school of the political sociology of the welfare state 
(already presented in chapter 2), which emphasizes the role of class mobilization as the 
basis of party politics. Korpi argued that policy preferences were the result of the class 
struggle and defined party politics “as a simple transmission belt conveying the 
preferences and demands of various interest groups to the leaders, who implement 
them” (Korpi 1989). In a renewed perspective, Esping-Andersen considered parties as a 
link between class mobilization and policy preferences (Esping-Andersen 1999). These 
influential theories have contributed to the “postulate” that the left parties mobilize the 
lower earners (Pontusson and Rueda 2008).   
This approach considers – and limits - political parties simply as a function of 
representation of their voters. Indeed, most studies of welfare preferences rely on this 
static assumption; and particularly they expect the mainstream left to represent 
working-class interests. However, since the 1980’s, the social structure and the 
preferences of voters have changed, and the electorates have dramatically ‘dealined’ and 
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realigned (Evans 1999, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi et al. 2008). Indeed, social-democratic 
parties were historically the agents for welfare issues and redistribution politics, and the 
working class constituted their core constituency. Socialist and social-democratic 
parties were thus considered to be highly in sync with the working class. However, West 
European electorates have deeply realigned, in two different ways. First, because of the 
deindustrialization of Western Europe, the proportion of blue-collar workers has starkly 
diminished and the working class electoral basis of social democratic and socialist 
parties has shrunk. Second, because of the tertiarization of economies and the diffusion 
of education, there has been an important occupational upgrading of the social 
democratic voters (Kitchselt 1994, Häusermann 2010)32. This second aspect of the 
sociological realignment of social-democratic voters is often neglected, even though it is 
at least as relevant for parties (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015. Social democratic 
parties have experienced a major re-composition of their constituencies: the share of 
educated middle-class voters increased, while the share of working class voters shrunk. 
Arguably, the dramatic realignment of the working class has benefitted radical right 
parties in every country. Indeed, a large proportion of working class citizens, who had 
been assumed to support the left, tend to either abstain or support other parties, such as 
radical right parties.  
There are two possible consequences in terms of party positions to this transformation. 
Social-democratic parties may have updated their preference to their changing middle-
class constituents; on the other hand and radical right parties may have updated theirs 
to increasingly blue-collar constituents. This study only addresses the second, and the 
following section deals with the potential consequences of this electoral realignment on 
radical right parties. Although this chapter partly relies on a comparison between the 
                                                        
32 Social Democratic parties had to respond to the preferences of the middle class for cultural 
liberalism (Kriesi et al. 2008); a fine grained analysis of class voting in Germany, Switzerland 
and Britain (Oesch 2008) shows that, within the middle class, it is especially salaried 
professionals in the social and cultural services that rally the libertarian left. To put it simply, 
there are two general theories to explain the programmatic shift of the social democratic parties 
(Häusermann 2014). First is a constraints based argument: all mainstream parties have 
converged because of exogenous constraints in terms of social and economic programs, 
therefore social democratic parties cannot push for more welfare expansionist agendas anymore 
(Mair 2008). Second, social democratic parties are expected to adopt more centrist strategies in 
order to strategically respond to the changing preferences of their voters. 
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radical right and the social democratic parties; it focuses on the impact of electoral 
realignments on radical right parties.  
This partial realignment of voters from the left to the radical right, is supported by the 
left-authoritarian views of a large segment of the working class, namely left-wing 
positions on socioeconomic issues (pro-welfare) and authoritarian positions on 
sociocultural issues (law and order, immigration, etc.). Some fifty years ago Lipset 
(1960: 101-2) wrote that 
 
“The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues; 
they favour more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income 
taxes, support of trade-unions, and so forth. But when liberalism is defined in 
noneconomic terms - as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc. --the 
correlation is reversed. The more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are 
more intolerant.” 
 
The average “authoritarian worker” described by Lipset would be best represented by 
parties with left-wing positions on the socioeconomic dimension and right-wing 
positions on the sociocultural dimension. Yet the left-authoritarian voters used to 
support communist and social democratic parties (Lipset 1960; 1959a, 1959b). Such a 
group of voters still exists but, in the absence of parties combining such views, it is 
underrepresented (Kriesi et al. 2008, Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009, Thomassen 
2012). In 2009, the left-authoritarian combination of views could not find 
correspondence at the party level: no party in Western Europe offered at the same time 
left-wing and authoritarian policy proposals (Lefkofridi et al. 2014). While parties on the 
left advocated pro-welfare economic positions but progressive stances on sociocultural 
issues (e.g. women’s and gay rights’, social diversity); the right, which is more 
traditional/authoritarian in the cultural sphere, supported free market economy and a 
small state. Hence, left-authoritarians were cross-pressured between different issue 
dimensions: they had to make a choice between either parties on the radical right (who 
advocated their authoritarian sociocultural views) or on the social-democratic and 
radical left that supported a strong state (left-wing socioeconomic views). Their party 
choice depended on prevailing concerns; voters chose those parties that had similar 
views on the issue that they consider salient to them personally (Giger and Lefkofridi 
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2014): those concerned more about immigration, would support the radical right; the 
same type of voters, however, who were more concerned about the economy, chose 
parties on the left.   
Formerly the key electoral clientele of parties on the left, blue-collar workers now 
constitute the core supporters of the radical right in Western Europe. Authors have 
investigated this realignment, to the point that studying the radical right’s working class 
voters has almost become a subfield: the radical right is often studied through its 
working class electorate (most notably Oesch 2008, Mau and Mewes 2012, Rydgren 
2013).  This, in turn, has raised the question of how the radical right parties, which 
typically support free-market economy, appeal to the working class on economic, and 
especially welfare issues. As the working class is most exposed to market risks, its 
support for radical right parties opposing left-wing policies (e.g. state intervention in the 
economy) has been puzzling. Oesch (2008) investigated why workers are more likely 
than other classes to support the RR and found that “questions of community and 
identity (the defence of national identity against outsiders and the upholding of an 
exclusive form of community)” seem to be more important than “economic grievances” 
in motivating the working class to cast a radical right vote in Austria, Belgium 
(Flanders), France and Norway (Oesch 2008a: 369). Yet radical right parties achieve 
high degrees of congruence with their supporters on all issue dimensions (Lefkofridi 
and Casado-Asensio 2013). Thus, they cannot be too distant from their voters’ economic 
preferences and chapter 3 showed how welfare attitudes and feelings of economic 
insecurity influence radical right voters. The relevance of welfare related concerns of 
radical right voters is also not restricted to the blue-collar among them, but applies to all 
radical right constituents. The guiding questions of this chapter are to understand if the 
attention radical right parties pay to welfare politics increase over time? Do they 
promote welfare protection? And what type of welfare solidarity do they promote?  
The expectation is that radical right parties have undergone a programmatic shift from 
their 1980’s electoral success, which were was mainly due to the mobilization of voters 
on sociocultural issues and immigration. Their contemporary strategy is expected to 
rely on a combination of (left-wing) socioeconomic and (right-wing) sociocultural ideas. 
In addition, this socioeconomic shift bears the trademark of the radical right by 
producing an anti-immigrant, exclusionary approach to welfare politics. By framing 
redistributive solidarity in such a way, that is promoting a welfare state for “blood and 
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soil” nationhood, radical right parties have “energized” the division between diversity 
and solidarity (Banting and Kymlicka 2016).  
The programmatic shift and the exclusive solidarity sub-hypotheses build on existing 
studies of the programmatic positions of radical right parties and transpose the 
protection and exclusion hypotheses at the party level (4.1.). The second section of the 
chapter presents the design of the analysis, the different methods and the data 
employed (4.2.). The programmatic shift hypothesis is tested by looking at the salience 
of welfare politics for radical right parties, and their partisan positioning on these issues. 
Finally, the exclusive solidarity hypothesis is tested by looking in-depth at the 
exclusionist modalities of radical right parties’ manifestos (4.3.). 
 
4.1.  The welfare preferences of radical right parties: hypotheses 
 
In order to study how radical right parties tackle welfare politics - who gets what, when, 
and how – this chapter focuses on welfare entitlements, deservingness criteria and the 
reach and scope of welfare policies. To verify the protection and exclusion hypotheses 
applied to political parties, this chapter answers two more specific sets of questions. 
First, testing the protection hypothesis refers to the “what” dimension of welfare 
politics. What are the positions of radical right parties on welfare issues, redistribution, 
social benefits? What is the extent to which they promote welfare redistribution? Are 
they proponents of expanding the welfare state, that is, are they holding positions that 
are protective from economic insecurity? Second, testing the exclusion hypothesis refers 
more to the “who” dimension of welfare politics. What distinctions are made between 
individuals, and what does it entails for them in terms of redistribution? Who is 
deserving of welfare benefits? More precisely, are radical right parties singling out any 
particular groups (negatively or positively) when dealing with redistribution? I first 
review existing studies on the radical right parties’ welfare agenda (4.1.1.), then 
elaborate the programmatic shift sub-hypothesis (4.1.2.) and the exclusive solidarity 
sub-hypothesis (4.1.3.) 
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4.1.1. Radical right parties’ welfare agendas 
 
The historical position of radical right parties with regards to globalization and 
European integration has traditionally been to promote a rightist path on both economic 
and cultural issue dimensions. Indeed, long standing radical right parties emerged from 
liberal parties (FPÖ), anti-tax or even anti-statist movements (FrP and DF) or agrarian 
conservative parties (TF and SVP). In parallel, other radical right parties were 
influenced by the Nouvelle Droite and genuinely spurred from extreme right movements. 
They were fiercely motivated by anti-communism and therefore proponents of very 
liberal market positions (see for instance the FN’s charismatic leader Jean-Marie Le Pen 
who described himself as the “French Reagan” in the 1980’s). In a seminal piece, 
Kitschelt (1995) argued that the winning formula for radical right parties was the 
combination of neoliberal views on socioeconomic issues and authoritarian views on 
sociocultural issues. While they advocated free market economy, radical right parties 
capitalized on the cultural threats of globalization (e.g. on how immigration threatens 
national identity and way of life. Radical right parties have managed to shift voters’ focus 
on the cultural dimension of political conflict from the 1980’s onward (Kitschelt 1995): 
they emphasized tradition, cultural heritage, law and order as well as a negative 
perception of immigration. 
Indeed, the key factor of their electoral success which has reshaped political cleavages is 
“not the economy, stupid!” (Mudde 2007). The most salient issues in their electoral 
campaigns were sociocultural; namely law and order, morality and authority, national 
way of life and opposition to immigration. Through the advocacy of authoritarian and 
nationalistic imageries of society radical right parties have not only have rendered 
sociocultural issues highly salient – especially immigration - but they have even shifted 
entire party systems towards their preferred positions on these issues (e.g. Lefkofridi 
and Horvath 2012; Van Spanje 2010). The consequence of the pressure exerted by the 
radical right, traditional right-wing parties have shifted or followed to the right. 
Following the contamination hypothesis: mainstream parties react and adapt by copying 
the radical right’s agenda on immigration (Mudde 2004, 2007, Van Spanje 2010, 
however this theory is contested by De Lange 2007). Arguably, some radical right 
parties are even successful in implementing restrictive immigration policies while not 
being part of government (Minkenberg 2001).  
  100 
Although they emerged as the opponents of cultural globalization, radical right parties 
later also tackled the consequences of economic globalization (Kriesi et. al. 2006) to 
respond to changes on the demand side, where the boundaries between economic and 
cultural conflict started being increasingly blurred (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). On 
the one hand, the cultural dimension of conflict in Europe today encompasses questions 
beyond cultural liberalism (e.g. immigration, European integration) such as issues of 
distribution (welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse). On the other hand, voters’ 
contemporary preferences on distributive issues fail to form a single economic 
dimension (ibid.). Hence, welfare issues are hard to classify either on the socioeconomic 
or sociocultural dimension (see also Koster et al. 2013).  
Since the mid-1990s, radical right parties started revising their electoral agendas to fully 
exploit the left-authoritarian niche in the electoral market. Compared to other party 
families, the radical right nowadays frames economic globalization in terms of “labour 
and social security” more than any other party family besides the radical left (Höglinger 
et al. 2012). Some scholars have argued that new radical right parties have adopted 
“leftist” preferences in terms of redistribution (Derks 2006). The development of 
welfare agendas helped the radical right expand its competitive strategy against parties 
of the left, and especially mainstream social-democratic and socialist parties who had 
traditionally been the main proponents of the welfare state and its expansion. If radical 
right parties tried to adapt to the views of these (potential) supporters (Rydgren 2007), 
it follows that over time we should observe an increase of attention paid to welfare state 
issues by radical right parties.     
Yet, radical right parties face important constraints in their pursuit of a programmatic 
shift towards the left on issues of redistribution: the two core groups voting for the 
radical right, namely blue-collar workers, and the self-employed and small-business-
owners, have opposite preferences on welfare issues, with the former supporting 
extensive redistribution and the latter favouring limitation of the welfare state 
(Ivarsflaten 2005). Hence, radical right parties have to resolve the problem of 
accommodating the contradictory preferences on welfare issues of these two groups 
(Afonso 2015). If radical right parties move too far left to match social-democratic 
parties on welfare state expansion, they are in danger of alienating their conservative 
supporters.   
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4.1.2. The programmatic shift sub-hypothesis 
 
Hence, although I expect radical right parties to pay increasing attention to 
redistributive issues and to promote welfare expansion, I acknowledge that they have to 
do so carefully, so that their gains among industrial workers would not be offset by 
losses among conservative supporters in small business, rural areas and middle class 
voters. In this regard, while some scholars have argued that radical right parties 
abandoned formerly market liberal positions in favour of more centrist positions on the 
economy (de Lange 2007; Kitschelt 2007), others have talked about radical right parties 
“masking” their economic platforms via position “blurring” (Rovny 2013). For instance, 
they promoted protectionist trade policies that would benefit certain groups while at 
the same time they supported cuts on welfare policies (Heinisch 2003). Over time, the 
strategy of the radical right has deviated from Kitschelt’s (1995) winning formula of 
neoliberal views in support of free market economy (socioeconomic right) combined 
with illiberal views on society (sociocultural right). The “new winning formula” of the 
radical right (de Lange 2007) sought to respond to the aforementioned changes at the 
level of their electorates. Based on these evolutions, I develop the sub-hypothesis which 
expect a programmatic shift of radical right parties on welfare positions: that welfare 
state expansion becomes an increasingly important policy issue for radical right parties.  
Note that it is very likely that the programmatic shift hypothesis does not apply to all 
radical right parties; and substantive variation across cases can be expected. Because 
these parties want to keep their voters’ preferences equilibrium, or because they are 
institutionalized parties with conservative ideological heritages, some radical right 
parties might be very averse to such programmatic change. In addition to these 
constraints (institutionalization and conservatism) arguing for more extensive welfare 
benefits is also context dependent. In hard times, most parties of the spectrum might be 
tempted to do so, but mostly, increasing welfare provisions can be less relevant in good 
economic times. This might prove relevant for the Swiss case, where there is less need 
than in other countries for more protective welfare provisions.  Hence, there are three 
possible outcomes to the hypothesis: promoting more welfare protection 
(programmatic shift), blurring welfare positions (programmatic blurring), or simply 
maintaining a limited welfare state (no programmatic shift). Another way to put this 
hypothesis is to consider that a party family (the radical right) reacts to the issue 
  102 
ownership of another party family (the social-democrats) in order to compete for its 
constituents. In general, when parties take up an issue that is “owned” by another party, 
they usually reframe it in their ideological perspective (see Spoon et al. 2014 for a 
similar argument on party competition over environmental issues). Radical right 
parties’ support for welfare state expansion could compete against Social Democrats, the 
historical proponents of the welfare state, by tactically tying to integrate their 
preferences and rhetoric on sociocultural issues to it.  
 
4.1.3. The exclusive solidarity sub-hypothesis 
 
If radical right parties have expanded to the welfare policy space, they are expected to 
do so with an agenda of exclusive solidarity, because radical right parties are essentially 
movements of exclusion (Rydgren 2005), this should be reflected in their discourse 
about redistribution. In addition to their well-documented cultural preferences they 
have developed more generous, yet ethnically exclusive preferences regarding the 
welfare state (Svallfors 2012; de Koster et al. 2013). These results concur with the 
expectation that radical right parties would move towards a ‘nationalist-interventionist’ 
position (Kriesi et al. 2012, Chapter 1). Using their best weapon (immigration) in 
political competition radical right parties seek to mobilize globalization and European 
integration ‘losers’ by appealing simultaneously to their cultural fears (e.g. erosion of 
traditional cultural and national way of life) and their economic insecurities (need for 
protection). Drawing on their issue competence in the area immigration, radical right 
parties are expected to frame the politics of solidarity in an anti-immigrant way so that 
they can be perceived as “owners” of a refined, exclusionary concept of solidarity. For 
this general exclusive solidarity, the literature has coined the term “welfare chauvinism” 
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Mau and Mewes 2012). In this way, their electoral 
discourse would promote an exclusive conception of solidarity that is specifically 
directed against migrants who are deemed to usurp social benefits. It follows that the 
pro-welfare agenda advocated by radical right parties should be clearly a chauvinist one 
(only for the natives). Yet in the framework of the exclusion hypothesis, immigrants 
(and welfare chauvinism) are just one out-group that would be “excluded” from welfare 
benefits under the norm of reciprocity. Under this logic, immigrants would be deemed 
less deserving, because they have contributed less to the welfare system. Similarly, other 
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outgroups, such as civil servants, may be considered to be receiving more benefits than 
what they are perceived to contribute, which would result in welfare populist 
preferences. Some groups may be positively perceived: following the norm of equality, 
the radical right might single out outgroups that are considered particularly deserving. 
The normative beliefs about deserving or undeserving outgroups may then be 
entangled. For instance, welfare populist attitudes could find their translation in 
praising some groups such blue-collar workers or farmers as particularly deserving of 
welfare protection and currently being entitled to less than they should. The same 
groups could be deemed to deserve more under the norm of equality, but with a 
different normative justification. On the other hand, needy groups may be perceived not 
to be genuinely in need, and just to be taking advantages of welfare benefits when they 
would be expected to rely on themselves (e.g. “false handicapped”). Under the norm of 
self-reliance, some individuals or outgroups may be considered to be “assisted”, those 
that fake or cheat the system (the unproductive “social parasites” in the words of Saint-
Simon). The violations of the norms of reciprocity and self-reliance could result in 
targeting very similar groups, yet the normative argument underlying the exclusion – 
“singling out” – are different. On the one hand, it is a matter of those that contribute less 
than what they receive; on the other hand, they are perceived as having renounced to 
personal autonomy in order to rely on the collectivity. 
Hence, the radical right parties are expected to put forward non-inclusive welfare 
schemes and a conception of the welfare state based on exclusive solidarity, that would 
set apart some social groups (positively or negatively). Consequently radical right 
parties would oppose an inclusive welfare state that gives broad access to welfare 
benefits, and rather strive to redefine its boundaries and the criteria of deservingness. 
The deserving recipients of welfare benefits should be clearly defined and differentiated 
from the undeserving ones according to the core norms of the welfare state. In general, 
support for welfare policies depends on how the individuals perceive other “social 
groups according to a deservingness scale” (Van Oorschot 2000). Among all social 
groups, the immigrants and the unemployed are always at the bottom of the 
deservingness scale, whereas the elderly and disabled are at the top (Van Oorschot 
2006). The exclusionist welfare conception of the radical right would distinguish groups 
that should be more deserving along ethnic/national lines or because of belonging to a 
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fantasized conception of the people, and groups that should be less deserving because 
they did not contribute enough or because they are deemed unreliable. 
 
4.2.  Data and methods 
 
In order to test the programmatic shift and exclusive solidarity hypotheses, I rely on 
mixed-method approaches based on multiple data sources (4.2.1.) which rest on a 
nested research design (4.2.2.) 
 
4.2.1. Multiple data sources 
 
To test both hypotheses, I rely on a mixed method approach; using different sources and 
type data, and both quantitative and qualitative methods.  
To analyse the manifestos, I rely mainly on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) 
database33. It consists of quantitative codes generated from counts of sentences and 
quasi-sentences where parties position themselves on policy issue. These have been 
collected and coded by the CMP and include political programs of parties from around 
fifty countries since 1945 (Volkens et al. 2013). The quantitative codes of party positions 
on policy issues is essentially salience-based (Laver 2013). These party manifestos have 
been coded in a similar, systematic way across countries, and are thus comparable - 
notwithstanding language differences and manifestos’ length variance across countries 
(Budge et al. 2001). The score associated with each issue represents the percentage of 
manifesto length devoted to such issue.  Thus, the higher the score, the more salient an 
issue is to the party (Spoon et al. 2014). This constitutes an ideal data collection for 
investigating the evolution of issue salience in parties’ electoral discourse, and more 
precisely preferences regarding the redistributive and welfare politics (Nygård 2006).  
The salience of welfare politics over the 1980-2012 period provides a measure to 
evaluate to what extent radical right parties adopt pro-redistribution agendas. The CMP 
data has nonetheless been criticized, mainly for two reasons. First, it relies on the 
assumption that parties’ positions can be inferred from salience, and therefore parties 
with similar salience scores are expected to hold the same preferences. This measure is 
                                                        
33 Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika (2015): 
Manifesto Corpus. Version: 2015-1. Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center. 
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imperfect, but I argue that it is still very relevant to show long-term evolutions. These 
long-term evolutions are also subject to qualifications, since inter-coder reliability has 
proven to be rather low (Benoit et al. 2009). Yet, this critique mostly concerns the 
categorization of issues which dates from the 1970’s, and which may have become 
politically irrelevant (Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof 2013). In the case of welfare politics, 
the item of “welfare expansion” used in the following analysis can nonetheless be 
considered as still politically relevant. In addition to the longitudinal data on manifestos, 
the following analysis is completed with party positions extracted from the euandi data. 
euandi is a Voting Advice Application (VAA) launched for the 2014 European Parliament 
Elections developed at the European University Institute (for full data collection 
methodology and presentation of the dataset see Garzia et al. 2015). The recent 
emergence of VAAs has contributed to novel and more refined methods of identifying 
party preferences. Notably, euandi offers voters the possibility to compare their political 
preferences with the positions of the 246 parties competing in this election. Party 
positions have been estimated by experts, in collaboration with the political parties 
themselves, through an iterative method. Each individual party has been asked to place 
itself on the 30 issues selected, motivating their choices by providing supporting party 
material. Simultaneously, teams of country experts have positioned the parties on the 
same issues and provided supporting campaign material (manifestos, party platforms, 
and other party documentation)34. Once these two stages were completed, results were 
confronted during a calibration phase, and parties were asked to provide additional 
evidence in the case of discrepancies. Overall, 55% of all the parties contacted engaged 
in this cooperative coding scheme. This dataset thus provides 30 issue positions of all 
European political parties for the year 2014 collected through a rigorous methodology. 
It is a useful qualitative complement to the quantitatively measured positions of the 
CMP data. A left/right scale of welfare issues is derived from the different items of 
welfare position and deservingness of the data, in order to refine the welfare 
preferences. The last section of the analysis relies on three case studies of in-depth 
analysis of three recent manifestos of radical right parties: Front National (FR), 
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (AT), and Schweizerische Volkspartei (CH). They 
constitute the main source to investigate the exclusion hypothesis, and identify the 
                                                        
34 The political parties of each countries were coded by a team of 4 political scientists selected by the 
project team at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. For further details, see the official 
website of euandi, URL: http://euandi.eu/abouteuandi.html.  
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groups of individual that are specifically targeted (positively or negatively) by radical 
right parties when it comes to redistribution.  
 
  
Salience based analysis 
(CMP 1980-2012) 
Expert survey 
(euandi 2014) 
35 
In-depth 
manifesto 
analysis 
Austria (FPÖ) 1980-2009 X X 
Belgium (VB) 1980-2003 / 2007-2010 X   
Denmark (DF) 1998-2011 X   
Finland (TF) 1999-2011 X   
France (FN) 1986-2012 X X 
Netherlands (LPF, PVV) 2002-2003 / 2006-2010 X   
Norway (FrP) 1980-2009     
Sweden (SD) 2010 X   
Switzerland (SVP) 1983-2011 X  X 
Table 12 - Cases and data of radical right parties for chapter 4 
 
Relying on multiple data sources helps capturing the party positions in the most reliable 
way.  This means not only relying on different datasets, but also on different data 
collection methods to increase the reliability of the analysis. Here, in addition to the 
manifestos themselves (for case studies), I rely on salience-based coding of party 
manifestos and expert positioning. In order to assess the preferences of radical right 
parties, Carter opts for expert surveys among all options on the basis of their scope and 
availability (Carter 2005). I argue that the combination of expert survey, text analysis of 
party programs, and salience-based data provides richer information.  
The cases retained in the cross-country comparison need to have an electorally 
significant right-wing party, setting the threshold of electoral significance at 5 % in the 
                                                        
35 Switzerland’s parties were not originally coded in the euandi data; placing its parties on 
welfare issues is however much needed in this analysis, since the SVP is one of the in-depth 
cases studied in the last part of the chapter. To fill this missing data, I have asked three Swiss 
experts on political parties to follow the same coding procedure followed by the teams of the 
euandi project. As a result, I can identify the major Swiss parties on welfare issues. I therefore 
thank Hanspeter Kriesi, Jasmine Lorenzini, and Swen Hutter for their contribution. It was 
unfortunately impossible to gather such panel of experts on Norwegian parties.  
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latest national parliamentary elections. Table 12 presents the cases selected: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Some countries did not have radical right parties as early as the 1980’s, therefore party 
position indicators are only calculated from the years they reached the 5% threshold.  
 
4.2.2. Research design 
 
This chapter follows a “nested research design”; combining large-N and small-N studies 
adds a “synergetic value” to the analysis: while the statistical analysis can guide case 
selection for in-depth research and provide direction for more focused case-studies, the 
(b) small-N analysis can be used to assess the plausibility of observed statistical 
relationships between variables (Lieberman 2005). 
The test of the protection hypothesis proceeds in three steps. First, I compare the 
salience of welfare expansion across party families, the CMP data provides the five most 
salient issues in the radical right parties’ manifestos in the nine countries under study; 
three points in time are selected to grasp the evolution of agendas: early 1980s, mid-
1990s and the most recent election available in our data36. The frequency of each of the 
top five issues mentioned in radical right manifestos is also compared to the mean 
salience of this issue in the system (by taking into account all the other parties 
competing in that election) (for a similar type of analysis see Cole 2005).  
The second step focuses exclusively on the salience of welfare politics for the radical 
right parties. To do this, the evolution of salience in radical right manifestos is compared 
to that of social-democratic parties in the same system. The salience theory of party 
competition posits that parties selectively emphasize topics where they feel they have a 
good reputation, while deemphasizing those that may be electorally costly/put them at 
disadvantage against their competitors. Thus parties emphasize some issues more than 
others in their competition against each other (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; 
Bélanger and Meguid 2008). In this way, parties seek to prime their “own issue’s” 
salience in the decisional calculus of voters. Parties’ tendency to focus on the issues of 
electoral advantage is relatively path-dependent given the role of parties’ institutional 
and organizational legacies in determining their policy package (Marks and Wilson 
                                                        
36 In some cases, RR parties did not compete in elections as early as the 1980s. It is replaced with 
the closest election they competed in.  
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2000). Traditionally, social democratic parties are considered to “own” the issues of 
welfare politics. Thus, the comparative approach in this part of the analysis is double: a 
comparison of the salience of welfare state expansion across radical right parties, but 
also with social democratic parties.   
The key variable in this step of the analysis from the CMP data is ‘welfare state 
expansion’ examined from the 1980’s to the latest available codings37. This item refers 
to “favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain, or expand any public social service 
or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: health care, 
child care, elder care and pensions, social housing – but this category excludes education” 
(CMP Codebook).    
Third, to better understand radical right parties’ agendas, their current substantive 
preferences on welfare issues are examined. The data collected by the euandi project 
allows mapping and comparing the welfare preferences of radical right and social-
democratic parties on a left-right scale based on their positions on five welfare issues. 
The specific items used to construct the welfare preferences’ index are:  (1) social 
programs should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes; (2) pension benefits 
should be reduced to limit the state debt in [country]; (3) government spending should be 
reduced in order to lower taxes; (4) government should reduce workers’ protection 
regulations in order to fight unemployment; and (5) the state should provide stronger 
financial support to the unemployed workers38.   
The exclusive solidarity sub-hypothesis is explored in two steps. As welfare chauvinism 
is the principal exclusionary preference expressed by radical right voters, it is 
specifically tested at the party level through a cross-party family comparison based on 
the euandi data. It evaluates the positions of parties on the issue about whether 
immigrants should have harder access to social benefits compared to the country’s 
citizens39. This question allows us to see whether and to what extent the two party 
                                                        
37 Another item, ‘welfare state limitation’ could have been included as a counterpart. However it 
is left out of the analysis, since it is of negligible proportions for most parties (and never 
exceeding 3% of manifestos).  
38 Items selected form a homogenous scale (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81, confirmed by factor 
analysis). 
39 The exact wording of the question in English is “It should be harder for EU immigrants working 
or staying in [country] to get access to social assistance benefits than it is for [country]'s citizens”. 
This question targets immigrants from within the EU, but it can be used as a proxy of 
inclusiveness/exclusiveness of welfare benefits. Most likely, the exclusiveness of radical right 
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families that compete on the welfare state subscribe to a concept of solidarity that 
includes immigrants or not.  
Second, I conduct three case studies of party manifestos: the French Front National (FN), 
the Austrian FPÖ and the Swiss SVP. These three countries are continental welfare states 
and have important radical right parties. However, they diverge in political 
characteristics, especially with regards to electoral rules (proportional representation 
versus majoritarian system). This has had consequences for the opportunities (e.g. 
participation in government) available to the radical right. In the Austrian case the 
radical right can in theory even participate in government coalitions provided that the 
mainstream parties coalesce with it (for instance the Schüssel government 2000-2005). 
In the Swiss case, the SVP is de facto part of the government, as it is one of the four 
parties included in the “magical formula”. In France, the two round majoritarian system 
has long prevented the FN from obtaining seats in parliament despite their electoral 
results. The case selection primarily derives from the testing of the protection 
hypothesis. Following a nested research design, these parties are three characteristic 
examples of the three possible outcomes of the assumed increased welfare protection 
offered by radical right parties: favourable to welfare expansion (FN), or blurred welfare 
preferences (FPÖ), or in favour of welfare limitations (SVP).  I examine the content of 
these parties’ most recent programmes and analyse how they frame arguments, and to 
what extent they differentiate groups when considering deservingness of welfare 
benefits.    
The FN case study is based on the document entitled “Notre Projet: Programme Politique 
du FN”. It contains 106 pages and was issued for the purpose of the 2012 presidential 
campaign; at the time of writing, it is still considered the major and most up-to-date 
programmatic document of the party in 201440. Contrary to the FN, the FPÖ program is 
comparatively rather short, but this length is typical for this party. The 16 page electoral 
program issued for the legislative 2013 election is entitled “Österreich im Wort”41. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
parties for EU immigrants is at least as strong, if not much stronger, for immigrants coming from 
non-EU countries. Due to missing data, the Finnish parties of interest (SDP/TF) are not included 
from this step of the analysis. 
40 The document is available on the party’s official website: 
http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/Programme.pdf 
41 The document is available on the party’s official website: 
http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/wahl08/FP_-Wahlprogramm_NRW08.pdf  
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SVP “Wahlplattform 2011-2015” is a 129 pages programme used for multiple 
elections42. When reporting qualitative findings, specific words or phrases are cited in 
quotation marks (translated from the original texts) for the purpose of illustrating the 
language used to frame redistributive solidarity.  
 
4.3.  Protection hypothesis: salience of welfare politics for the radical right 
 
In order to examine the protection hypothesis, this section addresses the following 
questions: to what extent do radical right parties emphasize redistributive politics in 
their manifestos compared to other parties (4.3.1.)? Is the salience of the welfare state 
stable over time, or is it changing? Is there a strong difference between the issues 
emphasized by radical right parties compared to the rest of the party system? How 
‘leftist’ are radical right parties on welfare issues (4.3.2.)?  
 
4.3.1. Are radical right parties proponent of redistribution and protection? 
 
The first step of the analysis is to compare the salience of “welfare state expansion” the 
radical right to other party families. It is a simple measure of the proportion of 
manifestos devoted to welfare expansion over the period 1980-2012.  
Two clear patterns emerge from figure 4: expanding the welfare state is increasingly 
important for radical right parties over time, but it remains the party family for which it 
is the least salient. Between the 1980’s and the 2000’s, the salience of ‘welfare 
expansion’ in radical right parties’ manifestos has increased by 70%, which corresponds 
to the average rate for other party families. This increase is still higher for the radical 
right than for social-democratic, liberal and Christian-democratic parties. This first 
overview of salience shows that welfare politics concerns an increasingly relevant in 
radical right parties’ manifestos, but it obliterates country variation, and the relative 
salience of this item in each manifestos.   
 
                                                        
42 The document is available on the party’s official website: 
http://www.svp.ch/positionen/parteiprogramm/ 
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Figure 4 - Salience of welfare state expansion in party manifestos in Western 
Europe (1980-2012) 
 
Table 13 provides the ranking of the top five issues of each radical right party at three 
points in time: in the early 1980’s, the early 1990’s, and the latest manifesto available in 
the CMP data. It shows that welfare expansion is an increasingly salient component of 
manifestos, and even the most salient issue for some parties. Furthermore, the 
traditional liberal/market-oriented economic and welfare limitations preferences that 
are salient concerns in the 1980’s tend to fade away in more recent manifestos. 
However, this programmatic evolution of radical right parties does not apply to every 
party in Western Europe. Moreover, the next sections show that this evolution is not as 
linear as the aggregated results of figure show.  
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The classification of the top five most salient issues n party manifestos over time produce 
three patterns of evolution. The first pattern applies to the French FN and the four 
Scandinavian radical right parties, and supports the protection hypothesis: welfare state 
expansion, is gradually becoming a central feature of the radical right’s agenda. In this 
respect, the Norwegian Progress party (Fremskrittspartiet (FrP)) and French Front 
National are model cases. In the case of Norway, “free market economy” and “economic 
orthodoxy” made up more than 25% of the FrP’s manifesto in 1981, but this proportion 
shrunk in 1993, and in 2009 welfare state expansion constituted the most important issue 
for the FrP. In the case of France, free market economy ranked among the top-5 most 
salient issues in the 1980s and it constituted 7.9 % of their manifesto. In 2012, however, 
free market economy does not appear among the top-5 issues; welfare expansion has 
become the second most salient issue with 11.4% of the manifesto devoted to it. In both 
cases, we see a clear shift from the liberal economic agenda of the 1980s to a more welfare-
oriented manifesto in the most recent election. Because the Danish People’s Party (DF), the 
True Finns (TF), and the Sweden Democrats (SwD) are younger parties, the changes in 
manifestos are not as marked as for the FrP, but these parties all advocate welfare state 
expansion. Welfare expansion is even the top-issue for the SwD in 2010 – the year when 
this party achieved its electoral breakthrough. Second, Austria constitutes a category of 
one, where pro-redistributive policy preferences do not appear among the top five issues of 
the FPÖ. Still, the FPÖ evolved on these issues: it used to be a fervent proponent of free 
market economy in the 1980s, but this position’s salience decreased in the 1990’s. Support 
for free market economy has disappeared from recent manifestos. The question remains, 
however, whether the shift away from more right-wing economic policies has been 
accompanied by an increase in redistributive and pro-welfare preferences – a question, 
which is addressed in the following section. The third group of countries in the sample 
includes Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Contrary to the protection hypothesis, 
the relevance of welfare-oriented issues for the SVP, the PVV, and the VB decreases over 
time. Although these parties ranked welfare expansion among their top priorities in the 
1980’s, it is not the case anymore in their more recent manifestos. We must note however, 
that in Belgium and the Netherlands, the parties themselves have changed over this period. 
Arguably, in Belgium, as the Vlaams Belang (VB) is the direct successor Vlaams Block and 
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this party transformation has limited impact; but it is more significant in the case of the 
Netherlands, where the PVV replaced the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). Not only did the LPF 
promote welfare state expansion and social justice (salience of ‘equality positive’) but it did 
so in greater proportion than other parties competing in the same election (salience is 
higher than the average in the party system); whereas, the PVV does not emphasize these 
issues in its manifesto.  
 
4.3.2. The welfare preferences of radical right parties and social-democratic parties 
 
Overall, radical right parties in Western Europe cannot means be considered indifferent to 
issues of redistribution, although different patterns emerge over time and across countries. 
The next section narrows the analytical lens and focuses on the salience of welfare state 
expansion. To recall, this item refers to introducing, maintaining or expanding any type of 
social service or social security scheme (except for education). This indicator allows for 
measuring to what extent the radical right parties promote welfare protection, and for 
comparing radical right parties with social-democratic parties. Indeed, the programmatic 
shift sub-hypothesis expects that the radical right parties challenge the left on the issue 
they ‘own’. Figure 5 presents the salience of welfare state expansion in the manifestos of 
radical right and social-democratic parties for every election they competed in since 1980. 
Two patterns emerge in Figure 5: ‘inverse’ and ‘concurrent’ evolution of salience of welfare 
state expansion. ‘Inverse evolution’ occurs when the evolution of salience is opposite for 
radical right and social-democratic parties. In most cases, the salience of welfare expansion 
increases for the radical right parties, while at the same time it decreases for social-
democratic parties (e.g. Austria, Belgium, and Finland); but the opposite also occurs (e.g. 
Switzerland). In Austria and Finland, for instance, the salience of welfare state expansion of 
social-democratic parties declines, and it is even surpassed by that of the radical right 
parties in the late 2000s. This is less evident in Denmark and the Netherlands, although the 
patterns look similar evolutions. In the case of the Netherlands, the LPF in the early 2000s 
had similar levels of salience of welfare expansion as the PvdA, the PVV seems to be 
following a similar trend. Though in Denmark the evolution is less clear, the gap in salience 
between the two parties is decreasing. In the case of Switzerland the salience levels of 
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welfare expansion between the SVP and the PSS are also clearly diverging. However, over 
time, the salience of welfare expansion for the SVP is decreasing neatly, and it reaches the 
lowest level of any radical right party considered in this study, while the PSS increasingly 
promotes it. The second pattern which emerges from these data is the concurrent evolution 
of social-democratic and radical right parties’ advocacy in favour of welfare state 
expansion. This is very clear in France and Norway (where salience increases for both 
parties). The case of France is an illustration of a dramatic change: the FN did not advocate 
welfare state expansion in the 1990s but in 2012 it reached a similar level of salience as the 
PS.  Salience of welfare expansion for radical right parties is highest in Norway as well as in 
Sweden, where it is the most salient issue (albeit of lower salience than for social-
democratic parties). The Belgian case provides the example of a reverse trend in 
concurrent evolution: the salience of welfare expansion is decreasing for both parties. 
Salience-based analyses show that radical right parties vary in their emphasis of welfare 
protection in their manifestos. There are three clusters of countries: 1) welfare expansion 
becomes an increasingly salient issue, comparable to the levels of social-democratic parties 
(Scandinavian radical right and FN), 2) welfare expansion remains undetermined showing 
no clear evolution trend (FPÖ and the Dutch cases), 3) parties that contradict the 
protection hypothesis, expanding the welfare state is not a salient issues (SVP, VB).  
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Figure 5 - Evolution of the salience of welfare expansion for radical right and social-
democratic parties in Western Europe 
The relevance of welfare expansion is particularly increasing for Scandinavian radical right 
parties. One explanation may be that radical right parties align to their party systems, since 
welfare expansion is promoted be almost all Scandinavian parties. It also echoes the results 
of chapter 3, which showed that welfare normative concerns are more influential for 
Scandinavian radical right voters than in continental welfare states. The Front National is 
following similar pattern, but this trend is not a clear-cut for the other radical right parties.  
Trends of salience over time are a good indicator to show the importance of welfare issues 
for the radical right parties; yet, they are not sufficient to substantially document party 
positions. The third step of the cross-country and cross-party comparison compares radical 
right, social-democratic and mainstream right parties’ positions on welfare state issues in 
2014 (figure 6). Negative values (-10) represent left wing positions on welfare issues, and 
positive values (+10) represent right-wing positions.  
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Figure 6 - Position of radical right, social-democratic and conservative parties on a 
left/right welfare scale 
 
The left-right positioning of radical right and social-democratic parties reveals that parties 
from both families are located on the centre or the left side of welfare politics. As expected, 
all of the social-democratic parties position themselves on the left side of welfare politics, 
and so do three out of the seven radical right parties under study (DF, PVV, SD). French FN 
and Belgian VB are exactly at the centre of the left/right welfare scale, whereas the True 
Finns  and the FPÖ have slightly more right-wing welfare positions compared to all other 
radical right parties in the sample (respectively scores of +1 and +2 on the right on a 20-
point scale). We should underline, that apart from the SVP, no radical right party is located 
on the extreme right of the axis. Indeed, the Swiss party system is the most polarized with 
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regards to welfare issues, and the SVP lies with the PLR at the very right side of the political 
spectrum. Looking at the distance between the national pairs of parties, we observe that on 
this 20-point scale, the mean distance between the radical right and the social-democratic 
parties on welfare issues is 6.25. There are outliers however, since this difference is of 18 
points in Switzerland, but there is no difference in the left-right positioning of the two party 
families in Denmark and the Netherlands.  
 
Parties 
Protection 
Hypothesis 
DF + 
FrP + 
SD + 
TF + 
FN + 
LPF/PVV . 
FPÖ . 
VB . 
SVP - 
 
Table 14 - The protection hypothesis by country 
 
The programmatic shift sub-hypothesis, and more precisely the challenge of radical right 
parties to social-democratic parties on the issues they ‘own’, find partial support in the 
data. Welfare expansion – increased protection - is an increasingly salient issue for some 
radical right parties, and their position on this issue is very close to that of the social-
democratic parties. In particular, this hypothesis is confirmed in the Scandinavian 
countries and in France. The FPÖ and the PVV present more contrasting cases: these 
parties tend to maintain a blurred position on welfare politics. The Belgian VB is another 
contrasted case: welfare expansion is less salient over time, but the party holds rather 
centrist positions in terms of welfare left/right positioning. The Swiss SVP is an outlier to 
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this regard: not only is welfare expansion not salient for this party, but the SVP also 
promotes a very limited and rightist conception of the welfare state.  
 
4.4.  Exclusion hypothesis: solidarity with an exclusive trademark 
 
This section tests the exclusion hypothesis by assessing if radical right parties promote a 
model of exclusive solidarity in two steps. Since welfare chauvinism is the most relevant 
attitude for the radical right voters, the preferences towards the exclusion of migrants from 
welfare benefits are compared for the radical right and the social-democratic parties 
(4.4.1.). Then, following the principle of nested analysis, three case studies of manifestos 
provide in-depth knowledge on the nature of radical right parties’ welfare positions 
(4.4.2.). The selection of cases derives from the previous sections; the three cases represent 
each of the three possible outcomes of the protection hypothesis: increasing salience of 
welfare expansion (FN), blurred welfare preferences (FPÖ) and decreasing salience of 
welfare preferences (SVP). The focus is on indicators of inclusiveness and mentions of 
groups that are positively or negatively targeted by radical right parties. 
 
4.4.1. Party preferences for welfare chauvinism 
 
The party positions on the restriction of welfare benefits for migrants is a good indicator of 
welfare chauvinism. Thanks to the euandi data it can be calculated for six pairs of social-
democratic and radical right parties: Austrian SPÖ and FPÖ, Belgian SP.A and VB; Danish 
SDDK and DF; French PS and FN; Dutch PvdA and PVV; Swedish SAP and SwD.  Table 15 
shows clearly that all radical right parties (marked in bold) either tend to agree or strongly 
agree with the exclusion of immigrants from welfare benefits. As much as radical right 
voters are welfare chauvinist, the parties also differentiate themselves with this preference. 
Radical right parties are in congruence with their electors: they all single out immigrants as 
being underserving of welfare benefits. On the other hand, social-democratic parties are 
supportive of an inclusive concept of solidarity, with the exception of Austrian SPÖ which 
positions itself in the middle of the scale, thus supporting neither harder nor easier access 
of immigrants to social benefits.  
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Completely 
disagree 
Tend to disagree Neutral Tend to agree Completely agree 
PS, SAP, SP.A PvdA, SDDK SPÖ SwD, FPÖ 
PVV, FN, DF, VB, 
SVP 
Table 15 -Restriction of social benefits for migrants (euandi, 2014) 
Exclusiveness is a critical aspect of the radical right’s welfare preferences, be it the voters 
or the parties. It is also what clearly distinguishes the radical right from other parties. Yet, 
expecting that radical right parties promote an exclusive solidarity goes further than 
welfare chauvinism. In a logic of exclusion, other groups should be targeted, and their 
access welfare benefits limited (or they should be granted limited solidarity) according to 
the perceived violation of welfare normative beliefs. The next section assesses the 
exclusion of welfare groups by radical right parties, relying on three recent manifestos of 
electorally successful radical right parties that hold diverging positions on welfare issues.  
 
4.4.2. Three cases of exclusive solidarity 
 
In order to understand the nature of the welfare preferences of radical right parties, it is 
necessary to look more closely into their manifestos. Salience based analyses give a good 
insight of the importance parties devote to an issue, but provide more limited information 
on the content of their positions. These sections investigate if and who are the groups the 
radical right blames and wants to exclude from redistribution. The quantitative analysis of 
salience of welfare expansion for Austria, Switzerland and France showed change over time 
(Figure 5): while radical right parties in these countries used to have economically liberal 
preferences in the 1980s, the FN shifted to favouring welfare state expansion, the FPÖ 
remains blurred on welfare issues, whereas the SVP does not promote welfare expansion 
(and never did). This change is very clear in the case of the France: for the FN, which used 
to hold an economically orthodox neoliberal position in the 1980s, welfare state expansion 
became a prominent issue in more recent decades (Table 12 and Figure 5).  Marine Le 
Pen’s takeover of the party presidency in 2011 seems to trigger the welfare protectionist 
turn of the FN (chapter 6 addresses the question of causation in greater detail). In Austria, 
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the FPÖ and the SPÖ have been converging regarding their degree of attention to welfare 
state extension. In terms of positions on welfare issues, the FN is exactly at the 0 point on 
the left/right scale, and the FPÖ is only slightly more on the right side of the scale, while the 
SVP is at the very right extreme (Figure 6).  
 
FN’s left-wing economic turn 
The FN’s manifesto confirms its left-wing shift in terms of welfare issues and it is a clear 
example of programmatic shift. The FN promotes expansive and protective welfare policies, 
which is a dramatic rupture with former references to free market economy. One of the 
major economic argument of the program is to re-build a strong state, and to protect the 
public services “that have been decimated by privatization and three decades of ultraliberal 
politics”. Another example of FN’s turn is its determination to keep the 35-hour working 
week. This policy is a symbolic indicator of the left-right economic divide for parties in 
France: it was implemented by a socialist government in 1998 and has been hardly fought 
against by all centrist and right parties since then. The FN claims to be a forceful proponent 
of “social justice” and advocates rather progressive social policies, such as higher taxes for 
the wealthiest, return to a full retirement age of 60, and an ambition to defend and improve 
social security.  
A textbook case of welfare chauvinism. 
In the case of the FN, immigration is undeniably one of the most salient issues in the 
program and it is primarily framed in economic terms. For the FN, immigration is a tool of 
“big corporate interests” to exert pressure and lower the wages. Immigration is presented 
as a “weapon in the service of capital”43. From the perspective of immigrants, the FN 
explains that they move to France because of the “most generous social advantages in 
Europe”. FN claims that social programs would function as a “sucking pump” driving legal 
and illegal immigrants to France.  
The case of French public housing for the less well-off is a good illustration of how 
immigrants are blamed for ineffective social justice and failed social programs. The FN 
                                                        
43 Both terms “grand patronat” (big corporate interests) and “grand capital” (big capital) are 
symbolically associated with the rhetoric of the left.  
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considers that immigrants, both legal and illegal, are the first cause of the housing crisis. 
The FN claims that immigrants are even favoured in terms of housing compared to French 
citizens. Thus the FN’s economic framing of immigration is expressed both in terms of 
causes and consequences: immigrants move to France because of generous social benefits, 
and they threaten social security and welfare programs by abusing it.  
FN’s generous but exclusive welfare policy preferences 
The FN builds its argument around claims specific to two groups: to increase the benefits 
for the less well-off and to ensure “national priority” for French citizens. The concept of 
‘national priority’ also labelled ‘national preference’ or ‘citizen priority’ and it is the core 
argument of the welfare agenda of the FN. Healthcare and family policy give two good 
illustrations of the FN’s preference for exclusion of social groups. The FN claims that 
“securing” social security and health insurance is one of its priorities. But the social model 
of solidarity that FN seeks to defend is explicitly exclusive. One of the main proposals of the 
FN – repeated in several instances of the manifesto - is to suppress the Aide Médicale d’Etat 
(AME), a medical insurance for the poorest, whatever their legal immigration situation. 
Indeed, this universalistic policy is designed for illegal immigrants, and it is antithetical to 
the FN’s welfare chauvinist positions. The suppression of AME would, according to the FN, 
not only improve the social security’s finance, but on a normative level it would also mean 
stopping the assistance of individuals that are ‘undeserving’ of national solidarity. This 
measure is characteristic of the FN’s welfare’s ideology of restricting benefits for 
immigrants and undeserving groups, but it is a one-time policy to suppress one (rather 
limited) welfare scheme.  
Indeed, the FN position on social security goes far beyond in terms of exclusiveness: the 
suspicion that the immigrants are benefiting from the system goes hand in hand with the 
claim that they are “undeserving”. The FN wants to set up an “observatory for the social 
rights of foreigners”. Its mission would be to control immigrants more thoroughly and 
make sure that they are not “abusing” the system. For instance, one of its measures would 
be to make identity check more strict (e.g. with biometric documents) to ensure that 
“immigrants do not multiply their IDs” in order to benefit from the same social service 
several times. The immigrants are deemed to cost more than they contribute, but they are 
also the object of cultural prejudice. Indeed, immigrants are essentially perceived as 
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dishonest, and the FN’s rhetoric doesn’t rely only on the principle of reciprocity, but also on 
cultural prejudices. With regards to social security, immigrants are not considered to be as 
deserving as French citizens, even when they are not breaking any rule. For instance, the 
FN wants to introduce a one-year period of extra contributions in which immigrants would 
work and pay taxes to social schemes, without receiving any benefits. Once this extra 
contribution would be paid, immigrants would be seen as more fit to integrate the 
reciprocal system of social security.  
Family policy is another example of the FN’s exclusive redistributive solidarity. The party is 
proponent of a very generous family policy: large increase of family subsidies, but also of 
subsidies for people with special needs, and for the elderly. All these financial or fiscal aids 
should, however, should be restricted to French citizens. The FN details their exclusiveness 
by considering that a family needs “a least one French parent” to be eligible to family-
related social benefits. This is a very clear case of welfare chauvinism, expressed through 
the FN’s motto of “national preference”. 
In addition to being a textbook example of welfare chauvinism, the FN argues for greater 
welfare protection for other social groups that are insufficiently covered. They define, in a 
populist way, groups of “forgotten citizens” that are not granted the welfare protection they 
should. Thus, the FN insists on the norm of equality for those “crushed by the system”. 
These needy groups are mainly the blue-collar workers, the farmers and the lower income 
earners. Stressing the norm of equality, the FN makes a territorial argument and calls for 
greater protection of “relegated areas” (poor peri-urban) where the state is considered to 
have given up on its citizens.  
   
FPÖ’s ‘blurred’ economic policy   
The FPÖ has a more inconsistent economic messages compared to the FN. Its manifesto 
preserves some key elements of neoliberal rhetoric: it argues in favor of a “thin” state that 
should limit itself to its “actual” tasks in order to reduce administration costs and taxes. The 
argument relies on a conventional liberal economic approach: private investments will 
follow tax cuts, and in turn jobs will be created, which would lead to greater prosperity. 
Contrary to the FN, the FPÖ does not travel to the left on the economic dimension, however 
it sends blurry messages: on the one hand it seeks to reduce taxes whereas on the other it 
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wants to maintain the existing social security and pension systems. The solution to this 
paradox is to confine the welfare state to the natives. More specifically, the FPÖ considers 
immigration to be a “sucking pump” which justifies its opposition to a basic social security 
for all people living in Austria: FPÖ opposes such as scheme as it would create “an unequal 
form of redistribution” and would provoke immigration of people who are “exclusively 
interested in the Austrian social services”.  
Immigration: a cultural problem?  
Contrarily to the FN, FPÖ frames immigration essentially in cultural-religious terms: 
decades of immigration from foreign cultural circles, the FPÖ argues, brought about 
“radical changes in the structure of the population”, whereby Islam is now the second 
biggest cultural community in Austria. The FPÖ perceives this as a threat for the (cultural) 
future of Austria: the Islamic community would, by the end of the century have become the 
“strongest” group in the entire country. Moreover, the FPÖ portrays peoples of Islamic 
culture as non-conforming to the Austrian constitutional principles and as undercover 
“conquerors”44. In its chapter “Women- Men-Partnership-Family”, the FPÖ states clearly 
that immigration from non-European countries has even endangered the equality of 
opportunities between women and men in Austria45.  
Although having framed immigration as a cultural threat in the introduction of its electoral 
program, the FPÖ also links immigrants to economic problems, such as abuse of the welfare 
state and unemployment. In the first chapter entitled “Austria first” the FPÖ begins with 
facts about immigration to elaborate more on the extent to which immigrants are welcome 
and under what conditions46. The FPÖ proposes that Austria should start sending 
foreigners back to their countries of origin: foreigners who misuse the social system, those 
who break the law, those whose asylum application was rejected, and those for whom 
                                                        
44 The FPÖ opposes the construction of anything that symbolizes the desire to conquer Austria that 
are masked under the freedom of religion, such as Minarets. Also, it clarifies that violation of the 
Austrian constitutions, such as violence against women, the lack of respect towards the freedom of 
press and opinion and the torment of animals, are not covered by freedom of religion and should 
thus be punished. 
45 The FPÖ specifically refers to forced marriage and headscarf as well as genital mutilation as 
“clear signs” of women’s oppression, which cannot be accepted in Austria. 
46 Every sixth resident of Austria and every third resident of Vienna have foreign roots; in 2007 
there were 820.000 legal and 100.000 illegal immigrants in the country.  
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there is no job or humane home in Austria should be repatriated. Moreover, The FPÖ’s 
chapter “social justice” resembles very much the FN in that it emphasizes the economic 
aspects of migration. Without presenting any specific statistics, the FPÖ writes that “a large 
part” among migrants either has no job or is over- proportionately hit by unemployment 
due to its low education level. It is in this context where the FPÖ places the image of a 
“strained social system” – a welfare state under pressure because of “economic refugees” 
(Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge). Doing so, the FPÖ make an explicit argument about violated 
reciprocity: on top of cultural opposition to immigration, immigrants are perceived to be 
more dependent and cost more, because they contribute structurally less.  
 “Austrians first”, the FPÖ’s welfare chauvinist motto extends beyond the distribution of 
social benefits to labour-market policies, such as priority allocation of private sector jobs. 
For instance, the FPÖ proposes that in sectors where there is strong need for labour (e.g. 
health and care), the AMS (Austrian unemployment agency) should, based on long-term 
planning, train Austrians to get the qualification for these jobs and prevent immigrants 
from accessing them. In other words, rather than give the jobs to qualified immigrants, 
more public money should be spent to train Austrians so that they get the available jobs 
instead.  
Saving the strained welfare state 
The FPÖ’s plan to save the “strained welfare state” is to create a social security tailor-made 
for “temporary” Gastarbeiter, which would give them access to medical care and would be 
financed by their own contributions. Again, the FPÖ makes a clear call for reciprocity as 
main criteria of welfare deservingness. Non-natives who are frequently or long-term 
unemployed should lose both their residence and working permits. The FPÖ makes very 
clear that the Austrian social security system should not include immigrants, for whom 
different arrangements should be made. Although the FPÖ does not go into as much detail 
as the FN does (note that however the FPÖ program is only 16 pages), in the FPÖ’s ideal 
world immigrants should be nothing more than temporary workers47 who will soon leave 
and should not be part of the Austrian welfare system. The “already expensive welfare state 
                                                        
47 For an analysis of conflicting rationalities and the role of the radical right in the case of the 
Austrian Seasonal Worker Scheme, see Horvath (2014).   
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(7 billion per year)” should target those really in need and the FPÖ does support social 
programs for the elderly, the people with special needs and the unemployed – but 
membership in all these categories is reserved to native Austrians. Although the FPÖ is not 
as “left” on welfare issues, it shares the concept of exclusive solidarity based on reciprocity 
with the FN, which expresses even greater degrees of distrust against immigrants. 
The FPÖ does not argue more based on the norms of self-reliance and equality. Its positions 
are truly that of the status quo: the goal is to “save the welfare state”. Their solutions 
include the exclusion of immigrants from most benefits, and providing training to Austrian 
nationals with low qualifications. In addition to its reciprocity based conception of welfare 
chauvinism, the FPÖ puts forward blurred preferences: it promotes concurrently the 
“reduction” of the state’s administration, while seeking to “save” all its welfare programs.  
 
SVP: limiting a welfare state responsible for abuses 
Contrarily to the FN and the FPÖ, the Swiss SVP is a clear proponent of welfare limitation 
and provide a textbook example of Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula’. As previous sections have 
shown, welfare expansion is a decreasingly salient issue for this party over time. The 
analysis of the 2011-2015 party manifesto also show that the SVP is a clear proponent of 
welfare limitation. The argumentation relies heavily on normative beliefs of self-reliance, 
and individuals and groups breaching this principle. In the SVP manifesto immigration is 
essentially a distinct issue which is not tackled together with welfare issues, contrary to the 
case of FN and to a lesser extent for the FPÖ. Immigration is treated in a separate chapter, 
distinct from the one relating to the social security system and the one on healthcare. 
The argumentation of the SVP in favour of welfare limitation is based on two pillars: 
welfare spending has increased in too great proportions over the years, and the social 
security system has created too much dependence. As an introduction to their proposals 
for social security, the SVP claims that the aim of this system is to support those who are 
“genuinely” in need, because “the system is being abused and the lazy are growing at the 
expense of the hard-working, and they are rightly unwilling to play along”. The SVP thus 
argues for a general decreasing of the “ballooning welfare system” listing almost all the 
types of benefits to be reduced. More specifically, they propose the increase of retirement 
age (AHV) which could not be spelled out more clearly in terms of violation of the norm of 
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self-reliance. While insisting on the “limits of social welfare”, they quote article 6 of the 
Swiss Federal Constitution: “all individuals shall take responsibility for themselves, and 
shall, according to their abilities contribute to achieving the tasks of the state and society”. 
Because the SVP perceives the norm of self-reliance to be breached, it argues, for instance, 
in favour of a “self-financing healthcare system”. Remarkably, the SVP targets a specific 
category of abusers, which is not often argued against by other parties: the abusers of 
Disability Insurance (IV). It targets specifically the abusers of this scheme because they are 
considered to be “false handicapped”.  
However, when illustrating their manifesto with real-life examples, the SVP shows how 
they consider the link between welfare abuse and immigration to be self-evident. When 
targeting abusers, the manifesto example pertains to pensioners from the Balkans “who 
can afford to support half a village at Switzerland’s expense”. Another illustration of the 
anti-immigrant twist of their welfare position is an example of a “real situation, according 
to a police report” of differences of treatment among pensioners. The names they give to 
the characters of the story leave no doubt about the message behind welfare abuse: “Fritz 
Schoch” is a disadvantaged pensioner in comparison to “Hakan Fenaci” and his wife, who 
receive disability pension (IV) granted by “Dr. Narsalaam Kusayi”. Overall, while insisting 
on the norm of self-reliance, and how the social system perverts the behavior of 
individuals, the SVP clearly states that “poorly qualified foreigners are leading to a steady 
rise in welfare costs”. 
Immigration remains at the core of the FN and FPÖ and the SVP’s programs. Radical right 
parties in the three countries perceive immigration, and consequently also diversity, as a 
threat to the welfare state and thus propagate an exclusive, chauvinist concept of solidarity. 
These parties are very similar in that they portray social programs as “endangered” by 
immigration. In that sense, they mirror perfectly the welfare chauvinist preferences of their 
voters. Each of these parties, although promoting different level of welfare protection, 
differentiates among social groups when evaluating welfare deservingness. Table 16 
recapitulates the conception of solidarity these parties put forward, which norm of the 
moral economy of the welfare state they mobilize to justify their positions, and which 
groups are differentiated (positively or negatively).  
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Parties 
Type of 
redistribution 
favoured 
Core normative 
argument 
Exclusiveness/Inclusiveness of 
outgroups 
Front National 
Exclusive and 
expansive 
solidarity. 
Reciprocity and 
equality 
Targeted undeserving groups: 
immigrants, welfare scroungers. 
Positively viewed groups: 
extended redistribution for 
farmers, blue-collar workers, low-
income. 
FPÖ 
Exclusive and 
blurred solidarity. 
Reciprocity 
Targeted undeserving groups: 
immigrants.  
Positively targeted groups: low-
skilled 
 
SVP 
Exclusive and 
restricted 
solidarity. 
Reciprocity and 
Self-Reliance 
Targeted undeserving groups: 
immigrants, welfare 
scroungers/abusers, "false 
handicapped". 
Positively viewed groups: farmers. 
Table 16 - The differentiation hypothesis by country 
 
4.5.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that that the radical right grasped the opportunity to appeal to its 
constituencies by offering protective welfare policies, while remaining on the right on 
sociocultural issues and especially immigration. The descriptive analysis showed that over 
the last 30 years, radical right parties are generally increasingly proponents of welfare 
protection. These parties seem to be aligning or getting closer to social-democratic parties 
on socio-economic issues, or at least for most cases to dissociate themselves from 
conventional right-wing welfare positions. More precisely, there is a shift to the 
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traditionally left side of welfare politics (e.g. in favour of more generous redistribution) of 
the radical right parties (with some notable exceptions like the Swiss SVP). Some radical 
right parties have gradually invaded the political space traditionally occupied by social-
democratic parties: over time, welfare state expansion became a salient topic for many 
radical right parties. While social-democratic parties did not abandon economic equality 
and the promotion of welfare state expansion, some radical right parties made a gradual 
yet radical move towards the left on social policy, abandoning their pro-market neoliberal 
ideology to adopt pro-welfare positions. The programmatic shift sub-hypothesis is 
validated in some cases only. Radical right parties in Scandinavia and the French Front 
National have operated a genuinge programmatic shift in terms of welfare preferences. 
However, other some seem to engage in more modest blurred programmatic shifts (FPÖ 
and PVV), while the welfare preferences of some parties have not evolved towards 
protection (SVP and VB).  
In addition, this positional shift comes with the definition of a strictly restrictive concept of 
redistributive politics: radical right parties frame welfare policies in terms of exclusiveness 
of undeserving outgroups, whatever their preferences for more or less redistribution are.. 
All radical right parties target immigrants as undeserving of welfare benefits. Their 
justifications do not lie only in the cultural rejection of immigration, but are also motivated 
by the idea of violated reciprocity. Immigrants are considered as a burden on the welfare 
state, because they are considered to be highly dependent while contributing minimally. 
Welfare preferences of radical right parties are guided by welfare chauvinism, which shows 
a high level of congruence with their constituents. As welfare limitation and egalitarianism 
partly determined some voters’ preference for the radical right, some parties are 
proponents of an extended (FN) or limited (SVP) welfare state. All parties, however, 
identify groups within the population (low-skilled, blue-collar workers, famers) who are 
considered to be more deserving than the actual level of benefits they enjoy. Exclusive 
solidarity is a common feature of all West European radical right parties.  
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5. Welfare politics and the radical right: a class based approach 
 
 
 
 
The class structure of the radical right constituency has become a prominent subfield in the 
study of the radical right’s success. This debate is largely articulated around the working 
class, and how it came to become the core electorate of radical right parties. The analysis of 
chapter 3 confirmed this overrepresentation of the working class: being a worker is the 
very significant determinant of voting for the radical right. There is an extensive literature 
that studies the working class as the core clientele of radical right parties. This class 
structure of radical right constituencies is working class oriented in most West European 
cases:  French Front National (Mayer 2002, Gougou and Mayer 2013), Flemish Vlaams 
Block (Swyngedouw 1998, Lubbers et al. 2002), Norwegian Progress Party (Bjorklund 
2011), the Danish People’s Party (Andersen and Bjorklund 2000, Meret 2010), the Sweden 
Democrats (Oskarson and Demker 2015) and the Austrian FPÖ (Scheuregger and Spier 
2007). The field of study of the class composition within radical right constituencies is not 
limited to case studies and provides the opportunity for rich cross-country comparison 
(Oesch 2008, Rydgren 2013).  
However, the overrepresentation among radical right voters does not apply to every West 
European cases; and, more importantly, many of the aforementioned studies point to the 
proletarization of these constituencies in the 1990’s. In the cases of the Italian Lega Nord 
and the Swiss SVP, the class composed of small-business owners, artisans, and 
independents counted for a higher proportion of radical right voters than the working class 
(Kitschelt and McGann 2005). It also cannot be claimed that radical right parties are 
genuinely considered as working class parties. First, as stated in the introduction, they are 
still not the “parties of the working class”, since they are not its preferred voting choice 
(not voting is the modal electoral outcome among the working class). Moreover, the class 
composition of these parties is diverse, as it is the case for most party families. Even if the 
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largest share of radical right voters belongs to the working class, they do not make up more 
than the majority of voters. The literature on class composition of the radical right 
constituency also indicates that the sociological profile of the voters is changing. This 
evolution is striking in the case of France, between the 1990’s when the Front National 
found its core electoral clientele in the “small shops and the workshops” (Perrineau and 
Mayer 1992), and to 2012, when party leader Marine Le Pen claimed her party was “the 
party of the working class” (Mayer 2013a). Betz has coined this transformation process as 
the “proletarization” of the radical right constituencies. The most important aspect of this 
concept is that it describes a process of change.  
With Western societies becoming increasingly “classless” (Kingston 2000), social classes – 
from a key factor in the “sociological model of voting” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) – would have 
become less and less important for explanations of political preferences. Some authors 
even wrote about the “death” of class voting (Franklin, Mackie, Valen 2009; Knutsen 2006; 
Thomassen 2005, see also Dalton 2008, Katz and Mair 2009). However, others have 
contradicted this theory (Hout et al. 1993, Evans 2000). Over the years, nonetheless, social 
scientists provided more and more evidence that RRP were turning into “working class 
parties”. This “proletarization” of RRP constituencies in the 1990’s was documented 
extensively in many West European cases, such as the French Front National (Mayer 2002), 
Flemish Vlaams Block (Swyngedouw 1998), the Norwegian Progress Party (Bjorklund 
2011), the Danish People’s Party (Meret 2010), and the Austrian FPÖ (Scheuregger and 
Spier 2007). By now, a broad consensus exists among scholars that workers have become 
“the core clientele” of radical right-wing parties (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, see also 
Oesch 2008).48  
This consensus is strongly interwoven with theories that consider workers as the principle 
“Modernisierungsverlierer” (Betz 1994) or “losers of globalization” (Kriesi et al. 2008; 
2012). Yet, empirical evidence pertaining to the assumed growth of workers as a clientele 
                                                        
48 It has often been argued that this transformation occurred at the expense of the political Left. 
According to several authors, many working class voters of RRP used to support left-wing parties 
(Betz 1994, see also Betz and Meret 2012. For a critique of similar theories concerning the French 
case – especially pertaining to the idea of “communicating vessels” between former communist 
voters and “clienteles” of the Front National – see Lehingue 2003. 
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of radical right-wing parties from the moment of their electoral breakthroughs until today 
remains scarce. 
The increasing importance of the working class in radical right’s constituencies raises 
questions that are still not completely answered. This chapter addresses several aspects of 
the relation between class politics and the radical right that have remained understudied. 
First, how has the class profile of West European radical voters evolved since their initial 
electoral breakthroughs of the 1980’s? Second, how is the transformation of the class 
distribution of radical right voters related to welfare preferences? And finally, what are the 
party level consequences of these transformations? More precisely, has the changing class 
structure of the radical right constituencies caused change for the parties’ welfare 
preferences? 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter looks at the dynamic dimension of the 
precarization sub-hypothesis. Chapter 3 has shown that radical right voters were 
influenced by their economic insecurity in their voting decision, but this chapter deals with 
the aggregated level. The expectation is that radical right constituencies are increasingly 
composed of working class voters. Chapter 4 has shown that many radical right parties 
adopt more protective preferences in terms of welfare politics. The programmatic adaption 
sub-hypothesis expects that this evolution is the consequence of the precarization of their 
constituents.  
In order to evaluate precarization, programmatic shift and how they are linked, this 
chapter is structured in two parts. First, I look at the class structure of radical right 
constituencies at an aggregated level, and over time. Overall the working class’ weight in 
radical right constituencies is growing (5.1.). The second part of the chapter follows 
Kitschelt’s call to give more attention to the supply side of the study of radical right parties 
(Kitschelt 2007, 2013). The first section of this chapter shows that there are some clear 
class patterns among the radical right constituency; I thus analyse, in a second step, the 
relation between welfare preferences of social classes and party politics. I find that some 
radical right parties adopt protectionist and pro-welfare positions because of the changing 
class structure of their voters (5.2.).  
As shown in chapter 3 and consistent with the literature on individual-level determinants 
of the vote, the working class is strongly associated to the radical right vote. The vote of the 
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working class has been the heart of class-based analysis for at least two reasons: it was 
strongly associated to voting for the left for most of the post-war period, and this support 
was considered to be the basis of political coalitions that developed the welfare state. This 
is the core of the ‘power resource’ theory, also discussed in chapter 1. In the Three worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen showed how the working class vote for the left 
created the basis for the transformation of capitalism though the development of the 
welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990). However, when this work was published, not only 
had the class structure of advanced democracies evolved, but the electoral alignment of the 
working class had somewhat ‘dealined’. The decrease in electoral importance of left wing 
parties – parallel to the gains of the radical right – is a first indication of this electoral shift. 
Figure 7 shows these trends for nine Western European democracies. The vote for the 
maisntream left, which was strongly associated with the working class, is steadily 
decreasing in most countries. On the other hand, these countries have all witnessed the rise 
or the appearance of radical right parties. This is particularly striking in the cases of 
Belgium, Finland, and Switzerland, where radical right parties have reached similar or 
superior electoral levels compared to the left from the 2000’s onward. 
These descriptive trends point to the transformation of the class alignments in Western 
Europe, keeping in mind the growing importance of the working class in the determinants 
of the radical right vote. However, they do not demonstrate that the working class has 
shifted its electoral support the radical right parties. The next section looks in detail at the 
class composition of radical right constituencies in Western Europe between 1992 and 
2014. In addition to refining knowledge on the radical right vote, this section contributes to 
the wider debate on class voting. Considering the dealignment of the working class with the 
left, some authors argued that traditional class voting had faded (Dalton 2008, Katz and 
Mair 2009). 
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Figure 7 - Electoral evolution of the left and radical right parties in Western Europe 
 
Regarding socio-economic preferences on the demand side, research has already shown 
that the working class is not the only overrepresented occupational class within radical 
right constituencies. Radical right parties are expected to be cross-pressured by 
heterogeneous constituencies in terms of occupational class and attitudes. Ever since the 
electoral breakthrough of contemporary radical right parties, researchers in several 
European countries have distinguished socially and attitudinally diverging subgroups 
within radical right constituencies. Plasser and Ulram (2000), for instance, not only found 
strong support for the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) among “Wohlfahrsstaatliche 
Chauvinisten,” i.e. relatively young, low skilled “welfare state chauvinists,” supporting 
government intervention to protect their jobs, but also among “Systemverdrossene Rechte,” 
i.e. authoritarian and ethnocentric “rightists who are disillusioned by the system,” mainly 
workers, whose protest votes and penchant for a strong leader would go hand in hand with 
a strict rejection of egalitarian tendencies and welfare state interventions. Similarly, in 
France, Nonna Mayer (2002) discerned two opposite blocs within the same electoral front. 
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On the one hand, lower educated, non-religious “ninistes” (“neither left nor right”), 
politically uninterested workers who would mainly vote Le Pen out of protest and despair, 
yet with leftist socio-economic preferences. On the other, relatively high educated, religious 
and bourgeois “droitistes” (“rightists”), stemming from the higher middle class, who, hostile 
to public services and public servants, would be sociologically and ideologically closer to 
supporters of the “classic,” governmental right. These studies thus suggest that instead of 
one single “winning formula”, multiple formulas exist for different social groups within 
radical right constituencies. By testing the precarization over time hypothesis, I aim at 
getting a better grasp of the class-based heterogeneity within the RRP constituencies. 
 
5.1. The radical right constituency: a class-based approach 
 
The following analyses look at evolutions of the class composition of radical right 
constituencies in Western Europe from 1992 to 2014 using a combination of 
Eurobarometer data (EB, 1992-2000) and the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2014). No 
other existing datasets allow for longitudinal class-based descriptive statistics of the 
constituencies of West European party constituencies. An ideal analysis would have 
presented findings on the class composition of radical right parties in all relevant countries 
since their electoral breakthrough of the 1980’s. Unfortunately, this analysis had to be 
restricted to the 1992-2014 period, for two main reasons. First, the number of radical right 
voters in the Eurobarometer data before the 1990’s is too limited. Second, radical right 
parties had not yet appeared on the democratic scene in all countries under study in the 
1980’s (Belgium’s VB and Finland’s TF notably). Integrating data of the 1980’s would thus 
be country-biased and unreliable. I nonetheless have to acknowledge that the sample is still 
slightly unbalanced: not all the country-specific cases are included in all the survey waves. 
There is no data on Swiss voters before 2002, for instance, whereas, in the case of Norway, 
Austria and Finland, a few years are missing in the Eurobarometer data of the 1990s. Table 
17 presents the radical right parties considered in this section, and the years for which 
comparative data on their voters is available. 
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Despite these quasi-inevitable shortcomings, this dataset provides a reliable picture of the 
cases under study. Moreover, this unique dataset allows for the operationalization of social 
classes over the time period 1992-2014. 
Despite the fact that available occupational information in the Eurobarometer is more 
limited than in the ESS, it is still possible to operationalize this social characteristic into 
four coherent categories: employers (small and large), middle-class, working class (manual 
workers) and routine workers (low-skilled non-manual). Due to a lack of information 
concerning the sector of employment as well as the respondents’ previous employment, 
retired respondents and non-employed are not kept in the sample (following the 
classification of Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015, see table 7 of chapter 3 for the recoding 
of ISCO class schemes. Class distribution between the two datasets is consistent, see 
Appendix A) 
 
Country 
Presence of country in 
data 
Radical right parties 
Presence of 
radical right in 
data 
Austria 1994-2010, 2014 Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ) 
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) 
1994-2014 
2005-2014 
Belgium 1992-2014 Vlaams Blok (VB) 
Vlaams Belang (VB) 
1992-2003 
2004-2014 
Denmark 1992-2014 Fremskridtpartiet 
Dansk Folkeparti (DF) 
1992-1995 
1995-2014 
Finland 1993-2014 Suomen maaseudun puolue (SMP) 
Perussuomalaiset  (TF) 
1993-1995 
1995-2014 
France 1992-2014 Front National (FN) 1992-2014 
Netherlands 1992-2014 Centrum Democraten (CD) 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 
Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV)) 
1992-2002 
2002-2004 
2006-2014 
Norway 1992-1996, 2002-2014 Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) 1992-2014 
Switzerland 2002-2014 Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) 1992-2014 
Table 17 - Description of selected cases and parties of chapter 5 
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Subsequently, in order to refine the class-based analysis of radical right-wing voters, I rely 
on multivariate analysis covering a more restricted time period. Accordingly, the second 
part of the analysis, relies on the ESS data (2002-2014), with an elaborated 8-class 
occupational positions scheme (based on Oesch 2006a, b). This second step thus allows for 
a finer-grained estimation of the relevance of belonging to a social class for the radical right 
vote. To estimate the effect of the 8-position occupational class classification on voting for a 
radical right party, I use a binomial logistic regression model with country fixed effects.  
The first empirical research step describes the class patterns within the radical right 
constituencies, by using two descriptive indicators: the political distinctiveness and the class 
distinctiveness of RRP of the different social classes within radical right constituencies, 
calculations are presented in table 18 (following Korpi 1972). The political distinctiveness 
of a class corresponds to the proportion of voters for a specific party among each of the 
different social classes. For instance, the political distinctiveness of the working class 
voting for the radical right is a/(a+c). The class distinctiveness, by contrast, of the radical 
right is the proportion of each social class within the radical right constituency. For 
instance, the share of working class voters among all radical right voters is calculated by 
a/(a+b). Both indicators are calculated for each year between 1992 and 2014, using a 3-
year average in order to balance the smaller samples of the early years of the datasets. 
 
Classes Radical right 
Other parties 
/ no vote 
Total 
Workers a c a + c 
Other classes b d b + d 
Total  a + b c + d N 
Table 18 - Calculating class and political distinctiveness 
 
5.1.1. Evolution of the class composition of radical right constituencies 
 
The political distinctiveness of occupational classes confirms the relative proletarization of 
radical right constituencies (Figure 8). In the early 1990’s, blue-collar workers vote in 
much higher proportions for the radical right than the average population, or any other 
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social class. In the later years of the sample, the radical right vote of the working class is 
twice the size of that of the voters at large. However, from the 2000’s onwards, the low-
skilled routine class reached similar levels of electoral support radical right than that of the 
working class. By contrast, the distinctiveness of the employer class – which mainly 
comprises craftsmen and shopkeepers – follows the evolution of the average vote for the 
radical right. Finally, the middle class constitutes the only category that systematically 
votes less for the radical right than any other social group. Indeed, West European middle 
classes constitute the core electoral support of social-democratic parties during the past 
decades (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015).  
 
Figure 8 - Evolution of political distinctiveness of occupational classes (1992-2014) 
Figure 9 shows that the evolution of class distinctiveness is actually rather stable between 
1992 and 2014. Throughout the period, workers make up about 35 percent of radical right 
voters. Interestingly, however, routine service workers represent a similar share of radical 
right voters during the 1990’s. From the early 2000’s onwards the latter even constitute 
the largest occupational class within radical right constituencies. This partly contradicts 
the proleatrization theory, but not necessarily the expectation of precarization, as a large 
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share of economically insecure voters are found in the service sector. One should note, 
however, that – even though the proportion of blue collar worker workers within radical 
right constituencies is somewhat constant –, the absolute number (and relative share) of 
working class voters within West European democracies has slightly decreased during the 
period under study (‘structural’ or ‘ecological realignment’, Evans 2000). This implies that 
the relative number of workers voting for the radical right is increasing. Still, the claim that 
workers would constitute the new core clientele of radical right-wing parties does not 
correspond to the empirical findings.   
 
 
Figure 9 - Evolution of class distinctiveness within radical right constituencies 
(1992-2014) 
The Alford Index provides further confirmation to the relative proletarization theory and 
by extent to the precarization of radical right constituencies. It is a simple indicator of class 
voting, but it is very useful for large-scale longitudinal analyses of class voting (Dalton 
2013). The original Alford Index illustrates the left-wing electoral alignment with the left, 
and is the difference between the share of non-manual voters of the left and the working 
class voters of the left (Alford 1962, 1963). I adapt this indicator and create a “radical right 
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Alford Index” of the working class vote for the radical right, calculated by a/(a+b) – c/(c+d) 
(table 16). 
 
Figure 10 - Alford Index of the radical right49 
 
The evolution of the Alford Index adapted to the West European radical right 
constituencies shows a clear pattern: the working class votes substantially and increasingly 
more for the radical right than other social classes (Figure 10). From 1992 onward, the 
radical right appeals more and more to working class voters. This trend is inversely 
proportional to that of the classic Alford Index (working class vote for left parties). Gingrich 
and Häusermann have computed the Alford Index with the similar social classes: the 
decline of the classic Alford Index is very neat over the same time frame. Their analysis is 
divided between the four welfare regime types but shows a common trend: the Alford 
Index was close to 20 in Western Europe in the 1980’s, closer to 10 in the 1990’s, and is 
close to 0 in the 2010’s (except in Southern welfare regimes, where it remains high, around 
10) (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). The present analysis shows cases from continental 
and Scandinavian welfare regimes, but the contrast between the two Alford indexes in the 
                                                        
49 Graph shows the Alford Index of the Radical Right with a 3-year moving average to compensate 
for unbalanced samples by year.  
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2010’s is striking: it at its highest – around 7 – for the radical right, when the working class 
is not aligned with the left anymore (Alford Index of zero).  
In sum, the working class is clearly more likely to vote for the radical right. The eroding 
support of the working class for the left parties has been – at least partly – replaced by 
support for radical right parties. If the (voting) working class is increasingly supporting 
radical right parties, it does not mean they are “working class parties”. Indeed, as the class 
distinctiveness of the radical right showed, other social classes, like the low-skilled service 
workers, also composed a significant share of the radical right constituencies. The radical 
right constituencies are not composed of a majority of working class voters.  
 
5.1.2. Belonging to a class and voting for the radical right 
 
Whereas the previous section showed that class patterns have not disappeared and that 
the radical right constituency consists increasingly of routine workers, the following 
section will use a more fine-grained scheme of class distribution among radical right 
voters. Through logistic regression analysis, I test the determinants of radical right voting 
in Western Europe between 2002 and 2014. Unfortunately, this model cannot include the 
refined welfare variables used in chapter 3 (attitudes and indicators of economic 
insecurity), and thus provide a simpler explanation of the radical right vote. The dependent 
variable is thus coded as a dummy: voting for a radical right-wing party against all other 
choices (that is, other parties and no vote). The model comprises four socio-demographic 
control variables that are conventionally used in the analysis of electoral behaviour: age, 
gender, household income (in deciles) and education level (low, intermediate, high). These 
variables account for a – minor but relevant – portion of the variance (Van der Brug et al. 
2005). Besides these socio-demographic factors, three attitudinal variables were integrated 
in the model, corresponding to the three dominant branches of existing theories explaining 
radical right support (see Oesch 2008). That is: cultural conflict (captured by the variable: 
‘Immigrants make country worse or better place to live), protest voting (‘Satisfaction with 
the working of democracy in country’), and economic protectionism (captured by the only 
socio-economic attitudinal variable that was available in all the seven ESS rounds, namely: 
the preference for governmental redistribution of income). Finally, an additional variable 
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measuring the experience of unemployment accounts for economic insecurity. This model 
is innovative because, thanks to the rich ESS dataset, it can test the relevance of more 
precise occupational positions on voting behaviour. Occupational class is coded in 8 
positions, with production workers as the reference category. Finally, in order to account 
for contextual level variations, the model includes country fixed-effects and year dummies 
for the seven waves of data. (See Appendix B for a detailed account of the used variables). 
This model supports the findings of chapter 3 and it largely confirms the expectations 
derived from existing studies (Table 19). Gender and age are significant determinants of 
the vote: radical right voters are more frequently male and generally younger. The results 
show that being a production worker constitutes a strong determinant of radical right 
support. Production workers are more likely to vote for a radical right party than any of the 
other seven occupational classes. In this regard, the former are particularly opposed to 
sociocultural (semi-)professionals. This observation is in line with the theory of 
transformation of political conflicts, in which the emergence of the cultural conflict pits 
these two social categories against each other in the political space (Kriesi et al. 2008; 
2012). Controlling for the major attitudes that traditionally explain the radical right vote 
(anti-immigration, protest), it is thus safe to claim that class-based voting is not entirely 
dead.   
This model however does not show the full account of the class-voting for the radical right. 
The categorical variable of 8 occupational classes at this stage only shows class positions 
with regard to production workers. To specify the effect of occupational classes more 
precisely predicted probabilities of voting for the radical right for each class are presented 
(figure 11). 
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Voting for the radical right Coef. Std. Err. 
   
Gender (male) -.32*** (0.03) 
Age (years) -.01*** (0.00) 
Income -.01     (0.01) 
Level of education (low)   
- Intermediate   .08       (0.04) 
- High -.47*** (0.05) 
Occupational class (prod. workers)   
- Service workers -.15** (0.05) 
- Clerks -.27*** (0.05) 
- Small business owners -.12*** (0.05) 
- Socio-cultural professional -.82*** (0.07) 
- Technical professional -.43*** (0.06) 
- (Assistant) managers -.47*** (0.05) 
- Self-employed and large employers -.49*** (0.10) 
Negative perception of immigrants   .31*** (0.01) 
Dissatisfied with democracy   .12** (0.01) 
In favour of income redistribution -.22*** (0.03) 
Faced unemployment of more than 12 months   .13** (0.05) 
Year (2002)   
- 2004   .10      (0.05) 
- 2006   .23** (0.05) 
- 2008   .64*** (0.05) 
- 2010   .45*** (0.05) 
- 2012   .52*** (0.06) 
- 2014 
  
-.32*** 
(0.05) 
 
Pseudo R²=0.13 
N=59,978 
 
 
Table 19 - Binomial logistic regression with country fixed effects; Reference 
categories of categorical variable in parentheses  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
It should be emphasized that predicted probabilities are predictions about hypothetical 
observations; they are not predictions about each of the specific subgroups. The effect of 
each occupational class is computed with every other variable set at their mean value. 
Hence predicted probabilities are a statistical tool that allows for singling out the effect of 
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each occupational class on voting for the radical right, but it does not predict the exact vote 
share for each of the occupational classes. In the sample, the average predicted probability 
of voting for a radical right party is of 0.07, but as figure 11 shows, there is substantial 
variation across occupational groups.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Predicted probabilities of voting for radical right by occupational class 
 
Out of the eight occupational classes, four have significantly different predicted probability 
of voting for the RRP than the average sample. This means that controlling for other 
factors; belonging to one of these four occupational classes has a particular influence on the 
probability of voting for a radical right party. As previously confirmed, production workers 
and sociocultural (semi-)professionals display the starkest differences in these matters. 
The probability of voting for the radical right for a production worker (.10) is 3 points 
above the average and twice the size of that of a socio-cultural professional (.05). 
Importantly, the predicted probabilities of voting for the radical right among routine 
service workers and small business owners are also significantly higher than the average, 
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whereas they are significantly lower for (assistant) managers. This confirms the cross-class 
hypothesis stating that sociologically (very) different classes are significantly 
overrepresented within radical right constituencies. Interestingly, all these four classes are 
situated in the relatively lower regions of the social space: they are likely to be the most 
exposed to economic insecurity. 
In order to assess the specific class profiles that influence the probability of voting for the 
radical right, Table 20 presents these statistical ideal types of radical right voters for 
different occupational classes. For each of the overrepresented occupational classes within 
the RRP constituency (production workers, service workers and small business owners), 
the profile of the voter that is most likely to support the radical right is identified. 
Additionally, in order to test if there is a specific relation between working in the industrial 
sector and radical right support, the profile with the highest probability of voting for the 
radical right within the technical worker category was also identified. Interestingly, there 
are different factors within each of these classes which contribute to the highest probability 
voting for the radical right. Being male and retrospectively economically insecure (having 
faced unemployment during one’s career) increases the chance of voting for the radical 
right among all four of the categories. However, education, which is often considered a 
linear predictor (the less educated are expected to vote more for radical right-wing parties, 
e.g., Ivarsflaten and Stubarger, 2013) has contrasted effects across different occupational 
categories (confirming results of chapter 3). 
The statistical ideal type that is the most likely to vote for the radical right is lower 
educated production workers who faced unemployment (probability = .20). However, 
when it comes to service workers, technical professionals and small business owner 
classes, having an intermediate level of education (and not low) increases the likelihood of 
voting for a radical right party.  
 
To sum up, the class structure of the radical constituencies has evolved over the last 30 
years: as the support of the working class for the left was eroding, radical right parties have 
gained increased support from this class. These specific voter types support the 
precarization sub-hypothesis: among lower social classes, the more economically insecure 
individuals are more likely to vote for the radical right. The next section investigates how 
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the shifting class structure of the radial right constituency – and chiefly the support of the 
working class for radical right parties’ - influences the parties’ preferences on welfare 
issues.  
 
 Predicted probability to 
vote for a RRP 
95% Conf. interval 
Mean .07 .07 .08 
    
Production worker .10 .09 .11 
Production worker, lower education, faced 
unemployment, male 
.20 .18 .22 
    
Service worker .09 .08 .10 
Service worker, intermediate education, faced 
unemployment, male 
.18 .16 .20 
    
Small business owner .09 .08 .09 
Small Business owner, intermediate education, 
faced unemployment, low income, male   
.18 .16 .20 
    
Technical professional .06 .06 .07 
Technical worker, intermediate education, faced 
unemployment, male  
.14 .12 .16 
Table 20 - Predicted probabilities of voting for the radical right 
 
5.2.  The party-level consequences of class-based constituencies 
 
The previous section has shown class politics is increasingly important in radical right 
constituencies, yet the consequences at the party level remain unclear. This second step of 
the analysis focuses on the importance of the working class for radical right parties, and 
tests how it affects the preferences of Western European radical right parties. I find that 
some radical right parties have adopted protectionist positions and support for the 
expansion of the welfare state. 
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This question addresses the debate on the congruence of preferences between parties and 
their voters. Do parties represent their voters? Or do voters follow their parties? The 
question of linkage between parties and their voters originates in Sartori’s statement that 
“citizens in modern democracies are represented through and by parties. This is inevitable” 
(Sartori 1968, italics in original). Thus, I ask the question to know whether it is inevitable 
that radical right parties take up on the interventionist preferences of their working class 
voters. This linkage however can work in two directions: top-down and bottom-up. Top-
down conceptions of party linkage posit that the voters adapt to the views of the parties 
and their leaders. The bottom-up theory argues that political elites adopt the positions of 
the mass public, and more precisely, parties adopt the preferences of their constituents (or 
electoral base). Both these processes are largely supported by evidence, and since both 
mechanisms seem to work simultaneously, the analysis has shifted to the sequencing of 
specific policy areas, to understand “who’s cueing whom?” (Steenbergen et al. 2007). The 
following analysis therefore addresses the dynamic between the two sub-hypotheses of the 
protection hypothesis. Both the precarization and the programmatic shift have found 
empirical support in the previous chapters, but the question remains if one is causing the 
other. Are precarious – working class – voters incited to vote for radical right parties 
because they promote welfare protection? Or are radical right parties strategically 
adopting protective welfare politics to match their constituents’ economic insecurity? 
Based on the previous chapters and other works, I expect the parties to pursue a 
programmatic adaptation. More than a general model of bottom-up linkage between 
parties and voters, I propose a more modest mechanism of party realignment with its 
constituency. 
Class voting has direct consequences on party politics because of the particular welfare 
preferences of social classes. The wider debate on the class profile – and the expected 
welfare preferences – of a constituency and its relation to party politics have been 
comprehensively reviewed and discussed by Häusermann, Picot and Geering.  They present 
the variation between an “old school” and a “new school” (Häusermann et al. 2013). The 
former is at the core of the work of Korpi and Esping-Andersen. To put it simply, parties are 
expected to reflect the preferences of their base, and more particularly, the left represents 
the “struggle for distributions of workers in the political arena” (in the words of Korpi 
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1983). In a simplified way, parties are just the translation – the “conveyor belt” - of the 
preferences and demands of different groups. This conception is now largely outdated, 
because the electoral constituencies of parties have substantially evolved in Europe. 
Häusermann et al. address the broader question of support and development of welfare 
policies. By criticizing the simplistic model of a “conveying belt” between voters interest 
and policy implementation, they also argue that the political context (institutions and party 
systems) and new types of party-voter linkage (particularistic or cultural ties to parties) 
have complicated the oversimplified link between class representation and welfare state 
policies (Häusermann et al. 2013). 
I argue that, at least to some extent, the preferences of the working class in terms of 
welfare politics are conveyed by the radical right. In a bottom-up mechanism, parties of the 
radical right adapt to their new and increasingly working-class tainted constituencies, who 
are assumed to have pro-redistributive preferences. This assumption is still widely 
supported: at aggregated levels, workers and low-wage earners display high support for 
welfare redistribution (Van Oorschot 2008, Svallfors 2012). More precisely, the workers 
who have shifted from the left to voting for the (radical) right are “insiders (…) in defence 
of the status quo and welfare chauvinism” (Häusermann and Walter 2010).  
A major qualification of the hypothesis that radical right parties have partly taken on the 
working class’s welfare agenda lies in the individual-level determinants of the vote for 
radical right parties. Indeed, the driving force of the support of the working class for the 
radical right lies in the cultural cleavage (Bornschier 2010). Authors argue that the support 
by the working class support for the radical right is “ideational in nature” rather than 
related to material conditions (Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013). Despite these individual-
level factors that point to the limited significance of the economic and redistributive 
preferences of the radical right working class, it is unlikely that their stable and 
interventionist positions on redistribution do not affect the radical right parties in any way. 
In addition, chapter 3 has shown that the welfare preferences of the radical right voters are 
not only grounded in self-interest, but they are also ‘ideational’ normative beliefs.  
To assess the transformations of radical right welfare preferences and the dynamic 
influence of the party-voter linkage, I first show the evolution of radical right parties 
towards protectionist preferences (5.2.1.) In a second step, regression models evaluate the 
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direction of the mechanism of influence of the precarization of radical right constituencies 
and programmatic shifts of parties (5.2.2.) 
 
5.2.1. Radical right parties and protectionism 
 
The section investigates how the programmatic preferences of radical right parties have 
evolved between 1980 and 2012. Because of the growing relevance of the working-class in 
their constituencies (increasing political distinctiveness of the working-class towards the 
radical right, increasing Alford index), I expect that some of these parties will adopt 
preferences that are in line with the more interventionist preferences of the working class. 
This expectation follows on the analysis of chapter 4, and it should be read in light of the 
precarization of constituencies shown in the first section of the present chapter. 
Because the working class is more the most exposed and threatened by economic 
globalization, it tends to adopt more protective positions on socio-economic issues. Indeed, 
in order to attract working-class voters, some radical right parties have adopted positions 
that are in the defence of the welfare state and generally economically protectionist (Betz 
and Meret 2013). I expect three possible outcomes for the evolution of protectionist 
preferences for radical right parties: adoption of protectionism, indifference, or rejection. 
To measure the preferences of radical right parties, I look at the manifestos, relying on the 
Comparative Manifesto Project database. As outlined in chapter 4, this data provides 
salience-based coding for each manifesto. The higher the percentage of a manifesto is 
devoted to an issue, the more salient it is for the party (Spoon et al. 2014). Protectionism is 
measured in two ways. First, the item Planned Economy is composed of favourable 
positions towards ‘market regulation’, ‘economic planning’, and ‘controlled economy’ 
(three different codes from the CMP). The second item considered is a negative measure of 
protectionism: Market Economy, it is composed of the codes for favourable positions on 
‘free market economy’ and ‘economic orthodoxy’. Figure 12 presents the evolution of the 
salience of preferences for market economy and planned economy for 8 radical right 
parties in Western Europe between 1980 and 2012.   
In France, Finland and Austria, the radical right parties appear to adopt a protectionist 
shift. The FN, PS and FPÖ have abandoned pro-market economy positions at the same time 
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as they have adopted preferences for planned economy. In two Scandinavian cases, 
Denmark and Norway, this transformation is not as clear-cut. The DF and the FrP have not 
adopted preferences for a planned economy, but the salience of market economy in their 
programs has drastically decreased. In the case of the Netherlands, the two parties, the LPF 
and the PVV, seem to have a rather neutral position towards protectionism. Although the 
SVP displays variations on these two measures, it is hard to conclude on their position on 
protectionism; apart that do make any claims for a planned economy. In Belgium, the VB 
seems to adopt a position of rejection of protectionism, being increasingly in favour of 
market economy. 
 
Figure 12 - Evolution of protectionism in radical right parties' manifestos 
 
These patterns are consistent with the results of chapter 4, which showed that some radical 
right parties promote the expansion of the welfare state. Scandinavian parties and the 
Front National have turn their backs on pro-market and limited welfare policies, whereas 
the VB and the SVP have not. 
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However, adaptation to protectionist preferences is simply a trend that follows the 
evolution of the class structure presented in the first section; it does not demonstrate a 
causal mechanism between the two observed phenomena. The rest of the section presents 
a model that explains programmatic shift by the composition of the electorate.  
 
5.2.2. Appeal to economically insecure voters or programmatic adaptation? 
 
In order to see how the changing class structure of the radical right constituencies affects 
these parties’ positions, I have gathered a dataset combining the aggregated descriptive 
data on the radical right voters presented in the first section (extracted from the EB/ESS 
data) with data on preferences of parties for welfare redistribution (extracted from the 
CMP). I take the radical right Alford Index as the indicator of changing class structure, and 
focus on the item welfare state expansion for the party preferences (salience indicator used 
in chapter 4). The units of analysis are elections over time. For each election, the data 
informs on the class structure of voters and the preferences of parties, which gives 52 
observations: every election between 1980 and 2013 in which one of the cited radical right 
parties competed50. Figure 13 shows two scatter plots of the relation between the party 
preferences for welfare expansion and the working-class overrepresentation of their 
constituencies for elections between 1980 and 2013 in Western. The scatter plot on the left 
includes the 52 elections, and the statistical relation between the two variables is not self-
evident. However there is an evident outlier in the score of salience of welfare expansion in 
the party manifestos (True Finns Party in 1991). When this outlier is taken out (N=51), the 
correlation between the Alford index of radical right constituencies and the salience of 
welfare expansion party manifestos appears to be positive.  
 
                                                        
50 Because of missing data on Switzerland (unavailable data on voters form the EB), the SVP is left 
out of the analysis, which focuses on Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, and 
Norway.  
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Figure 13 – Class composition and party preferences of the radical right 
 
As Häusermann et al. argue, welfare preferences of political parties are determined by 
political and contextual factors (Häusermann et al. 2013). Therefore the following models 
includes measures the lagged electoral results of the radical right parties, economic growth 
(GDP, data from the World Bank) and a dummy variable that accounts for the participation 
of the party in government to account for the salience of welfare expansion in radical right 
parties’ manifestos. Through OLS regression models, the effect of the class structure of 
constituencies on the welfare preferences of parties can be assessed. The following 
regression models are particular, because they include a finite population; this means that 
the 51 observations in the models compose the universe of cases (except for the excluded 
outlier). Furthermore, because the lagged variable is included in the model to account for 
the past level of salience of welfare expansion, the number of cases included drops to N=44. 
Table 21 present the results of two model explaining the evolution of welfare expansion in 
radical right parties’ manifestos. Model I includes a dummy for Scandinavian countries, 
whereas model II includes country dummies.  
Because of the small sample size, the contextual and political control variables yield no 
significant effect in the model. However, the sign of the coefficients are in line with existing 
theories about the radical right parties’ welfare preferences. Membership to a cabinet (only 
a few cases: Austria and the Netherlands) increases the salience of welfare expansion in 
radical right manifestos. One possible explanation is that participation to a government 
makes radical right parties more ‘responsible’, and inclined to integrate positions on all 
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issues in their manifestos, whereas parties that remain in the opposition can frame their 
manifestos on their own issues only (such as immigration). 
 
Welfare Expansion (I) (II) 
Lagged DV 0.28 ** (0.13) 0.13  (0.18) 
Cabinet member 2.71  (3.49) 2.37  (3.9) 
% vote -0.07  (0.08) -0.06  (0.12) 
GDP growth -0.07  (0.29) -0.33  (0.34) 
Alford Index 0.40 * (0.23) 0.55 ** (0.28) 
Scandinavian 2.43 ** (1.24)    
Country 
(ref=Austria)       
- Belgium    1.73  (2.22) 
- Denmark    0.64  (2.48) 
- Finland    4.69  (2.97) 
- France    -0.89  (2.25) 
- Netherlands    -1.22  (2.71) 
- Norway    3.65 * (1.91) 
       
       
Cons. 2.35  (1.82) 2.58  (2.86) 
Adj-R² 0.34 0.33 
Table 21 – Explaining the evolution of welfare expansion in radical right’s party 
manifestos 
 
This effect has been identified as the dilemma of radical right parties regarding social 
policy-making when they participate in government: trade-off between, on the one hand, 
cooperation with right-wing partners in a coalition government and, on the other hand, 
keeping office-seeking preferences targeted at the working-class voters (Afonso 2015). On 
the other hand, these parties tend to reduce the salience of these preferences with higher 
economic growth (welfare protection being a less politically salient issue; negative effect). 
Nonetheless, this model does not support these theories with significant results. 
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In both models, the Alford Index however, has a strong and positive effect on the salience of 
welfare expansion in radical right parties’ manifestos51. The higher the share of working-
class voters for the radical right, the more salient welfare expansion is for these parties. 
The country variables confirm the important country variation of the previous findings: the 
salience of welfare expansion for the radical right is higher in Scandinavia, and particularly 
in Norway. The effect of the working-class composition of radical right constituencies on 
the parties’ preferences for welfare expansion is significant and consistent across models. 
This gives reliable support to the programmatic adaption hypothesis. 
Models I and II provide evidence that the working-class oriented class structure of the 
radical right constituencies influences the parties’ preferences on and for welfare. Yet, it 
does not solve the question of “who’s cueing whom?” Indeed, there is an alternative to the 
bottom-up linkage between constituents’ and parties’ preferences; it may be that working-
class voters support radical right parties because the latter put forward preferences for 
welfare expansion. This top-down party-voter linkage cannot be ruled out by models I and 
II, and their results could be interpreted the other way around. In statistical terms, it means 
that models I and II could be violating the OLS condition that independent variables are 
exogenous. To put it simply, the Alford Index may be an endogenous variable in the model, 
and it could vary simultaneously with the variable of salience of welfare expansion. If the 
key variable is endogenous, the model would be biased, and it would not be possible to 
conclude that the class composition of constituencies influences the parties’ preferences. 
The next step of this analysis will show that the Alford Index is an exogenous variable to 
the model explaining the salience of welfare expansion by using the Hausmann Test for 
endogeneity (derived from Hausman 1978). This test follows two steps to show that the 
variable of interest (the Alford Index) is exogenous in the model explaining the dependent 
variable (salience of welfare expansion). The first step is to identify a good instrument for 
the variable of interest through an OLS regression, the second step is to include the 
residuals of this model explaining the Alford Index into our initial models (Wooldridge 
2002).  
                                                        
51 When the same models are performed with N=52 (including the Finnish outlier), none of the 
variables of interest have significant results.  
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In order to identify a strong instrument for the Alford Index, an OLS model is performed 
with the Alford Index as a dependent variable including all the exogenous variables of 
models I and II and the lagged Alford Index as potential instrument.  
 
Alford Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
     
Cabinet Member 0.46 1.50 0.30 0.763 
% vote 0.02 0.05 0.37 0.716 
GDP growth 0.04 0.13 0.30 0.767 
Country (ref=Austria)     
- Belgium 0.05 0.86 0.06 0.956 
- Denmark 0.34 0.97 0.35 0.728 
- Finland 0.37 1.15 0.32 0.752 
- France 0.48 0.86 0.56 0.580 
- Netherlands 0.31 1.07 0.29 0.775 
- Norway 0.04 0.73 0.05 0.959 
Lagged Salience welfare 
expansion 0.04 0.07 0.54 0.590 
Lagged Alford Index 0.80 0.11 7.58 0.000 
Constant 0.74 1.11 0.66 0.513 
     
N=44 Adj-R²=0.68     
Table 22 – Finding a strong instrument for the Alford Index 
 
Table 22 shows that the lagged Alford Index is a strong predictor of the Alford Index; it is 
significant at p<0.001 level with a high t-statistic. The lagged Alford index is therefore a 
well fitted instrument in the model. Moreover, the fact the lagged salience of welfare 
expansion is not significant is another indication that welfare expansion does not explain 
the Alford Index.  
The next step of the Hausman Test is to test the residuals of the equation of table 22 in the 
original equation of the relationship between salience of welfare expansion and contextual 
and political factors, i.e. the structural equation (Table 21). The null-hypothesis of the test 
entails that the residuals have no effect, and that therefore the Alford Index is exogenous. 
Given that the residuals are not significant and therefore not associated to the salience of 
welfare expansion, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Alford Index is exogenous 
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in this model. The Alford Index However remains a positive and significant predictor of the 
salience of welfare expansion (Table 23). 
Salience Welfare 
Expansion Coef.   
Std. 
Err. t P>t 
      
Cabinet Member 2.14  4.00 0.54 0.596 
% vote -0.07  0.13 0.55 0.584 
GDP growth -0.35  0.35 1.00 0.326 
Alford Index 0.63 * 0.35 1.80 0.081 
Country (ref=Austria)      
- Belgium 1.59  2.29 0.70 0.491 
- Denmark 0.38  2.62 0.15 0.885 
- Finland 4.48  3.07 1.46 0.154 
- France -1.06  2.33 0.45 0.653 
- Netherlands -1.56  2.89 0.54 0.594 
- Norway 3.61 * 1.94 1.86 0.072 
Lagged DV 0.12  0.18 0.67 0.507 
Residuals -0.22  0.58 0.37 0.713 
Constant 2.63  2.90 0.91 0.372 
      
N=44 Adj-R²=0.31       
Table 23 - Explaining the evolution of welfare expansion in radical right’s party 
manifestos with Hausman test 
The previous test allows to conclude with confidence that the Alford Index is a strong 
exogenous predictor of the salience of welfare expansion in radical right parties’ 
manifestos. In other words, the higher the share of working class voters in radical right 
constituencies, the higher these parties emphasize the expansion of welfare benefits. This 
gives however reliable support to the programmatic adaption theory. 
 
5.3.  Conclusion 
 
As the class structure evolved in Western Europe, the class profile of radical right 
constituencies has also changed. Even though it is shrinking in society, the working class’ 
importance among radical right voters is has been on the rise since the 1990’s.  In 
response, some radical right parties have updated their socio-economic preferences to be 
more in line with their core voters. Most radical right parties have renounced supporting 
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open market economy, and some have adopted preferences for economic protectionism. In 
general, their shift towards the adoption of pro-redistribution preferences is determined 
by the share of working class voters among their voters.  
The important contribution made by this analysis is the effect of the Alford Index on 
welfare expansion. We can conclude that overall, in Western Europe, the more the radical 
right constituencies are composed of working class voters, the more the parties are 
proponent of the expansion of the welfare state. Certainly, this result does not hold for all 
cases, but it seems to be very relevant for the Scandinavian parties and the French Front 
National. In these cases, the programmatic shift sub-hypothesis can be refined into a theory 
of programmatic adaptation to changing constituencies. The next chapter gives an 
overview of the expectations of the protection and exclusion hypothesis, and addresses 
more specifically the question of the strategic adaptation of parties, through a case study of 
the Front National. 
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Appendix A –Distribution of occupational groupings in 2002 across surveys 
 
In order to validate the measure across the EB and ESS, I examine the distribution of each 
category in 2002, the 1 year of overlap between the ESS and EB surveys. The coding 
scheme yields roughly equivalent numbers of workers across the two samples in 2002. 
There are larger discrepancies in the middle-class and routine categories.   
 
Appendix B – Description of the variable used in the logistic regression 
  Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Voting for RRP 66005 0 1 0,11 0,31 
Gender (m/f) 65992 0 1 0,51 0,49 
Age 66005 18 102 51 17 
Income 66005 1 10 6,41 2,34 
Education level 65853 1 3 2,14 0,77 
8 occupational classes  60086 1 8 - - 
Negative perception of immigrants 66005 0 10 4,88 2,08 
Dissatisfied with democracy 66005 0 10 3,78 2,16 
In favour of income redistribution 66005 0 1 0,64 0,47 
Faced unemployment of > 12 months 66005 0 1 0,11 0,29 
 
In order to maximize the number of cases missing data of each of the numerical 
independent variables was replaced the mean value of the sample. The number of missing 
responses does not exceed 2% for these variables. “don’t know” responses, are also quite 
marginal: for no single class the percentage of don’t know answers is above 0.86 percent.   
Country Employers Middle class Workers Routine Employers Middle class Workers Routine
Austria 17.67 47.53 19.12 15.68 12.27 49.74 20.96 17.02
Belgium 16.29 46.38 27.89 9.45 12.81 41.91 31.95 13.32
Denmark 7.1 58.22 22.27 12.42 13.91 53.71 20.63 11.75
Finland 15.59 50.67 23.87 9.88 9.63 46.69 29.32 14.35
France 12.05 53.42 26.13 8.41 10.88 39.31 33.74 16.08
Netherlands 14.17 53.91 15.24 16.67 10.77 51.83 16.62 20.79
Norway
Switzerland 10.13 49.12 25.36 15.4
Eurobarometer (%) European Social Survey  (%)
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6. The Front National and welfare politics 
 
 
 
“I walk on both my legs. On one side 
unemployment, public debt, and 
purchasing power. On the other, 
immigration and insecurity.”  
Marine Le Pen52 
 
 
The final chapter of this study provides a case study of the Front National (FN) in order to 
bring together both hypotheses, on the demand and the supply side of electoral politics. 
Chapter 3 tested the protection and exclusion hypotheses at the individual level: radical 
right voters are determined in their vote choice by economic insecurity (precarization of 
constituencies) and attitudes resulting from the perception of breached welfare norms 
(scapegoating of norm-violating outgroups). Chapter 4 assessed the evolution of (some) 
radical right parties’ for protective welfare policies (programmatic adaptation) and the 
specific way in which radical right parties frame welfare politics (exclusive solidarity). 
Chapter 5 confirmed the precarization of radical right constituencies in Western Europe, 
and found it to be (partially) responsible for the programmatic adaptation of their welfare 
preferences. The present chapter intends to bring together the demonstration of both 
hypotheses in one in-depth case study. Previous results have shown that the Front National 
and its voters fitted most expectations of the both hypothesis. Moreover, the Front National 
has a historical legacy within West European radical right: it is one of the oldest (founded 
in 1972) and most successful radical right parties. The success of the West European 
radical right has been extensively studied, and the FN is often considered as an emblematic 
case.  
                                                        
52 Statement pronounced during a TV interview during the 2012 presidential campaign (TF1, 
03.06.2012) 
 166 
 
In addition, this chapter follows the epistemological directives to consider both demand 
and supply sides within the same analysis (Sartori 1969, Kitschelt 2007, Mudde 2007). The 
collection of the previous chapters constitute such a comprehensive approach; however 
this chapter gathers an analysis of ‘both sides of the coin’ using multiple data sources.  
The in-depth study of the FN aims at confirming the expectations entailed in both the 
protection and exclusion hypotheses. Has the FN constituency undergone a process of 
precarization? To what extent is economic insecurity driving its voters’ support? What 
preferences does the party hold for welfare politics? Chapter 4 has shown that the FN had 
adopted protective welfare preferences and framed welfare politics in an exclusionist 
fashion. But to what extent has this programmatic shift been determined strategically to 
match the FN voters’ welfare preferences and economic insecurity? 
To answer these questions I rely on different data sources. Some analyses rely on 
secondary data partly presented in previous studies while others are based on original data 
collected for the purpose of this chapter. On the demand side, the results are based on 
surveys in order to assess the precarization and the scapegoating attitudes of FN voters, 
these findings are extracted from the numerous works on the sociological profile of FN 
voters. On the supply side, the present chapter is based on the collection of party campaign 
material and the transcription of speeches from its leader Marine Le Pen.  
The first section of the chapter focuses on the demand side, and provides yet another 
confirmation of the precarization of the FN’s constituencies and their attitudes towards 
immigration and welfare out-groups (6.1.). The second section evaluates the programmatic 
shift and exclusive trademarks of the FN’s welfare preference through salience-based 
analyses of manifestos and in-depth studies of party campaign material and speeches (6.2.). 
Finally, I conclude that the FN and its constituents constitute a symptomatic example of the 
protection and exclusion hypotheses (6.3.) 
 
6.1.  Front National and the demand side of welfare politics 
 
The following section make use of secondary survey data analyses. The sociological 
composition of FN’s voters is extracted from the series of post-electoral studies conducted 
either by the CEVIPOF (Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po) or by the CEE 
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(Centre d’Etudes Européennes) in Sciences Po. Notably, these data have constituted the core 
of the analysis of each presidential campaign since 1995 (published under the collection 
Chroniques électorales). The data on the presidential elections from 1988 to 2007 of 
CEVIPOF post-electoral surveys is found in a series of books (Perrineau and Ysmal 1995, 
Perrineau and Ysmal 2003, Perrineau 2008). Data for the 2012 election is extracted from 
the Enquête électorale francaise (CEE) (see Mayer 2015a). These data allow to test trends of 
precarization of FN voters over time (6.1.1.). This section also relies on a composite 
measure of precariousness: Evaluation de la précarité et des inégalitées de santé pour les 
centres d’examen de santé (EPICES index, Mayer 2013b, Braconnier and Mayer 2015). It 
allows to present finer-grained details about preferences and attitudes of precarious voters 
(6.1.2.) 
 
6.1.1. Front National and the precarization of voters 
 
The precarization of voters is a long studied aspect of the studies of the Front National 
constituencies. More precisely the working-class composition of the FN constituencies has 
been long established: the core of the FN’s constituency is to be found among lower classes 
(“électorat populaire”, Perrineau 2013). The sociological profile of the FN voters is in line 
with the results of chapter 3. Yet, as Betz argued of the proletarization of the radical right 
voters in the early 1990’s, the working class dimension of the FN constituencies is a long-
term phenomenon. Based on the 1995 results, Perrineau had identified the “second 
lepénisme” (as an opposition to a more traditional petty bourgeois electorate, Perrineau 
1997), or more precisely described the working-class vote for the FN as “ouvriero-
lepénisme” (Perrineau and Ysmal 1995). These authors argued that the working-class 
sociological profile of the FN voters had consequences in terms of political preference, and 
labelled it “gaucho-lepénisme” to stress the economically left oriented preferences of these 
voters. Some authors argue that at the aggregated level, there is a cleavage between 
industrial regions (higher proportion of workers and long established heavy industries) 
and other regions in the propensity to vote for the FN. The FN obtains its higher electoral 
scores in region (rural or urban) which have the most established “industrial tradition” 
(Schwengler 2003) 
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Figure 14 shows the evolution of the FN vote of different occupational groups between 
1988 and 2012. As expected, blue-collar workers and the routine service workers vote for 
the FN in higher proportions than other social classes. Conversely, the service middle-class 
is increasingly less supporting the FN. (Farmers’ vote not reported due to statistically too 
limited samples, although the FN enjoys increasing support among farmers and rural 
populations, see Barone and Négrier 2015; data and sources reported in Appendix A). 
 
Figure 14 – Evolution of the political distinctiveness of the FN constituencies (1988-
2012) 
 
The increase of the working-class vote for the FN is also steady over time. The gap between 
the working-class vote for the FN and the total vote is higher at every presidential election 
from 1988 to 2012. Additionally, the political distinctiveness of the working class is 
increasingly in favour of the FN. Whereas the average overrepresentation of worker for the 
FN was of around 5% between 1988 and 2007(i.e. the difference between the total score 
and the working class vote for the FN is around 5%), it reached 13% in 2012 (see Gougou 
2015). Interestingly, the overrepresentation of blue-collar workers in the FN constituencies 
increases independently of the party’s electoral result. Indeed, the FN’s electoral 
progression suffered from Sarkozy’s victory in the 2007 presidential election. Yet the gap 
between blue-collar FN voters and the rest of FN voters is constant, which indicates that 
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Sarkozy managed to attract every segment of FN voters (and not primarily working class 
voters). 
Chapter 3 showed the effects of occupational class on the radical right vote as a proxy for 
precarization; yet it was combined with measures of economic insecurity to give a better 
account of precariousness. The occupational class divide among FN voters is not a sufficient 
measure to conclude that this constituency is genuinely precarized. Indeed, at the 
aggregated level, the FN increases its share of votes the most in regions where 
unemployment is also increasing, which indicates that the regions where economic 
insecurity and unemployment are the high constitute a “fertile ground” for the FN (Leger 
2015). In order to capture economic insecurity, I rely on a unique measure of 
precariousness that goes beyond strictly economic factors, to include broader social 
aspects of precariousness.  
The Epices index is a measure of precariousness that includes items on financial hardship 
and healthcare coverage, but also the frequency of social interaction and inclusion in 
society (Mayer 2013b, see Appendix B for the list of items included in the index). It is 
therefore very well suited to study precarization in the context of welfare politics.   
This index is positively associated to the FN vote: the more precarious individuals are more 
likely to support the FN (Mayer 2014). Figure 15 shows the association between 
precariousness and support for the FN. Note that the data does not ask respondents about 
their retrospective vote, but presents a composite indicator of appeal for the FN. It is 
measured by liking of the FN, liking Marine Le Pen, wishing to see Marine Le Pen win the 
election, and partisan proximity with the FN. 
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Figure 15 – Precariousness and appeal for the FN (2012) 
 
The relation between precariousness and appeal for the FN appears very clearly. As the 
average appeal for the FN is around 41%, it is 12 points higher for the most precarious 
individuals. Figure 15 shows that the appeal for the FN can be divided into four groups of 
different levels of precariousness: the least precarious (index=1) are the least appealed by 
the FN (28%), the appeal reaches an average of 38% for non-precarious individuals 
(index=2-5), but it reaches an average of 46.5% for precarious individuals (index=6-9); 
whereas the FN appeals to 53% of the most precarious decile of the population (Mayer 
2015b). Using the ‘appeal for the FN’ instead of vote choice gives an advantage because the 
less well-off tend to abstain rather than vote (Kreisi and Bornschier 2013); ‘outsiderness’ 
has a negative impact on voter turnout (Mayer et al. 2015). Nonetheless, this indicator 
shows the appeal for the FN of the most precarious, whether they cast a vote for this party 
or not. 
Overall, the presentation of this secondary data shows that the precarization hypothesis is 
verified for the case of the FN. Its constituencies are increasingly marked by lower 
occupational status; and precariousness is a significant indicator of appeal for this party. 
The latter result also points to the direction that there may be a stock of voters for the FN 
among precarious ‘outsiders’ who usually do not cast a vote but are responsive to the FN’s 
appeal.  
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6.1.2. Front National and voters’ scapegoating 
 
Chapter 3 provided empirical support for the scapegoating hypothesis on the basis of four 
elaborated welfare attitudes. These attitudes were theoretically deduced, yet they are also 
data-dependent. Indeed, only ESS4 provides detailed questions about welfare preferences. 
In order to further inquire the demand side of the exclusion hypothesis for the FN, the 
attitudes of welfare populism, chauvinism, limitation and egalitarianism cannot be tested in 
the same way as in the previous steps of the analysis. Indeed, “unfavourable attitudes 
towards outgroups” have been shown to be a singular feature of FN voters. In the works of 
Lubbers and Scheepers, “people who experience a discrepancy between their actual and 
subjectively claimed socio-economic position may perceive ethnic minorities as a competitive 
threat as well, and therefore are more unfavourable towards ethnic minorities and are more 
likely to vote for the Front National” (Lubbers and Scheepers 2002) 
Unfortunately, the models tested in chapter 3 cannot be reproduced here with satisfactory 
sample sizes or over time. However, based on secondary data established by Mayer (2013b, 
2015a), the exclusionary welfare preferences of FN vote can be confirmed.  
 
 
Figure 16 - Precariousness and agreement with the FN's ideas 
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Again, this data does not capture vote choice, but different measures of “agreement with 
the FN’s ideas”, and particularly, they assess he link between welfare politics and 
immigration. Figure 16 shows the attitudinal preferences towards immigration of 
individuals by their level of precariousness. As expected, based on the results of the 
previous section, the more individuals are precarious, the more opposed to immigration 
they are. However, the anti-immigration attitudes appear to be closely linked to welfare 
preferences: the more precarious individuals reject immigration, but they also consider it 
to be a threat for their job security. Interestingly, a higher proportion of individuals 
considers that immigrants come to France to “profit from social security” than they think 
there are too many immigrants in France. If these results do not test directly the exclusion 
hypothesis, they indicate that part of the anti-immigration attitudes are determined by 
welfare concerns, and more precisely the fact that immigrants “profit” from benefits and 
that immigration increases levels of economic (labour-market) insecurity.  
 
 
6.2.  Front National and the supply side of welfare politics 
 
The recent literature studying the FN on the supply-side is unanimous in describing the 
radical transformation the party has undergone in the 2010’s. This transformation affects 
most aspects of the party. Its organisation has been modernised (hierarchy of party 
leaders, integration of activists) and normalised  (it resembles more the functioning of 
other French political parties as opposed to the ‘one-man organisation’ of former 
charismatic leader Jean Marie Le Pen) (Dézé 2016). Arguably, the FN has transformed from 
an anti-system party to a mainstream conservative party (although this process is still 
ongoing according to Shields 2014). One manifestation of this modernisation is the capacity 
to better organise and present candidates in all local elections, which the FN had failed to 
do beforehand (Brouard and Foucault 2014). Marine Le Pen herself has claimed to 
transform the party, and engaged in a strategy of dédiabolisation (‘de-demonisation’) in 
order to break with the party’s reputation of scandals mainly due to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 
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use of provocation and racial slurs. This shift also translates into the program of the party, 
which has been updated, and more specifically regarding welfare preferences (indeed, on 
its core issue of immigration, the FN maintains its historical anti-immigration position). 
The remainder of this section gives additional empirical support to the claim that the FN is 
a symptomatic example of programmatic shift (6.2.1.) and exclusive solidarity (6.2.2.). 
Finally, it investigates campaign speeches of Marine Le Pen to assess the extent to which 
this transformation is the result of a declared strategy of the new party leader (6.2.3.). The 
last two sub-sections rely on Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA). A variety of techniques 
are used to assure the trustworthiness of the analysis of political texts, of which I retain the 
two most important ones (Morse et al. 2002). First is “explicating the process of analysis”: I 
resorted to “quantifying” the different themes in the documents. Second, I make available 
the data I rely on, particularly for documents that are not easily accessible. QDA is a useful 
method to refine party preferences and complement quantitative and salience-based 
methods. As Gerring (1998: 298) argues: “to make claims about party ideologies, one must 
involve oneself in the meat and gristle of political life, which is to say language. Language 
connotes the raw data of most studies of how people think about politics, for it is through 
language that politics is experienced”.  
 
6.2.1. Front National and programmatic adaptation 
 
Chapter 4 has shown that the Front National had operated a dramatic programmatic shift 
from neo-liberal economic policies in the 1980’s towards protective welfare preferences in 
the 2010’s. Relying on CMP data of the party manifestos, figure 17 confirms this radical 
transformation. The salience of preferences for welfare expansion have increased from 0 in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s to around 12% in 2012 (which constitutes the second most salient 
issue in the manifesto after ‘law and order’). The evolution of preferences for ‘planned 
economy’ follow the exact same trajectory. On the other hand, positive references to the 
‘market economy’ have decreased over the period.  
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Figure 17 - Evolution of welfare protection in the FN's manifestos 
 
The programmatic shift of the FN towards an economic agenda and welfare policies closer 
to that of the left is gradual, yet it has starkly accelerated between the 2007 and 2012 
election manifestos. It is likely that this change is the consequence of the takeover of 
Marine Le Pen as party leader and candidate for the 2012 presidential election. If the socio-
cultural positions of the FN remained the same, some authors have tried to characterize the 
new ideology of the FN on socio-economic issues. It has been labelled ‘ethno-socialism’ 
(Reynié 2011) or ‘social-populism’ (Ivaldi 2015a). Arguably, the transformation of the FN 
corresponds to the ‘interventionist-nationalist’ shift of radical right parties predicted by 
Kriesi et al. (2012). This study does not claim that this transformation constitutes a new 
party ideology, but rather that it is a clear example of the programmatic adaptation 
entailed in the protection hypothesis.  
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6.2.2. Front National and exclusive solidarity 
 
In order to confirm the exclusive solidarity hypothesis, this section analyses the FN party 
and campaign documentation from 1988 to 2012. Chapter 4 argued that salience-based 
analyses could not give a full account of the substantive party positions, and complemented 
it with the case study of the 2012 campaign manifesto. This sections takes a longitudinal 
approach and expands the nature of analysed party documents to show how exclusiveness 
is the trademark of the Front National’s welfare preferences.   
Table 24 presents all the party documentation collected in the electoral archives which give 
a finer-grain assessment of the party’s positions53. Statements of principle are standardized 
4-pages documents that are sent by mail to every registered voter: each party gives a 
condensed version of their program. Statements of principle are the most widely diffused 
campaign material. Electoral leaflets are distributed by the parties themselves, and 
complement the statement of principles. In most cases for the FN, the texts are very similar 
between leaflets and statements of principle.   
 
Year Type Title 
1988 
Statement of Principle   
Electoral leaflet Avec Jean-Marie Le Pen Défendons nos Couleurs 
1995 
Statement of Principle   
Electoral leaflet Tournons la Page, En Avant pour un 6ème République 
2002 
Statement of Principle   
Electoral leaflet La France Retrouvée 
2007 
Electoral leaflet Le Pen, Le Vote Vital 
Statement of Principle  
2012 Electoral manifesto Mon Projet pour la France et les Français 
Table 24 - FN electoral documentation 
 
                                                        
53 I thank Odile Gaultier-Voituriez in charge of documentation at the CEVIPOF (Sciences Po, Paris) 
for her assistance in collecting the electoral archives of the FN. Scans of campaign material archives 
available on demand. 
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The 2012 campaign is the only one for which – to my knowledge – the FN distributed a 
comprehensive manifesto (in previous elections, there is existing extensive party material, 
which however is not used for electoral propaganda). In itself, this is the evidence of a 
programmatic transformation of the party, which has evolved from a purely single issue – 
anti-immigration – party, to providing an extensive and detailed program which lists 
concrete policy decisions.   
The Front National, one of the oldest radical right parties in Europe, which has achieved 
major electoral success from the mid 1980’s, has long been a single-issue party. Anti-
immigration stances – i.e. closing down the borders and preventing newcomers in the 
country, as well as sending immigrants back to their country of origin – have originally 
constituted the core of the FN’s program. In terms of welfare politics, and the redistribution 
of state benefits, the anti-immigrations preferences have translated into “national 
preference”. It is clearly spelled out in campaign material since 1988. Since then, this 
welfare chauvinist policy is the cornerstone and trademark of the welfare policy 
preferences of the FN.  
The evolution of the welfare policies of the FN is marked by an important transformation, 
in form (from vagueness to an extensive detailed program) and content (increasingly in 
favour of extended welfare policies) The remainder of this section details this evolution, 
with a specific interest in which social groups – or types of benefits – are deemed more 
important. Overall, the FN’s welfare agenda is marked by an exclusive conception of 
solidarity, and the blaming of certain outgroups.    
In the 1980’s, the Front National generally held right-wing economic policies. FN’s 
charismatic leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen claimed to be the “French Reagan”, and pledged to 
cut back all dimensions of a state described as “overreaching and impotent”. The 1988 
program for social policy is articulated around two main concepts. First, social security is 
considered to be “mismanaged”. In order to improve the system, the FN identifies 
scapegoats, chiefly the immigrants. In order to reduce the level of spending, the FN 
introduces the concept of national preference, particularly for welfare benefits, access to 
jobs and to social housing. Interestingly, another group is singled out in the program: 
people infected with AIDS. Since the FN attributes the cause of their disease to be their 
personal responsibility (by condemning their behaviour in a direct targeting of 
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homosexuals), their medical treatments should not be paid for by social security. The 
second proposal of the FN regarding the issue of unemployment fits the traditional 
economically liberal agenda: by cutting corporate taxes, businesses will be able to create 
jobs.  
From this typically right-wing welfare agenda focused on economic policies, which should 
boost supply and individual responsibility of welfare claimants, the FN has gradually 
shifted to more generous welfare policies while insisting on the national preference. The 
FN’s welfare chauvinist concept is somewhat ill-named; indeed it proposes full exclusion of 
immigrants from social security schemes rather than a preference for national citizens. The 
1995 program for welfare policies is entirely built around the idea of national preference, 
and directly addresses most types of benefits: jobs, unemployment benefits, social 
assistance benefits, and public housing. If the reduction of social charges for business is still 
included in the program, it is alongside the creation of a new social assistance benefit – 
restricted to French nationals.   
The party documentation for the 2002 campaign is slimmer and vaguer on all policy issues, 
and specifically on economic and welfare proposals. The most salient issue of this campaign 
was growing insecurity and law and order, which benefitted Jean-Marie Le Pen who 
entered the second round of the presidential election for the first and only time. However, 
the charismatic leader also claimed to be “economically on the right, and socially on the 
left”. Without giving more precisions, apart from calls to save the pension system, Le Pen 
had operated a radical shift from his earlier policy views.   
This transition is accentuated in the 2007 campaign material, in which Le Pen argues in 
favour of increasing the minimum salary together with national preference for all social 
security benefits. To stress his point that the FN is the party defending welfare, one of the 
political leaflet is modelled on the format of the “carte vitale”, the official document that 
gives access to all healthcare benefits. Voting for Le Pen is presented as the “vote vital”.  
The 2012 manifesto of the FN marks the radical shift in welfare policies operated by 
Marine Le Pen. Diverging from the usual strategy of short party documents articulated 
around immigration and national preference; it provides extended policy preferences, 
including on all aspects of welfare policies. Proposals focus particularly on senior citizens 
and pensioners. The FN positions on the pension system is in line with the usual stance of 
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the left: “preserve the system of generational solidarity”, increase the pension benefits, and 
come back to the full retirement age of 60 year old or 40 years of contribution (which had 
been increased by the outgoing right-wing government).  But Marine Le Pen’s FN goes 
further than maintaining and preserving the current system and calls for additional 
benefits for French pensioners, and creating a 5th pillar in social security for old age and 
dependence. Because they have contributed the most, and are in need, pensioners and 
senior citizen have become one core population targeted by the FN. The 2012 manifesto 
also clearly points to the poorer citizens as deserving increased benefits. Within the 
framework of national preference, they follow the focus of previous programs on the 
“French excluded poor” (the 1995 manifesto focused on the “French homeless”, and 
following manifestos specifically addressed of the “lower earning French citizens”). The 
novelty of the 2012 manifesto is that the specific welfare measures intended to relieve the 
poorer citizen (such as increase of the minimum wage, lower retirement age for poor 
working families, lower VAT for products of “first necessity”) are combined with specific 
policies aimed at making the richer citizens contribute more. For the first time the FN calls 
for higher income tax for the richest households, and a new rate of VAT for “luxury 
products”.   
One of the markers of the FN welfare policies had always been family policy. In the 1980’s, 
the FN proposed a “maternal salary” for French stay-at-home mothers with several 
children. This proposal was amended over the years (extended to fathers in 1995), and 
really defined the fertility politics the FN envisaged as both a solution to immigration and 
to save the social system (2002 program). The 2012 version of the maternal salary really 
marks the toning down of traditional right-wing welfare policies for the FN: the maternal 
salary should be set at 80% of minimum salary and accessible to families with “at least one 
French parent”. By taking into account societal change – such as international marriages, 
the FN also introduces in 2012 the first breach in the sanctified “national preference”, 
which is gradually replaced by the term “citizen priority”.    
To sum up, the welfare agenda of the FN has evolved in the direction of more protective 
measures and more generous welfare benefits for specific outgroups. However, the 
exclusive dimension of the FN welfare agenda is constant over time, and reflects the idea 
that some outgroups are more or less deserving than others. “National preference” for 
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welfare benefits is the direct policy translation of welfare chauvinism. Yet other groups are 
positively singled out as deserving increased benefits: low wage earners, farmers, 
pensioners.  
 
6.2.3. Marine Le Pen’s influence? 
 
The programmatic shift of the FN has been operated under the influence of Marine Le Pen. 
The leader, elected at the head of the party in 2011 has triggered the shift towards more 
economic interventionism and welfare oriented policy preferences (Ivaldi 2015b, 2016). 
This shift is the result of the dédiabolisation strategy: the FN has diversified its policy 
agenda which includes more economic and welfare preferences with a renewed and more 
technocratic language (Alduy 2016). Indeed, Marine Le Pen is considered to have ‘de-
demonised’ its party in order to transform it into a mainstream political party (Shields 
2013). Most of the previous studies that have described the programmatic shift of the FN – 
including previous chapters and sections of this book – have done so on the basis of official 
party documentation. The following section offers to assess the strategic shift operated by 
Marine Le Pen on the basis of her public speeches for the internal party campaign. This 
analysis does not only provide additional confirmation of the strategic adaptation of the FN, 
it also evaluates the strategy elaborated by Marine Le Pen herself.  
The QDA is based on a corpus of 10 public speeches given by Marine Le Pen between late 
2008 and 2011. These speeches were archived at the time of publication and are not 
available on the party’s website anymore54. These speeches have been pronounced in 
different contexts (to the press, in front of activists or on online videos, during local 
campaigns) but they are representative of Marine Le Pen’s strategic vision for the party. 
Indeed they have been pronounced during the year when Marine Le Pen campaigned for 
the party leadership, or right after her election in early 2011. The speeches have been 
analysed with computer assisted qualitative analysis. Each statement has been coded along 
three axes subdivided into sub-categories: theme (unemployment, public services, 
immigration…), argumentation (examples mobilized, political references, ideology…), and 
                                                        
54 A full transcript of the speeches is available on demand.  
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political strategy (rupture, political implications…).  Table 25 details the speeches, their 
dates, and particular context. These speeches are mostly general, and they do not address 
specifically the welfare politics issues – although welfare concerns are always mentioned. 
However, this analysis is still useful to demonstrate that the programmatic adaptation of 
the FN’s program spurs from a genuine top-down strategic decision by Marine Le Pen. 
Discourse analysis has produced three central dimensions of Marine Le Pen’s speeches: 
claimed political rupture, development of an economic and welfare agenda, and building of 
credibility. 
 
Title Date Context 
Discours à l’Université d’été d’Evian 09.14.2008 - 
Discours à la Convention Européenne d’Arras 03.15.1009 - 
Discours sur l’école publié 11.11.2009 Published online 
Discours de campagne à Paris 03.02.2010 Local elections 
Discours « L’esprit du 29 mai » 05.28.2010 Published online 
Discours devant le Conseil National 03.04.2010 - 
Discours prononcé à Paris 11.14.2010 Official internal campaign 
Discours de clôture du Conseil National 02.12.2011 - 
Discours de campagne à Bompas 03.11.2011 Local elections 
Discours sur l’immigration à Six-Fours 03.12.2011 Local elections 
Table 25 - Corpus of Marine Le Pen's speeches 
 
Claimed political rupture 
During the internal campaign for party leadership, Marine Le Pen was opposed to Bruno 
Gollnisch, a long-time member of the FN and partisan of the traditional political line of the 
French radical right. Even though Marine Le Pen bears the same name as the founder and 
historical party leader, during the internal election she is the candidate of a political 
rupture. The claim of a “political rupture with the FN’s past” is among the most salient 
coded item in the corpus of speeches, both during the internal campaign, and once she won 
the party leadership. Marine Le Pen uses the claim for rupture both strategically to 
distinguish herself from her opponent during the campaign, but also after her election as a 
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strategic objective. Indeed, she mentions change and rupture to the greater extent in the 
speech after her election given in front of journalists: she presents the new program of the 
party and aspires to change its ideology and media communication. During the internal 
campaign, Marine Le Pen mentions “elements of rupture”, in an implicit contrast with the 
legacy of her father. She specifically denounce the conception of party leader as a “moral 
authority”, whose role is to tie together the different tendencies in the party; her objective 
is renewal, whether all members accept it or not. She openly admits that some activists’ 
ideology will be “shaken up”. Marine Le Pen claims the time of the “awakeners” who made 
the message of the FN publicly know is over, and that her election marks the time of the 
“builders”. This rupture is therefore not intended as a radical shift (it builds on the past), 
but she uses strong expressions to characterize it: “political recomposition” or 
“unprecedented efforts to change the FN”. Regularly, she uses the word “revolution” 
(whether “deep” or “pacified”), a concept which is not in the conventional repertoire of the 
French radical right (Marine Le Pen even compares this renewal with the ongoing Arab 
Spring at the time). The objective of Marine Le Pen’s project are spelled out directly: she 
aims at “making the political project evolve” and build a “renewed, open and efficient 
party”. Concretely, Marine Le Pen calls for the transformation of the party into a “large 
republican party”, which contradicts with the anti-system origins of the FN. Additionally, 
she calls members of other parties (which are usually fiercely denounced) to join the FN, 
with a direct call to the members of the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, the major Trotskyist 
radical left party. This appeal to leftist activists shows how Marine Le Pen intends to 
ground the political transformation of the FN in a left-leaning economic tendency. 
 
The development of an economic and welfare agenda 
The shift proposed to party members by Marine Le Pen is revealed in the saliency she puts 
on issues that were formerly somewhat neglected by the FN: unemployment, saving the 
social security system and public services. Unemployment had always been a concern for 
the Front National, yet the framing of this issue in Marine Le Pen’s speeches contrast with 
the previous references which were always linked to immigration. She refers to 
unemployment in order to denounce the record of mainstream political parties. She does 
not refute the party position that “immigration causes unemployment”, but tones it down 
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(immigration is only an “adjustment variable” of economic problems). The references to 
social security contrast to a larger extent with the party’s traditional positions in favour of 
more limited social security schemes. She calls the tentative reforms of social security 
“social aggressions” or “social wreck done in the back of French citizens”. Marine Le Pen 
openly calls for the “defence of social security” by using terms usually associated with left-
wing parties: “guaranteeing welfare benefits” or “not distinguishing the economy and social 
progresses”. Marine Le Pen claims clear welfare chauvinist policies, and argues in favour of 
a “welfare protectionism”. Moreover this theme becomes particularly salient in Marine Le 
Pen’s speeches in 2011 after her election at the head of the party. Additionally, and 
contrary to the first coding expectations, the “defence of public services” proves to be a 
very salient issue In Marine Le Pen’s programmatic positions.  
Welfare politics thus constitutes a new central dimension in the FN’s discourse with the 
upcoming of Marine Le Pen. Both the father and the daughter provided anti-system 
preferences, but while Jean- Marie Le Pen limited himself to denouncing and opposing, 
Marine Le Pen’s argumentation is more elaborated and ideological. She defines the new 
ideology of the FN as the opposition to an identified and theorised enemy: ‘mondialisme’. 
This renewed theory follows the historical opposition to the EU, immigration and the 
defence of national sovereignty which constituted the core of the FN program, but she 
frames it in a proposition to reform economic liberalism. The renewed ideology of the FN – 
which clashes with the neo-liberal positions of the party in the 1980’s is summarized in a 
campaign statement she repeats in several speeches: 
 “Free movement of people means immigration. Free movement of brains means 
emigration. Free movement of capital means speculation. Free movement of goods means 
deindustrialization. Clearly, freedom of movement means our liquidation” 
This statement combines the historical preferences of the FN (anti-immigration, threat to 
national identity) with the new ones (extended critique of finance in her speeches, 
deindustrialization and welfare concerns).  
 
The political objective of the programmatic shift 
The welfare oriented program of the FN under Marine Le Pen is based on a renewed 
discourse method, with clear political objectives. In terms of style, the political references 
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of Marine Le Pen contrast with that of Jean- Marie Le Pen: she relies extensively on political 
and intellectual references that did not belong the FN’s tradition beforehand. Marine Le 
Pen uses – almost abuses – consensual intellectual and cultural references (Chateaubriand, 
Platon, and Jacques Brel on several occasions). This strategy not only makes her positions 
appear as mainstream, it frames her arguments with references that political opponents 
cannot reject. Additionally, she makes extensive references to political figures of the left 
such as writers Emile Zola and Norbert Elias or statesmen such as Danton or Jean Jaurès. 
Marine Le Pen makes extensive references to the French Revolution and compares the 
political struggle of the FN to the battle of Valmy, the first decisive victory of the new 
French Republic. Jean-Marie Le Pen never illustrated his speeches and positions with such 
examples or references55. Additionally, Marine Le Pen makes reference to academics, and 
most notably to Hayek, but only to fiercely oppose his theories. Overall, the political 
references of Marine Le Pen mark a clear shift of political strategy towards consensual and 
left-leaning figures. Her arguments are also strengthened by using “official reports” and 
“expert report” and the abundant use of public sources and statistics in order to increase 
the credibility of her program, which is another contrast to the discursive style of Jean-
Marie Le Pen. 
The renewal of the party’s strategy have two identified objectives: extending the potential 
support of the FN outside of its traditional support base, and give more credibility to the 
party’s program. Indeed, the coding of “change in power” is one of the most salient in the 
speeches, and often associated to the ambition of transforming the FN vote from a “protest 
vote” into a “support vote”.  
To sum up, the programmatic shift which is evident in analyses of the 2012 FN manifesto 
spur from strategic adaptation guided by Marine Le Pen. Her internal campaign and 
speeches show increasingly salient and left-leaning preferences in terms of welfare politics, 
combined with an ambition to professionalize and give more credibility to her party. This 
supply-side strategy has proven to be successful, as the FN under Marine Le Pen has 
widened its electoral base, and attains more successful electoral results.  
                                                        
55 Although it is to be noted that Jean-Marie Le Pen organised his 2007 presidential campaign 
launch in Valmy, under the explicit influence of Marine Le Pen.  
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6.3.  Conclusion 
 
The Front National is considered as a characteristic radical right party: the party and its 
constituents encompass all the features of the definition of radical right parties in Western 
Europe. It has long mobilized its voters on socio-cultural issues (immigration, law and 
order), and it was led by a charismatic leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Populism is at the core of 
its ideology and has been an example of a single issue party. In addition to its academic 
relevance, the FN has laways held a central position in the political agenda in France, and is 
therefore the subject of an extensive literature (for an up to date comprehensive analysis of 
the party, its voters and its political relevance, see Crépon et al. 2015).  
However, this chapter has shown that the FN has starkly evolved since its electoral 
breakthrough of the early 1980’s; this transformation corresponds fully to the expectation 
of the protection and exclusion hypothesis. Regarding its constituents, the precarization of 
its voters is steady. Working-class and lower-skilled voters constitute the core of the FN’s 
electoral support. Moreover, precariousness appears as a critical factor in supporting the 
FN through exclusionary and scapegoating attitudes. If these demand-side processes have 
been ongoing since the early 1990’s, the radical shift operated by the FN regarding its 
political preferences is more recent. Because of this sequencing, one can argue that the FN 
has adapted its positions to its changing constituencies. The FN has developed a protective 
programmatic shift on economic and welfare issues while framing it in exclusive terms. The 
study of the claimed strategy of the new party leader Marine Le Pen enables to conclude 
that the protective and exclusive welfare politics promoted by the FN is the result of a 
strategic shift, which represents a genuine programmatic adaptation.  
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Appendix A: Sociological profile of FN voters 1988-2012 
 
(%) 1988 1995 2002 2007 2012 
Total 15 15 17 11 18 
Sex      
Male 18 17 20 13 19 
Female 12 12 14 8 18 
Age      
18-24 14 18 13 10 26 
25-34 15 20 17 10 20 
35-49 15 16 18 11 18 
50-64 14 14 21 12 20 
65+ 16 10 15 9 13 
Occupation      
Farmer 10 10 21 10 21 
Employer 19 19 20 10 16 
Manager 14 4 12 7 6 
Middle-class 15 14 10 5 12 
Routine service 15 18 23 12 23 
Blue-collar worker 17 21 24 16 29 
Education      
Primary 15 17 24 24 19 
Upper Primary  17 20 21 21 27 
Secondary 13 12 15 15 19 
Upper secondary 10 13 11 11 13 
Tertiary 9 4 7 7 7 
Sources: CEVIPOF post-electoral survey (1988-2007), CEE electoral survey (2012) 
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Appendix B: Items in the EPICES score of precariousness 
 
Do you sometimes meet with a social worker? 
Do you have complementary healthcare? 
Do you live in couple? 
Are you a home owner? 
Do you sometimes face real financial difficulties to cover your needs (housing, food, 
bills…)? 
Did you practice sports over the last 12 months? 
Did you go to a show or event in the last 12 months? 
Did you go on holidays over the last 12 months? 
Did you have contacts with family members other than your kids or parents over the last 6 
months? 
In case of difficulties, do you have persons around you that could host you for a few days? 
In case of difficulties, do you have persons around you that could help you materially? 
 
Sources: Mayer 2013b, 2015a. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
Bringing welfare politics back in the debate 
This book provides a renewed account of the radical right success in Western Europe, 
through the specific perspective of welfare politics. It shows that concerns over who gets 
what types of benefits and under what circumstances are relevant concerns for radical 
right voters and translate into party positions. However, the purpose of this demonstration 
is not to claim that welfare politics is the structuring political cleavage that explain how 
these parties rise. The contribution this books makes is more modest: the success of radical 
right parties cannot be fully explained by the appeal of voters for their conservative and 
authoritarian cultural positions. Yet welfare politics proves to be a conflict dimension 
which differentiates radical right voters and parties in the electoral arena. Because welfare 
concerns are relevant for the voters and the parties, welfare politics factors should not be 
ignored or discarded, but on the contrary should be considered with greater attention in 
the in the radical right scholarship. This demonstration may also prove to be of social 
relevance, indeed debating – arguing against ? – radical right parties should also take 
welfare politics into consideration – and notably by being able to address the economic 
insecurities and breached normative beliefs of their voters.  
In order to bring welfare politics back in the debate, I resorted to the most comprehensive 
analysis as possible. This imply considering the supply and demand sides of the electoral 
arena. Yet I do not claim this constitutes the entire array of factors necessary to fully 
evaluate electoral success; notably, greater attention should be devoted to macro-level 
characteristics such as institutional effects and media systems. In order to provide the most 
compelling evidence of the relevance of welfare politics for the radical right success, I 
relied on a variety of methods (quantitative and qualitative) and data (accumulation of 
surveys, party manifestos, electoral propaganda material, party leader speeches).  
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Findings and contributions 
The demonstration in this book has followed an inductive reasoning based on two main 
hypotheses. Bridging the extensive literature on the radical right and the political sociology 
of the welfare state, I elaborated the protection and exclusion hypotheses, which are 
specified at the voter and party levels. To recall, the protection hypothesis expects that the 
success the radical right in Western Europe is explained by the successful mobilization of 
voters of are economically insecure, i.e. who are seeking protective and risk-reducing 
welfare arrangements and who are opposed to change. This implied that the radical right 
constituencies are expected to undergo a process of precarization, and that parties 
responded accordingly with a programmatic shift. The exclusion hypothesis expects that 
this success is explained by the successful mobilization of voters who perceive that other 
individuals or outgroups are violating the shared normative welfare beliefs, and therefore 
should be excluded from welfare schemes. This implies that radical right voters scapegoat 
certain groups when assessing (un)deservingness to welfare benefits, and the radical right 
parties matched these preference with the promotion of an exclusive conception of 
solidarity. Both hypotheses find substantial, but partial, empirical support on both levels on 
analysis. Indeed, all expectations do not apply to the eight cases of pairs of radical right 
parties and their constituencies that have been examined in this book.  
Protection hypothesis: the precarization sub-hypothesis has been validated at the 
individual and aggregated levels. Analyses of voting behaviour have shown that individual-
level economic insecurity was positively associated with voting for the radical right. More 
precisely, complex measures of precariousness drive support for these parties. However 
belonging to certain occupational sectors, which are exposed to globalization and its 
subsequent revived economic competition, is another factor associated with voting for 
radical right parties. In Western Europe, the constituencies of radical right parties are 
increasingly consisting of blue-collar workers and lower skilled service workers. Chapter 5 
has taken class-based approach to assess the precarization of the radical right 
constituencies: based on the previous works that had established the dealignment of the 
working class with parties of the left, it shows that, although not complete, there appears to 
be an ongoing process of realignement of the working class with radical right parties. Not 
voting remains a prevalent choice among the working class, but the proportion of blue-
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collar workers voting for the radical right is increasingly growing. Furthermore, the appeal 
of precarious voters for the ideas of radical right parties (shown in chapter 6) indicates that 
there is a substantial stock of votes for these parties among non-voters. The appeal of 
economically insecure voters for the radical right is grounded in their perception that these 
parties represent the parties of the status quo (refusal of change) and the only political 
alternative (the radical right parties denounce mainstream parties and attribute them the 
blame for the contemporary social and economic problems). The subsequent 
programmatic change sub-hypothesis, at the party level, is verified in some countries only. 
Incidentally, it is in the countries where welfare politics is the most relevant for voters 
(Scandinavia, France), that the radical right parties promote extensive and protective 
welfare policies (FrP, DF, TF, FN). 
Exclusion hypothesis: the theory grounding the exclusion hypothesis brings an important 
conceptual clarification to the empirical studies that linked welfare politics to the radical 
right vote. By establishing that welfare attitudes are determined by the perception of norm 
violation of shared beliefs that constitute the moral economy of the welfare state, I present 
a mechanism of exclusion and scapegoating of outgroups. Indeed radical right voters and 
parties distinguish themselves by their welfare chauvinist attitudes. Analyses of the 
demand- and supply-side show that this attitude is not just a reflection of anti-immigrant 
preferences, but express preferences that stem from normative beliefs about welfare 
redistribution, chiefly the principle of reciprocity. Attitudes tied to the breach of the norms 
of equality and self-reliance are relevant only for some radical right parties, and some 
groups of voters. However, the mechanism of exclusive solidarity is common: scapegoating 
of perceived norm violating outgroups. This perception can be associated with preferences 
for either generous or limited welfare benefits, but it stems from the same logic of 
perception that some individuals or outgroups have broken the social contract. Welfare 
chauvinism entails that immigrants are not part of the social contract, and relies on a 
nationalistic conception of solidarity. This study shows that it constitutes the cornerstone 
of welfare politics for radical right parties and voters, yet exclusive solidarity is not 
restricted to ethnic or national boundaries. 
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Further perspectives 
The relevance of protective and exclusive welfare politics to explain the radical right 
success acts the dawn of Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula’. Even if it may still apply to some 
cases (e.g. the Swiss SVP), most radical right parties have shifted their position in order to 
appeal to economically insecure voters. However, not all radical right voters are precarized 
and economically insecure, which puts radical right parties in tension not to alienate parts 
of their constituents. Radical right constituencies cannot be considered as a homogeneous 
whole. As Ivarsflaten (2005, p. 490) put it: “The germ of destruction or limitation that these 
[radical right-wing] parties carry within them is without doubt their electorates’ deep 
division over taxes, welfare provisions and the desirable size of the public sector.” In view 
of their recent electoral successes and the possibility of several radical right parties 
entering office of certain West-European countries in the near future, it is highly relevant – 
both academically and socially – to develop more precise knowledge about the internal 
class-based divisions within radical right-wing constituencies. 
This study has provided a generalization of protection and exclusion dynamics which had 
only been considered through limited case studies. The scope of conditions to which these 
theories apply could be qualified. Such a comparative approach should be expanded to 
missing – yet highly relevant – cases in which welfare politics seems to have influenced 
electoral successes, such as the Brexit vote or the election of Donald Trump. Additionally, it 
is very possible that these theories apply particularly to a certain period, or particular 
dispositions of the political and party systems, which can only be assessed through further 
study of the relevance of the welfare politics for the radical right’s electoral successes. Such 
an endeavour should rest on even more diversified methodological approaches: survey 
experiments would offer a critical addition to the exclusive preferences of voters, and 
analyses of media coverage or leader interview would strengthen expectations that the 
programmatic shifts of radical right parties is the result of a strategic adaptation.  
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